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VABSTRACT
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND THE PRIVATE COLLEGE
AND UNIVERSITY
(September 1976)
Eric S. Mondschein, A. A. , Wesley College
B.A., American University
M.Ed., Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor David M. Schimmel
It has been well established that students enrolled
at public colleges and universities are entitled to the
protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
However, students attending private institutions of higher
learning today do not enjoy the same safeguards.
This study examines whether there are sufficient
educational and legal justifications for applying consti-
tutional standards to private colleges in the areas of
due process, equal protection, and expression. First, the
past legal relationship of the college to its students is
examined. The doctrines of in_ loco parentis , contract and
inherent authority are presented to illustrate the concepts
utilized by the courts in analyzing this relationship.
Although these doctrines have been modified because of the
application of the Constitution to public institutions, the
private college/student relationship is still controlled
vi
by them.
Second, the study presents the rights of students
enrolled in public colleges. Their rights to due process,
equal protection and expression are developed. Next, the
rights of private college students are examined.
Third, after highlighting the distinction between
the rights of public and private college students, the
educational and legal arguments for and against the pro-
position that private colleges should be judged by consti-
tutional standards are presented.
After analyzing the arguments for applying the
Constitution to private colleges through the use of the
state action concept, the study suggests that it is legally
and educationally desirable to apply constitutional stan-
dards to the private college/student relationship. Recog-
nizing the risks in applying all constitutional standards,
the study presents the reasons for at least affording due
process. Several possible approaches for having the prin-
ciples of due process apply to the private college/student
relationship are developed: through state and federal
legislation, the judicial process, and by executive action
of the federal government.
The goals of the study are: (1) To provide students
studying in the area of higher education an in-depth
examination of the public/private controversy in higher
education; (2) to provide those interested in the area of
vii
school law with a bibliography and case law analysis of
the concept of state action as it applies to higher educa-
tion and the constitutional rights of students to due
process, equal protection, and expression; and (3) to
present and analyze the educational and legal arguments
related to the application of the Constitution to private
colleges and universities.
The study concludes that constitutional standards
of due process should apply and that the possible risks
of such an application are outweighed by the probable
benefits to private colleges, their students and American
society. Finally, it suggests that further research should
be undertaken to determine what effects, if any, private
colleges have had on student knowledge, attitudes, and
behavior in relation to the democratic values embodied in
the Bill of Rights in comparison to public colleges.
viii
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
It has been well established that students enrolled
at public colleges and universities are entitled to the
protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 1
However, students attending "private" institutions of
higher learning today do not enjoy the same safeguards.
The Constitution protects persons against actions
taken by the federal and state governments and their agen-
cies. It does not prohibit actions taken by private per-
sons, whether acting individually or on behalf of corpor-
ations . 2
State colleges are agencies of the state and, there-
fore, their actions are considered state actions which
subject them to the restraints contained in the Fourteenth
x See Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education
,
294
F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert, denied 368 U.S. 930 (1961);
Brown v. Knowlton
,
370 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Goss
v. Lopez
,
95 S.Ct. 729 (1975).
2
"Persons" are of two kinds, natural and artificial.
A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons
include a collection or succession of natural persons
forming a corporation to which the law attributes the capa-
city of having rights and duties. Henry C. Black, Black's
Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition (St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub7
Co., 1951), p. 1300.
2Amendment. 3 Actions taken by private colleges have been
determined to be actions of private persons, thus not
coming under the prohibitions of the Constitution. 4
There are more than fourteen-hundred private colleges
in the nation, enrolling about one—fourth of all the stu-
dents in higher education. 5 It is the legal interpretation
of what is private about a private college that has made it
possible for their students to be suspended or expelled
without a hearing, punished for expressing their views on
controversial issues, and disciplined for violating rules
and regulations in ways that would be declared unconsti-
tutional at state institutions.
Yet, these same private colleges purport to educate
students to become better citizens and leaders in all
realms of our society. Dr. Donald Cowling, once President
of Carleton College, declared:
3 Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education , supra note 1.
Fourteenth Amendment, section 1, states:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const, amend.
XIV, sec. 1.)
4 See Browns v. Mitchell , 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969)
,
and Powe v. Miles, 407 F . 2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968)
.
5 Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, The Capitol
and the Campus , (New York: McGraw-Hill, April 1971), p. 63.
3The Amer ican college, especially the separately
organized and privately supported college, is indiq-
enous to the United States, and is one of the mostimportant agencies our country has developed forpreserving and making effective its basic social andpolitical philosophy
. . . that have led to the
American way of life. 6
The disparity between what is professed by the private
college and what is practiced therein is a crucial issue
facing our society today. While this country is founded on
a Constitution and Bill of Rights which embody the social
and political philosophies of our society that Dr. Cowling
describes as the "American way of life," 7 some of the values
inherent in the Bill of Rights are not practiced in many of
the private colleges. Instead, they have often chosen to
suppress unpopular ideas of students and suspend or expel
them without the benefit of a hearing. The effect such
practices have had on their students has been explored by
the President's Commission on Higher Education. The Com-
mission found that:
To teach the meaning and the processes of democracy,
the college campus itself should be employed as a
laboratory of the democratic way of life. Ideas and
ideals, and the habit of cooperation in a common
6 Donald Cowling and C. Davidson, Colleges for Freedom ,
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. vii.
7Arval A. Morris, The Constitution and American Educa-
tion, American Casebook series, (St. Paul, Minnesota:
West Pub. Co., 1974), pp. 113-114.
4enterprise can be gained
But this learning cannot
of higher education that
principles. 8
most surely in practice,
take place in institutions
are operated on authoritarian
One possible outcome of the disparity between what
is taught in the classroom and what is practiced at private
colleges may be reflected in a study conducted by the American
Council on Education. The Council reported that:
Private universities are the most likely to have
violent or disruptive protests.
. . . [The study] said
that 34.4 percent of the private universities had
experienced violent protests, and 70.5 percent had had
disruptive protests. [In contrast], public universities
had 13.1 percent experiencing violence and 43 percent
undergoing disruption. 9
Higher education is important to our society, for it
provides the learning experiences for students to develop
the skills and abilities necessary to live and practice
effectively in a democracy. However, people cannot be
expected to develop an understanding of democracy and the
values inherent in the Bill of Rights if "their campus life
is carried on in an authoritarian atmosphere." 10
8 Higher Education for American Democracy. A Report from
the President's Commission on Higher Education , (Washington,
D .C . : Government Printing Office, 1948) , p. 51.
9 Ian E. McNett, "A.C.E.'s Studies of Protesters Stir
Faculty, Student Critics," Chronicle of Higher Education 3
(September 15, 1969): 8.
1
°Arval A. Morris, supra note 7 at 14.
5Purpose of the Study
This study will examine whether there are sufficient
educational and legal justifications for applying consti-
tutional standards to private colleges in the areas of
student discipline, equal protection, and expression. Its
purpose is to: (1) Provide students of higher education an
indepth examination of the public/private controversy in
higher education; (2) provide those interested in school
law with a bibliography and case law analysis of the concept
of state action as it applies to higher education, and the
constitutional rights of students to due process, equal
protection, and expression; and (3) present and analyze
the educational, and legal arguments related to the appli-
cation of the Constitution to private colleges and univer-
sities .
Methodology
The purpose of the study will be pursued first by
reviewing the case law and the literature of the educational
and legal professions primarily related to the subject. The
literature will be studied to examine the position of higher
education in general, and private colleges in particular,
in this society. The status of private education will
be
explored by utilizing case law to demonstrate the relation-
ship of the institution to its students. The
concepts of
*
• 6
in loco parentis
, contract, inherent authority, and trust
fiduciary will be examined.
Second, the study will present the rights of students
enrolled in state colleges and universities. Their rights
to due process, equal protection, and expression will be
developed. Following this presentation, the rights of
students attending private institutions will be examined.
Third, after highlighting the distinction between
the rights of public and private college students, the
study will present educational and legal arguments for and
against the proposition that private colleges should be
judged by constitutional standards.
Finally, the study will explore a possible approach
and rationale for justifying the application of the
Constitution to private colleges in the area of student
discipline. The impact of applying constitutional standards
to the private college will be highlighted by examining the
possible consequences this will have on the private insti-
tution and its students.
Delimitations
This study will examine only the rights of college
students to due process, equal protection, and expression.
It will not explore such areas as freedom of (and from)
religion, association, and unreasonable search and seizure.
Although the distinction between public and private
7includes more than higher education, the study will be
limited to exploring the relevance of the distinction in the
student/college relationship. Furthermore, it will not
include an examination of state or federal legislation or
the common law as it might apply to this topic. The relation-
ship of faculty and administrators to the private institution
\
will also be left for further research.
8CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDENT/
UNIVERSITY RELATIONSHIP
Introduction
s
The rights of students to freedom and justice, and
the authority of colleges and universities to discipline at
their discretion, has been a pivotal issue in higher educa-
tion for the last one-hundred years. Educators and the
courts have been involved in controversies that reflect the
problems of our diverse culture. Courts have been called
upon to adjudicate problems that are intrinsic to higher
education, namely. How much control does a college have over
its students? And conversely, What rights and freedoms does
a student enjoy while attending a college or university?
It was not until the latter half of this century
that a real distinction was made between the rights of
students attending public or private colleges . 1 Until that
time, both relationships were controlled by the legal doc-
trines of in loco parentis , contract , and inherent authority .
Trust and fiduciary theories have also been used to explain
the relationship, though to a much lesser extent than the
*The distinction between public/private colleges will
be explained in chapters IV and V.
9first three doctrines.
In Loco Parentis
The doctrine of in loco parentis is a legal concept
dating back to Roman law. 2 It means that someone is dele-
gated the responsibility and authority over a child in place
of his/her parent. Although it has predominately been a
phenomenon of elementary and secondary schools, it has a
surprisingly strong legal basis in higher education. This
theory places "the school in the place of the parent and
affords school control over students commensurate with that
of the parent in all matters pertaining to functions of the
school." 3 There are several early cases in point.
In North v. Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois
,
4 Foster North was a student at the University of
Illinois in 1891. The university had a rule that required
all students to attend nonsectarian religious exercises
in the university chapel. North objected to the compulsory
attendance requirement and refused to attend the services
on the grounds that it was a violation of section 3, article
2
,
of the State Constitution which read in part: "No person
2 Henry C. Black, Black’s Law Dictionary , Fourth Edition,
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1951), p. 896.
3 Kern Alexander and David Solomon, College and Unive r-
sity Law
,
(Virginia: Michie Co., 1972), pp. 410-411.
4 27 N.W. 54 (111. 1891)
.
10
shall be required to attend or support any ministry or
place of worship against his consent." 5
The university suspended him for failure to comply
with its regulations. The Supreme Court of Illinois ruled
in favor of the university, and described the student/
university relationship this way:
By voluntarily entering the university or being
placed there by those having the right to control
him, he necessarily, surrenders very many of his
individual rights. How his time shall be occupied,
what his habits shall be, his general deportment,
that he shall not visit certain places, his hours of
study and recreation,— in all these matters, and many
others, he must yield obedience to those who for the
time being are his masters; and yet, were it not for
the fact that he is under the government of the
university, he could find ample provision in the
Consitution to protect him against the enforcement
of all rules thus abridging his personal liberty.
In this case [he] could not say the faculty had not
the right to require him to spend his time in attend-
ing chapel, because they, and not himself, had the
right to say how he should spend his time. 6
Another case, Gott v. Berea College
,
7 decided in
1913, has also been cited as authority in this field. 8 Of-
ficials of Berea College created a regulation prohibiting stu-
dents from entering restaurants and places of amusement in the
5 Id . at 55.
6 Id . at 56.
7 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913).
8 See for example: Alvin L. Goldman, "The University and
the Liberty of its Students: A Fiduciary Theory," 54 Ky. L.J.
643, 650 (1968); Warren A. Seavey, "Dismissal of Students:
'Due Process'," 70 Harv. L. Rev. , 1406, 1408 (1957); and
Robert M. O'Neil, "Private Universities and Public Law," 19
Buffalo L. Rev., 155 (1950).
11
city of Berea which were not controlled by the college.
Several students, who violated this regulation, were dis-
missed from the college. Gott, the owner of a restaurant
in Berea, brought an action against the college seeking to
prevent enforcement of the regulation. The court, finding
for the college, noted that:
College authorities stand in loco parentis
concerning the physical and moral welfare and mental
training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why,
to that end, they may not make any rule or regulation
for the government or betterment of their pupils that
a parent could for the same purpose. 9
Judge Nunn further stated that for the purposes of this
case.
The school, its officers and students, are a
legal entity, as much so as any family, and, like
a father may direct his children, those in charge
of boarding schools are well within their rights
and powers when they direct their students what to
eat, and where they may get it, where they may go,
and what forms of amusement are forbidden. . . .
A discretionary power has been given them to regu-
late the discipline of their college in such a man-
ner as they deem proper; and so long as their rules
violate neither devine nor human law, we have no
more authority to interfere than we have to control^
the domestic discipline of a father in his family. 15
In John B. Stetson University, et. al . v. Hunt , 1
1
a female student was summarily suspended from John B.
9 161 S.W. 204, 207 (Ky. 1913).
1 °Ibid.
^102 So. 637 (Fla. 1924) .
12
Stetson University on account of her alleged connection
with disciplinary troubles in a dormatory. The Supreme
Court of Florida cited the above quotation from Gott in
finding for the university. The court went on to explain
that because college officials stand iri loco parentis to
their students,
• • • every presumption must be indulged in favor
of the school authorities to the extent that they
acted in good faith, for the best interest of the
school and the pupil as they saw it, and no re-
covery can be had for error of judgments, ... 12
Summary and comment
. In the past, the concept of
J-oc° parentis pervaded the student/university relation-
ship in this country. But, today the influence of this
theory in higher education is not generally regarded as
having substantial impact on court decisions involving
college students. 13
A major factor that has led to the demise of the
in loco parentis doctrine has been the lowering of the age
of majority. As D. Parker Young explains:
This change has many implications for higher
education. Instead of the majority of students
being minors, colleges are filled with practically
all adult students. This inherently causes both
the student and the institution to have a different
perspective than was formerly held. 14
1
2
Id. at 641 .
1
3
Kern Alexander and David Solomon, supra note 3 at 411.
14
D. Parker Young, "Higher Educational Law: Current
Developments and Issues," Contemporary Legal Problems in
Education
,
(U.S.A.: N.O.L.P.E., 1975), p. 196.
13
Whatever may have been the basis for in loco parentis
historically. Has it not long since passed away? Professor
Henry Steele Commager believes that it has:
[In loco parentis ] was transferred from Cambridge
to America and caught on here even more strongly
for very elementary reasons: College students were,
for the most part, very young. A great many boys
went up to college in the colonial era at the age of
13, 14, and 15. They were, for the most practical
purposes, what our high school youngsters are now.
They did need taking care of, and the tutors were in
loco parentis . This habit was re-enforced with the
coming of education for girls and of co-education.
Ours was not a class society. There was no common
body of tradition and habit, connected with member-
ship in an aristocracy or an upper class, which
provide some assurances of conduct.
All of this now is changed. Students are 18
when they come up, and we have a long tradition
with co-education from high school on. Students
marry at 18 and 19 now and have families. Further-
more, we have adjusted to the classless society and
know our way about. Therefore, the old tradition
of in loco parentis is largely irrelevant. 15
Judge Doyle, in Soglin v. Kaufman , 1
6
appears to be
in agreement with the observations of Professor Commager
when he noted:
Underlying these developments in the relation-
ship of academic institutions to the courts has been
a profound shift in the nature of American . . .
colleges and universities and in the relationships
between younger and older people. These changes
seldom have been articulated in judicial decisions
but they are increasingly reflected there. The
1
5
as quoted in William Van Alstyne, "Procedural Due
Process and State University Students," 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
368 (1968).
1 6 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd 418 F.2d 163
(7th Cir. 1969)
.
14
facts of life have long since undermined the concepts,such as in loco parentis
, which have been invokedhistorically for conferring upon university author-ities virtually limitless disciplinary discretion. 17
Although the United States Supreme Court has not
ruled directly on the contemporary state of the doctrine
l°co parentis
,
in so far as it concerns public
schools
,
• • • it has indirectly modified its possible
applications. It is clear that parents have
enormous power over the lives of their children.
Principles of constitutional law are violated in
private homes with impunity. They are never in-
tended to operate in one's home, however desirable
it might be that they permeate our lives. The court,
however, has declared that the "Constitution does not
stop at the public school door." Thus, to the extent
that civil rights enter school doors, the principle
of in loco parentis is modified. Even though some
courts still use the latin phrase in explaining the
reasons for their decisions, it is likely that the
doctrine is in decline. The courts are more likely
to rely on the general principle that constitutional
rights apply to students in public schools and then
proceed with the application of that principle to the
unique factors of each controversy. 18
Contract
The "contract theory," apparently rather popular
with the courts, is based on traditional legal principles.
This theory assumes that the student and the college are
1
7
Ibid .
le David Schimmel and Louis Fischer, The Civil Rights of
Students, (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 10
.
15
Parties to a contract. The school advertizes and seeks
students, thereby making an offer; and the student, by
registering, accepts. The student agrees to pay tuition
and other fees, and the college agrees to provide instruction
and, subsequently, a degree if the student remains in good
standing academically and abides by the school's rules and
regulations
.
1
9
In recent years, courts have drawn a distinction
between private and public schools, maintaining that the
contract theory can apply to private schools but must be
modified by constitutional considerations at public insti-
tutions. 20 Although the courts now differentiate between
private and public colleges, the contract theory prevailed
for over one-hundred years without such a distinction. 21
For example, Goldstein v. New York University 22
concerned the expulsion of a student from the law school
in 1902 for allegedly passing a note to a female student
19 Kern Alexander and David Solomon, supra note 3 at 413.
20 See chapters IV and V.
2 im. m, Chambers, "Legal Rights of College and University
Students," N.O.L.P.E. School Law Journal 1 (Fall 1970): 82.
22 77 N.Y.S. 80, rev'd 78 N.Y.S. 739 (N.Y. 1902).
16
and then denying that it was sent by him. 23 The court, in
establishing the relationship of Goldstein to the law school,
stated:
The relation existing between the university and
the student is contractual. Plaintiff became a student
in the defendant's law school through an invitation
contained in a circular issued by the authority of the
university, in which it was stated that tuition [in-
struction] ..would be given to law students who were at
least 18 years of age and of good moral character, and
who would pay the university the sum of $100 a year.
He was accepted as a student
. . . when a student matric-
ulates under such circumstances, it is a contract be-
tween the college and himself. 24
Once the court had established the relationship as
contractual. Judge Patterson went on to explain that.
Obviously, and of necessity, there is implied in such
contract a term or condition that the student will not
be guilty of such misconduct as would be subversive of
the discipline of the college or school, or would show
him morally unfit to be continued as a member thereof.
The power of suspension or expulsion of students is an
attribute of government of educational institutions. 25
2 3 The cases cited herein are for the purpose of high-
lighting the position the courts have taken in the past
involving both public and private colleges. There are many
recent cases that have upheld the right of private colleges
to remove students without affording them the same protec-
tions as required of public colleges, because of the con-
tractual nature of the relationship. See for example: Carr
v. St. John's University, 187 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1962); Jones v.
Vassar College? ’299 N.Y.S.2d 283 (N.Y. 1969); Greene v. Howard
University , 271 F. Supp. 609 (D. D.C. 1967) , moot 412 F.2d
1128 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School , 478
F . 2d 137 (2d Cir. 1973); Brown v. Villanova University , 378
F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Greeny
a
v. George Washington
University
,
512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975); and Slaughter v.
Brigham Young University , 514 F . 2d 622 (10th Cir. 1975). The
current rights of students enrolled in private colleges will
be explained in Chapter IV.
2 4 Goldstein v. New York University, supra note 22 at 740.
2 5 Id. at 741.
17
Thus, the court upheld the expulsion as a proper
consequence of Goldstein's actions. By not living up to
the standard that "the student will not be guilty of such
misconduct as would be subversive of the discipline of the
college," the school was well within its authority to expel
a student for such a breach, as determined by the university
in good faith. 26
In Booker, et. al, v. Grand Rapids Medical College
,
27
two Black students, upon satisfactorily completing the first
year of a three year course in veterinary medicine, were
denied admission to the second year solely because white
students objected to their presence. The Supreme Court of
Michigan stated:
When one is admitted to a college, there is an
implied understanding that he shall not be
arbitrarily dismissed therefrom. The required
fees may be paid annually, and may be no more
than fair fees for the advantages received by
the students during the year, and yet is clear that
the fees for the first year are, in fact, paid and
received with the understanding that the work of
the year will not be made fruitless, and graduation
and a degree made impossible, by an arbitrary
refusal to permit further attendance. . . . There
is no good reason why the law should not recognize,
as growing out of these relations, a right of
relators resting in contract to be continued as
students
.
2 8
Because the court recognized the contractual relation-
ship between the students and the college, it refused the writ
2 6 Id. at 742. 2 7 120 N.W. 589 (Mich. 1909).
28 Id. at 591.
18
of mandamus sought on the ground that this extra ordinary
remedy is not available for the enforcement of a private
contract. 29 The court did intimate that the students were
entitled to redress, and the available remedy would be an
equitable decree of specific performance of the contract. 30
Anthony v. Syracuse University 31 is a case often
\
cited by proponents and opponents of the contract theory.
At Syracuse University, a student, Beatrice Anthony, in the
school of home economics was dismissed at the beginning of
her fourth year of residence in 1922. It was done without
the assignment of any cause other than the vague statement
that, "It was understood that she had caused trouble in
the sorority house where she lived, and that she was not
thought to be a typical Syracuse girl." 32
In defending its action, the university referred to
a statement in the school catalog which all students were
required to sign:
Attendance at the University is a privilege and
not a right. In order to safeguard its scholarship
and its moral atmosphere, the University reserves
the right to require the withdrawal of any student
at any time for any reason deemed sufficient to it,
2
9
Ibid.
3 0 Ibid .
3
1
231 N.Y.S. 435 (N.Y. 1928).
32 Id. at 437.
19
and no reason for requiring such withdrawal need
be given. 3
lb is interesting to note that both parties claimed
that a contract existed. Anthony argued that a contract
existed between her and the university for her continued
attendance. Therefore, she was seeking a specific perfor-
mance of this contract. 34 The university, however, relied
on what it claimed to be one of the terms of the contract;
namely, that Anthony's continuance as a student was strictly
at the pleasure of the institution, which she agreed to when
she signed her registration card. 35
The court, in citing the Goldstein case, recognized
that;
Under ordinary circumstances and conditions a
person matriculating at a university establishes a
contractual relationship under which, upon compliance
with all reasonable regulations as to scholastic
standing, attendance, deportment, payment of tuition,
and otherwise, he is entitled to pursue his selected
course to completion, and receive a degree. . . . 36
The court, however, went on to differentiate this case
from the general rule because here was an express contract,
a right to dismiss the student at any time for any cause
whatever, and the court is obliged to enforce contracts as
3 3
Id. at 438.
3 4 Ibid .
3 5 Ibid.
3 6 Ibid.
20
they are written. 37 Judge Sears also explained that:
(The relation between plaintiff and defendant was
wholly contractual. it was voluntary in its
(^inception on both sides. A student is not
required to enter the University, and may in fact,
!
after entry, withdraw without reason at any time.
The University need not accept as a student one
desiring to become such. It may, therefore, limit
the effect of such acceptance by express agreement,
and thus retain the position of contractual freedom
in which it stood before the student's course was
entered upon. I can discover no reason why a student
may not agree to grant to the institution an optional
right to terminate the relations between them. The
contract between an institution and a student does
not differ in this respect from contracts of employ-
ment . 3 8
In alleging a breach of contract, the court stated
that the burden of proof rests upon the student. She must
show that her dismissal was not for a reason within the
terms "scholarship" or "moral atmosphere" of the catalog
statement. 39 In other words, she must affirmatively prove
her conduct had been such that her summary dismissal could
not possibly be justified as falling within the meaning of
the catalog reservation. 40
In 1958, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a
similar dismissal of a student from the University of Miami.
3 7 Id. at 439.
3 8 Ibid .
39 Id. at 440.
40 For a detailed account of this case see, Edward Elliott
and C. C. Chambers, The Colleges and the Courts , (N.Y.:
Carniege Foundation, 1936), p. 33.
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Robinson v. University of Miami 41 concerned the expulsion of
a student who had written a letter to the editor of a local
newspaper dealing with the subject of atheism. Thomas
Robinson was an undergraduate at the college's school of
education; and to become a teacher, it was necessary for him
to intern in a local public school. Before beginning his
internship, the principal of the school in which he was to
do this practice teaching, read his article on atheism. The
principal notified the university and suggested that they
make an inquiry into Robinson's views. The college conducted
a hearing and concluded that Robinson was an atheist and
that he was "fanatical in his views." Under these circum-
stances, the university requested Robinson to withdraw from
the school. 42 Robinson believed that this was a breach of
his contract and sought to have the university held to
specific performance of the contract. As in the Anthony
case, the court rejected this argument, but did recognize
that the university and student relationship was contractual
in nature. 43 It also noted that the university bulletin had
the following provision in effect at the time:
41 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1958). This case is of particular
interest because the action was implemented by a public
^
school official in notifying the university of Robinson's
personal beliefs, yet the court did not even consider this
point. The question is raised whether or not the action was
solely private or was there state duplicity in the case.
See Chapter IV.
4 2 Id . at 444.
4 3 Ibid.
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Terms of Admission:
. . . the University reserves the right to change
any provision or requirement at any time within the
students' term of residence. The University further
reserves the right to ask a student to withdraw at
any time. 4 4
The court recognized this provision as part of an
express contract and noted that the "courts are obliged to
enforce contracts as they are written." 45 Chief Judge
Carroll declared:
The rule seems to be well established that where
a university reserves the right to have a student
withdraw at any time after his acceptance, it may
do so without the necessity of furnishing the student
with a reason or cause. . . . 46
Summary and comment . In the past, courts consistently
held that the relationship of students in either public or
private colleges was contractual. This theory, as inter-
preted by the courts, provided students with little protection.
Colleges were granted the power of dismissing students "at
any time for any reason" without having to present their
reasons to the student. Although the courts required the
schools not to act arbitrarily or capriciously, it would be
a difficult task to prove the action unwarranted when the
4 4 Id . at 443.
4
5
Ibid.
4 6 Id. at 444.
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student is not informed of the grounds of his/her dismissal.”
The contract theory is still the controlling concept
concerning the relationship of students to private colleges.”
It has been modified in relation to public colleges because
of the acknowledgement that students in public schools "do
not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse
gate .
"
4 9
There have been other objections to the use of the
contract theory in education. It has been argued that the
environment in which a student deals with a university is far
removed from the marketplace, and it is unwise, therefore, to
judge student/university conflicts by the law of the market.
"Contract rules were developed to deal with the hard bargins
made by self-interested persons operating in a commercial
47 In contrast to the above cases, it is interesting to
note that as early as 1887 a court of common pleas in Pennsyl-
vania ordered a student reinstated after he had been summarily
expelled by the president of the college for alleged mis-
conduct. The court said:
There is no reason to fear that the perpetuity or
utility of educational institutions depends upon their
successful assertion of the right to exclude students
without pursuing the forms of trial recognized not only
as wise, but demandable as well, and never denied in any
other relation in life. ( Commonwealth ex. rel. Hill v.
McCauley, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 77 [1887]. See also, Edward
Elliott and C. C. Chambers, supra note 40 at 30.)
This opinion was rejected as precedent then, and is still not
recognized by the courts in public or private colleges today.
48 This will be examined in chapters IV and V.
4 9 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
24
setting." 50 Moreover, to the extent that courts have
insisted on deciding these cases under this concept, they
have not applied the multitude of devices developed in
recognition of the fact that the further a bargain is
removed from the open market, the more sensitive courts
should be to the demands of fair and honest conduct. 51
It has also been urged that because a university is expected
to deal fairly with its students and because it sets the
terms of enrollment, the courts should not enforce con-
tractual reservations without requiring a showing by the
school of compelling reasons for invoking sanctions and a
fair fact-finding procedure. 52
Inherent Authority
Courts have consistently held that educational
institutions have the inherent authority to maintain order
and freedom and to discipline those students whose conduct
50 Alvin Goldman, "The University and the Liberty of
Its Students—A Fiduciary Theory," 54 Ky . L . J
.
643, 653 (1968).
51 Ibid., i.e. unconscionable contracts; use the construc-
tive conditions to rewrite contracts; unenforcable terms when
they are unreasonable. See also Friedman, "Private Govern-
ment on the Campus," 72 Yale L.J. 1362, 1377-79,(1963). (The
student contract with the university is surely a contract of
adhesion, and hence, should not be given literal effect in
enforcing it against him.
)
5 2 Ibid.
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is disruptive. 5
3
. .
. [A] College has the inherent power to promulgate
rules and regulations; that it has the inherent power
to discipline; that it has power appropriately
to protect itself and its property, that it may expectthat its students adhere to generally accepted standards
of conduct.
. . .
54
The foundation of this authority has been held to be
based on the long-standing custom of schools. 55 This custom
may be thought to be institutionalized in the common statu-
tory charter grants to colleges of power
. . . to make and establish such Ordinances, Orders
and Laws as may tend to the good and wholesome
government of the said College and all the Students. 56
5
3
John B. Stetson University, et. al, v. Hunt
,
102 So.
637 (Fla. 1924 ) ; Goldberg v. Regents of^University of Cali -
fornia
,
57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. 1967); Zanders v. Louisiana
State Board of Education
,
281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
,
393 U.S. 503 ( 1969 ) ; Esteban v. Central Missouri State College ,
415 F.2d 1077 (5th Cir. 1969); Slaughter v. Brigham Young
University, 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1975); Goss v. Lopez, 95
S.Ct. 729 (1975).
54 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College , 415 F.2d 1077,
1089 (5th Cir. 1969)
.
55 John B. Stetson University, et . al. v. Hunt, 102 So.
637 (Fla. 1924).
5 6 The Charter of Dartmouth College, reprinted in Charters
and Basic Laws of Selected American Universities and Colleges ,
by Charles Elliott (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1974),
pp. 227-250. It should be noted that the term "government" as
used above,
. . .
incorporates a trinity of functions: The enactment
of laws, rules, and regulations, judicial construction
of the same as applicable to their suggested violation,
and their execution. [It] ... is broad enough in
its scope ... to include administrative rules and
regulations affecting scholastic procedure as well as
disciplinary measures affecting only moral conduct or
order. (14 Corpus Juris Secondum , section 26, p. 1360.)
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Some courts have said that there is also inherent in
any college or university a duty on the part of its students
to conduct themselves in a manner conducive to the proper
administration of the institution.
In the school
,
as in the family, there exists onthe part of the pupils the obligations of obedience
to lawful commands, subordination, civil deportment,
respect for the rights of other pupils and fidelity'
to duty. These obligations are inherent in any proper
school system, and constitute so to speak the common
law of the school. 57
This authority is not limitless. Schools may
establish only those rules and regulations that have a neces-
sary relationship to the legitimate goals and purpose of the
institution. As long as a college enforces suitable rules
and regulations in a reasonable and not arbitrary manner,
the courts will not interfere with their proper adminis-
tration. 5 8
In Woods v. Simpson
,
5 9
a female student in 1924 was
not allowed to register for her third year of study because
she was accused of writing letters to a local newspaper
accusing male officials of the university of making objection-
able suggestions to female students, and otherwise exhibiting
"a wrong moral attitude toward them. " The administration
contended that the letter was a serious attack on the
5 7
John B. Stetson University, et. al. v. Hunt, supra note
55 at 640.
5
8
Anthony v. Syracuse University
,
supra note 31.
5 9 126 A. 882 (Md. 1924)
.
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institution and depicted a dangerous condition which was not
conducive to the proper atmosphere of an institution of
higher learning.
The court, in upholding the university's dismissal
of the student, defined the authority inherent in educational
institutions:
The maintenance of discipline, the upkeep of the
necessary tone and standards of behavior in the body of
students in a college, is of course, a task committed
to its faculty and officers, not to the courts.
. . .
Only in extraordinary situations can a court of law
ever be called upon to step in between students and
the officers in charge of them. When it is made clear
that an action with respect to a student has been, not
an honest exercise of discretion, looking to the proper
ends, but beyond the limits of that discretion, or
arising from some motive extraneous to the purposes
committed to that discretion, the courts may be called
upon for relief. In such case, the officials have, as it
is sometimes stated, acted arbitrarily, or abused their
discretion, and the courts may be required to remedy
that. 6 0
The courts are not anxious to become administrators
and handle acts of student disobedience and disruption. They
will interfere only where school officials act outside their
authority. 6
1
6 0 Id . at 883.
6 1
. .
.
the closer a school rule or administrative action
comes to infringing upon basic . . . rights, the more
justification [officials] must have for the rule or
action taken. ... (D. Parker Young, "Rights and
^
Responsibilities on the College Campus: An Overview,
N.O.L.P.E. School Law Journal 3 (Spring 1973): 64.
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In R^an v. Hofstra University
.
62
a student was
accused of destroying school property. He was expelled and
fined over $1,000 for the damages done. The expulsion
was the result of a hearing held contrary to the process
called for in the university's disciplinary procedures.
The provision stated that the student is given a choice of
s
appearing before either the Student Judiciary Board or
members of the Dean of Students' Staff. 63
The dean testified that Ryan was not given the
choice of the Student Judiciary Board, based on a school
rule which provided that a student "whose records suggest
significant emotional or psychological disturbances" will
be heard only by the dean's staff. 64 The dean did not
consult any psychologist or psychiatrist before making the
disciplinary reference to his staff committee.
Hofstra'
s
rules do provide an "appeal" procedure for
non-academic disciplinary situations. However, no appeal was
granted Ryan for over six months. In ordering the student
reinstated, the court declared:
6 2 324 N.Y.S. 2d 964 aff'd 328 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y. 1971).
Although the case is used herein to denote a school's
unreasonable use of authority and discretion, it will be
used in the subsequent chapters for its significance in
applying the state action concept. It is also of interest
because it rejects the implied contract theory as used in
"less enlightened times."
63 Id. at 970.
6 4 Ibid.
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.
Ho^stra University, though termed a "private 1
wShnnf
1
?!
cannot expel, bar and fine a student'ithout following fair and reasonable procedures.It cannot be arbitrary. it must abide by consti-tutional principles of fair conduct implicit in
our society. 65 ^
The court found that the dean's denial of access to
the Student Judiciary Board was arbitrary and an abuse of
his discretion, because there was no "finding of proof that
any such record of emotional problems existed prior to his
referral to the Dean's Staff." 66 Justice Harnett also found
that the amount of time that elapsed between the first hearing
and the appeal was unreasonable.
• • • the procedure adopted will necessarily deprive
[Ryan] of a semester's attendance in class. . . .
This delay works the imposition of a significant
penalty which entirely by-passes the review procedure,
and must be termed arbitrary and capricious, and
abusive of discretion on the part of Hofstra Univer-
sity. 6 7
Summary and comment . American colleges and univer-
sities have a tradition of autonomy. It has been said that
they merit this autonomy because they are experts in higher
education, and only with expertise can one make adequate
judgments. 68 The courts have accepted this notion. In doing
65 Id. at 968.
6 6 Id. at 975.
6
7
Ibid.
6
8
John Brubacher, The Courts and Higher Education , (Calif.
Jossey-Bass Inc., 1971), p. xi.
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so, they have acknowledged the inherent authority that
institutions have in promulgating regulations for "the
necessary tone and standards of behavior in a body of
students" and in the power to discipline "to protect itself
and its property." The bench has also pointed out that this
authority is not limitless. The universities' rules and
actions may not be arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.
Although the schools were given broad discretionary powers
the past, the courts have modified the college's authority
when it conflicts with the student's private rights.
. . . the University too is a creature of law.
The University must abide by legal procedures and
respect private rights. If the University is to
break the law by violating private rights, it has no
superior legal or moral position to one whose law
breaking consists of breaking windows. 69
Trust/Fiduciary 7 0
Another theory of the relationship between the
university and its students is one of trust. The college is
considered the trustee with the student the beneficiary
( cestui que trust)
.
7
1
There appears to be only one case that raised this
concept. It was a 1947 decision: People ex. rel. Tinkoff v.
6 9 Ryan v. Hofstra University , supra note 62 at 968.
7
0
Although these concepts are interrelated, they will be
examined separately for the purposes of this study.
71 Kern Alexander and David Solomon, supra note 3 at 413.
31
Northwestern University
.
72 The Supreme Court of Illinois,
rejecting the position that a person has a right to admission
to a private college, noted iii dicta that,
Plaintiff has no right based upon a trust relation-
ship with the university. Tinkoff did not become a
beneficiary upon compliance with the entrance require-
ments. We think he remained, at most, a potential
beneficiary until he was actually admitted . 73
This theory has not been raised in any modern cases,
and as Professor Alexander declares,
. . . it has the overriding weakness, that normally a
trustee does not have the legal power to change bene-
ficiaries as does the university when in its disciplin-
ary function it is forced to expel a student . 74
A fiduciary theory has also been advanced by a few
legal educators to explain the student/university relation-
ship. Although the concept does not appear to have been
raised in any student cases, it is worth noting.
In general, a fiduciary is one whose "function it is
to act for the benefit of another in matters relevant to the
relation between them ." 75 The fiduciary relationship is
characterized by the "confidence subsisting between two
parties; that if one party reasonably reposes confidence in
the fidelity and integrity of another, a fiduciary relation
7 2 77 N . E . 2d 345 (111. 1947), cert, denied 335 U.S. 829
(1947)
.
7 3
Id.. at 350.
74 Kern Alexander and David Solomon, supra note 3.
7 5Warren Seavey, "Dismissal of Students: Due Process,
70 Harv. L. Rev. 1406, 1407 (1957).
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exists. The relationship is often evidenced by the making
of confidential disclosures of a moral, social, legal, domestic
or personal nature. 77 Examples of this relationship are:
attorney/client
,
guardian/ward, doctor/patient, husband/wife,
and clergyman/parishiner
.
7
3
Professor Goldman contends that all the elements of
a fiduciary relation are present in the student/university
relationship:
It is no small trust—no small display of confidence
to place oneself under the educational mentorship of a
particular university. The value of an educational
experience is directly affected by the school's
conscientious, faithful performance directed toward the
students' benefit. The educator has the responsibility
of setting out tasks, the performance of which will
presumably benefit the student. The student performs
these tasks in reliance upon the educator's good faith
performance of his duties as a teacher. In addition to
often making confidential disclosures about his back-
ground, health, financial situation ... a university
[also] commands the student to disclose opinions on art,
religion, history, philosophy, political theory and the
like, in order to discover the extent of his learning
ability and potential. In making these disclosures,
the student reposes confidence in the school's skill
and objectivity in evaluating, scoring and reporting
those manifestations of . . . ability and potential. . . .
This reposing of confidence is that which is placed in a
fiduciary. 7 9
If the proposition is accepted, that there is a
fiduciary relationship between the student and university.
76 Alvin Goldman, supra note 50 at 668.
7
7
Ibid.
78 Id. at 669.
79 Id. at 671.
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Professor Goldman argues that:
Contrary to past practice, the courts have apositive duty to scrutinize carefully any action which
might blemish the high standard of conscience and honor
which should govern the conduct of a fiduciary (the
university) in dealing with entrustees (its students). 80
Thus, the university should have the responsibility
of showing that any action it takes is just and reasonable,
and in the best interests of the students as well as itself. 81
Goldman summarizes the relationship of the student
and university in this manner:
The university, like any fiduciary, and not the student,
should have the burden of demonstrating that any disci-
plinary action: (a) was reasonably imposed for cause
consistent with its function of maintaining an open-
minded atmosphere conducive to the acquisition and use
of tools for freely inquiring into and exploring ideas;
and (b) was imposed in a manner consistent with scholarly
integrity and fair process. In addition, as a fiduciary
the university ought to afford the student every oppor-
tunity and means of rehabilitation. On the other hand,
the university's fiduciary responsibility should not
extend beyond those activities in which it acts in a
fiduciary capacity with relation to the students. 82
Regretably, no court has had the opportunity to rule
on the applicability of this theory to date. The concept
would unquestionably have a great impact on private and public
colleges. It would require the schools to treat students
with one of the highest degrees of fairness and equity
recognized by law. 83
8
°Id. at 674.
8 2 Ibid .
8 2 Ibid.
8 3 Ibid
.
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Conclusion
The student/university relationship has been con-
trolled by the concepts of in loco parentis
, contract
,
and
inherent authority
. By utilizing these legal doctrines,
the courts have granted schools wide discretionary powers.
In their concern for protecting the autonomy of colleges,
they have been unwilling to impose their judgments upon the
institutions. In the past, judicial noninterference has
resulted in students being dismissed "at any time, for any
reason," or for not being a "typical Syracuse girl." One
judge has said that the court can no more control a school's
disciplinary actions than "control the domestic discipline
of a father in his family."
The courts have, however, declared that a college's
authority and power to discipline students is not limitless.
If a school's actions are arbitrary, unreasonable or capri-
cious, the judiciary could be called upon for relief. But
what is unreasonable or arbitrary? As the cases presented
illustrate, the courts allowed schools to act in ways that
today would be considered unconscionable by educators.
Professor Seavey aptly states:
Our sense of justice should be outraged by the denial
to students of the normal safeguards. . . . [It is]
shocking to find that a court supports . . . [the
college] in denying to a student the protection given
to a pickpocket. 84
8
''Warren Seavey, supra note 75.
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The courts today have modified these doctrines. 85
Constitutional standards are now applied to public colleges.
Although constitutional restraints do not now apply directly
to private institutions, the values embodied in the Bill of
Rights have been used as "benchmarks" in determining the
"reasonableness" of private administrative actions. 86 in
order to understand what these standards are, the following
chapter will examine the rights of students enrolled in
public colleges and universities.
85 This "modification" will be examined in the following
chapter
.
86 Friedman, supra note 51 at 1383-90.
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CHAPTER III
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND STUDENT RIGHTS
Introduction
Courts have recognized a university's right to have
order and discipline on its campus for the purpose of main-
taining the proper functioning of the educational institution.
When the rights of students conflict with the legitimate
interests of the university, the courts must determine whose
rights should be protected. Therefore, the study of college
students' rights should be explored through recent court
decisions which delineate their rights in public higher
education. This chapter will present the leading cases that
have established and defined the rights of public college
students to due process of law, equal protection, and freedom
of expression. 1
Although the chapter will explore these rights, students
are also guaranteed rights such as freedom of (and from )
religion, association and unreasonable search and seizure .
For key cases on freedom of religion see: Hamilton v. Regents,
of the University o f California , 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Everson
v7 Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Engel v. Vitale
,
370 U.S. 421 (1962
)
School District of Abinaton Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). For recent cases on freedom of
association, see: University of Mississippi Chapter of_^h^
M.C.L.U. vT University of Southern Mississippi , 452 F.2d j 64
73 th Clr. 1971); Mulkey v. Board of Regents of State ..of
Florida, 344 F. Supp. 1296 (D. Fla. 1972); Healy. v. James., 92
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Due Process: Minimal Requirements
N2
-§-tate sha11 •
•
.
• deprive any person of life,liberty, or property without due process of lawT~nordeny to any person within its“jurIsdictTon“tKe"equalprotection of the law.^ (Italics mine.)
Judicial disposition of due process cases turns on
the kind of violation that is alleged. Thus, any explanation
of due process of law must consider its two aspects--sub-
stantive and procedural. Although neither is readily de-
finable, it is essential to understand a general distinction
between the two
.
Substantive due process refers to the content or
subject matter of a law or an ordinance; whereas procedural
due process, by far the more litigated of the two, refers to
the manner in which a law, an ordinance, an administrative
practice, or a judicial task is carried out. In both the
substantive and procedural due process concepts, the judicial
test of constitutionality or legality is the same: Is the
S-Ct. 2338 (1972); Gay Students Organization of the Univer-
sity of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
T973T. For recent cases on freedom from unreasonable search
and seizure, see: Moore v. StudentT~A~f fairs Committee~of Troy
State
-
University
,
284 F. Supp. 225 (M.D. Ala. 1968); People
v. Cohen
,
292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. 1968); Speake v. Grantham ,
317 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.M. 1970); Keene v. Rodgers
,
316 F.
Supp. 217(N.D.Me. 1970); Piazzola v. Watkins , 442 F.2d 284
(4th Cir. 1971); People v. Boettner and Gottshall , 362 N.Y.S.
2d 365 (N.Y. 1974); State v. Boudreaux , 304 So. 2d 343 (La.
1974); State v. Johnson , 530 P.2d 910 (Ariz. 1975).
2 U.S. Const, amend. XIV, sec. I.
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governmental action "arbitrary," "capricious," or "un-
reasonable" either in content or in procedure? 3
Due Process and the state college student
. The
leading case concerning constitutional due process rights
of students is Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education
,
4
In this case, Dixon and five other students of Alabama State
College allegedly disrupted the college campus by taking
in a sit-in demonstration at the cafeteria of the
county court house. Because of this action, they were
expelled from college without a hearing. Furthermore,
the letter by which they were notified did not specify the
reasons for their expulsion.
The students filed suit to restrain the State Board
of Education from obstructing their right to attend college.
The assertion that they had a right to due process was
This constitutional guarantee demands only that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious,
and that means selected shall have real and substantive
relation to object. (Henry C. Black, Black's Law
Dictionary
,
Fourth Edition, [St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub.
Co.
,
1951]
,
p. 590)
.
The phrase "due process of law," when applied to
substantive rights, as distinguished from procedural
rights, means that the state is without power to de-
prive a person of life, liberty or property by an act
having no reasonable relation to any proper govern-
mental purpose, or which is so far beyond the necessity
of case as to be an arbitrary exercise of governmental
power. (Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 159 P. 2d
292 [Ariz. 1945]).
4 294 F . 2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert, denied 368 U.S.
930 (1961).
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unsuccessful in the district court, and the students
appealed. 5
The United States Court of Appeals held that due
process requires notice to the students and the opportunity
for a hearing before students of public colleges could be
expelled for misconduct. The court set forth what it
\
considered to be the notice and hearing required by due
process at state institutions of education. Since this
decision is relied upon heavily by other courts, it will
be quoted at length.
The notice should contain a statement of the specific
charges and grounds which
,
if proven
,
would justify
expulsion under the regulations of the Board of
Education . The nature of. the hearing should vary
depending upon the circumstances of the particular
case . The case before us requires something more than
an informal interview with an administrative authority
of the college. By its nature, a charge of misconduct,
as opposed to a failure to meet the scholastic standards
of the college, depends upon a collection of the facts
concerning the charged misconduct, easily colored by
the point of view of the witnesses. In such circum-
stances, a hearing which gives the Board or the admin-
istrative authorities of the college an opportunity to
hear both sides in considerable detail is best suited
to protect the rights of all involved. This is not
to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the
right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. Such
a hearing with the attending publicity and disturbance
of college activities, might be detrimental to the
college's educational atmosphere and impractical to
carry out. Nevertheless, the rudiments of an adversary
proceeding may be preserved without encroaching upon
the interest of the college. In the instant case, the
student should be given the names of the witnesses
against him and an oral or written report on the facts
5 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960)
.
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to which each witness testifies. He should also begiven the opportunity to present to the Board, or atleast to an administrative official of the colleqehis own defense against the charges and to produce!
either oral testimony or written affidavits of
ri
tn
o
SSe
?
hlS behalf * the hearing is not beforethe Board directly
,
the results and findings of thehearing should be presented in a report open to the
students' inspection. If these rudimentary elements
°f
>
fair play are followed in case of misconduct ofthis particular type, we feel that the requirements
of due process of law will have been fulfilled.
6
(Italics mine
.
)
In reaching this decision, the court indicated the
value of education for the students and pointed out the
probability that these students would not gain admission to
other colleges. The court recognized that the college had
the power to expel students, but that the school could not
arbitrarily exercise the power.
Admittedly, there must be some reasonable and
constitutional ground for expulsion or the court
would have a duty to require reinstatement (of
students) . The possibility of arbitrary action is not
excluded by the existence of reasonable regulations.
There may be arbitrary application of the rule to
the facts of a particular case. Indeed, that result
is well nigh inevitable when the Board hears only one
side of the issue. In the disciplining of college
students there are no considerations. . . which should
prevent the Board from exercising at least the funda-
mental principles of fairness by giving the accused
students notice of the charges and an opportunity to be
heard in their own defense. Indeed, the example set by
the Board in failing to do so, if not corrected by
the courts, can well break the spirits of the expelled
students and of others familiar with the injustice,
and do inestimable harm to their education.''
6 Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F . 2d 150,
159 (5th
-
CTr . 19611 .
”
7 Id. at 157.
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Although this case was not decided by the United
States Supreme Court, by denying certiorari 6 to the plea
from the Board of Education, the Court of Appeals' decision
was sustained.
^PP^-^^tion of the Dixon ruling . In the same year,
a similar decision was reached in the case of Knight v.
State Board of Education 9 involving students at Tennessee
A. & I. State University who had been summarily dismissed
following their arrest for participating in "sit-ins" at
public facilities. The students argued that the action
taken by the university through its discipline committee
violated their rights under the due process clause by not
giving the students proper notice of the charges against
them, or an opportunity to present their side of the case.
The court held that the students' claim to a
deprivation of procedural due process was well taken.
. . . the conclusion appears inescapable upon the
present record that the rudiments of fair play and
the requirements of due process vested in the
plaintiffs (students) the right to be made aware of
the evidence made against them and to be afforded an
opportunity to present their side of the case before
such drastic disciplinary action was invoked by the
university authorities. It is undeniable, in the
first place that the plaintiffs in being suspended
8Writ of. Certiorari : An order from a higher court to a
lower court to provide, for the higher court, the record of
a particular case ajudicated by the lower court.
9 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) .
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. . . were deprived of a valuable right of interest,i.e., the right or interest to continue their
training at a university of their choice.
. . .
10
Whether attendance at a state university be described as a
right or privilege, the court held that the students had the
right of due process, including notice and hearing.
Expansion of the Dixon ruling
. The courts have
further defined the due process ruling in the Dixon case by
determining which procedural safeguards apply and when.
The extent of procedural rights required by courts depends
on the severity of the possible punishment, the nature of
the substantive issue presented, the actual fairness of the
procedure adopted, and the circuit in which the case was
heard. 1
1
In 1967, a federal district court in Missouri
stipulated ten essential elements of student due process.
The case, Esteban v. Central Missouri State College , 12
involved two students who were suspended for taking part in
mass demonstrations which caused substantial disruption and
destruction of school property. The students filed suit
alleging that they were deprived of procedural due process
because the hearing afforded them was insufficient.
1 ° Ibid .
1
1
"Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in
Colleges and Universities," (N.Y.: A.C.L.U., 1970), p. 27.
1 2 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
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The critical defect in the hearing procedure usedby the college was the fact that ;Ke person to whomthe students were permitted to make their explanation
or showing
,
Dr. Chalquist, was only one of a number
of persons on the board which made the recommendation
of suspension. 1
3
Accordingly, the court directed the college to grant each of
the students a new hearing. The court prescribed the
procedure to include:
1. A written statement of the charges to be furnished
the student on at least ten-days notice;
2. A hearing before the college president, as the one
person possessing authority to expel or suspend;
3. Advance inspection by the student of any affidavits
or exhibits which the college intended to submit at
the hearing;
4. The student 1 s right to have counsel present with
him at the hearing ;
5. The right to present his version of the case and to
present affidavits, exhibits, and witnesses as he
desired;
6. The right to hear the evidence;
7. The president's determination of the facts solely
on the evidence presented at the hearing;
8. A statement by him in writing of his findings as to
guilt or innocence of the conduct charged;
9. A statement of any disciplinary action; and
10.
Permission to each side to make a record of the
events at the hearing. 1
4
(Italics mine.)
1
3
Ibid.
1
4
415 F . 2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1969).
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Right to Counse l and Due Process
. Another federal
district court did not go as far as the Esteban ruling
concerning the right to counsel. French v. Bashful
,
1
5
decided in 1969, was a civil rights action by suspended
and expelled state university students who alleged that they
were denied procedural due process at hearings held before
the university discipline committee. The district court
held that where the prosecution of the students before a
discipline committee was conducted by a senior law student,
who was chosen to prosecute because of his familiarity with
legal proceedings, due process was denied the students by
not permitting the students to retain counsel. The failure
of the committee to put its findings into a report open to
the students' inspection was an additional infirmity.
The court relied on Dixon and a 1967 case, Wasson
v. Trowbridge . 1
6
The court in the Wasson case held that a
student did not have the right to be represented by counsel
in expulsion proceedings. The court, however, qualified
its holding by saying:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of
fairness is a function of all of the other aspects
of the hearing. Where the proceeding is noncriminal
in nature, where the hearing is investigative and not
adversarial and the government does not proceed
15 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969).
1 6 382 F . 2d 807 (6th Cir. 1967).
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through counsel
. .
. due process does not requirerepresentation by counsel. 17
The court held that in view of the special circum-
stances of this case
,
procedural due process requires that
those students be permitted to be represented by retained
counsel. The court made it clear that they did not believe
a university should be required to appoint counsel for
students, for this would be too high a price for a college
to pay for the privilege of enforcing discipline among its
students
.
Right to a hearing before an interim suspension
.
Some fairly recent decisions have held that unless the element
of danger to persons or property is present, students are
entitled to a hearing before suspension may be imposed.
Thus, students at Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh,
suspended for destroying university property, were ordered
reinstated by the federal district court pending a fair
hearing unless the university could show that the students'
presence on campus posed a danger. 18
17 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D. La. 1969). The court then
went on to cite a constitutional authority, Professor Charles
Wright, who noted that:
. . . a leading case holding that counsel need not be
allowed qualifies this by saying that this is true so
long as "the government does not proceed through
counsel.". . . If universities . . . provide their own
lawyer to assist a tribunal, in those cases at least
the student can hardly be denied the right of his own
counsel. . . .
1
8
Marzette v. McPhee
,
294 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
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This test was also invoked in a decision involving
students at the University of Wisconsin at Madison who were
suspended for 13 days pending a full hearing on charges of
participation in violent disruptions. The case, Stricklin
v * Regents of University of Wisconsin. 19 was an action by
students against the university which argued that their
suspensions violated the due process clause. The students
asked for a temporary restraining order requiring their
reinstatement in the university. The court held that the
suspension of a student from a state university for a period
of 13 days as a sanction of misconduct, without specifi-
cation of charges, notice of hearing, or hearing violated
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 The
court further held that students should not be suspended
from a state university without a specification of charges,
notice of a hearing or a hearing unless (1) an element of
danger to persons or property is present, or (2) unless it
can be shown that it is impossible or unreasonably difficult
to afford it prior to an interim suspension. 21
Due process—access to university functions and
facilities . In Watson v. Board of Regents of University of
1 9 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
2
°Ibid.
2 1 Ibid
.
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Colorado
,
2 2
a non-student was denied access to the University
of Colorado by the university's special admissions
committee apparently for the reason that he had a prior
criminal record. The university president wrote Watson a
letter directing him to "
. . . refrain from entering upon
the campus of the University of Colorado." This action was
taken pursuant to the Board of Regents' regulation which
stated that,
. . . the university, acting through its administrative
officers, reserves the right to exclude those deemed
detrimental to its well-being or incompatible with
its function as an educational institution. 2
3
Watson claimed that the Regents' regulation was
unconstitutionally vague and that his right to procedural
due process had been denied since he was not afforded a
hearing prior to being denied access to the university.
Does the constitutional right to procedural due
process require a public university to offer a hearing to
a non-student prior to excluding him from university
property? The court held that it does where the university’s
facilities are generally open to the public at large.
Accordingly, on this basis the court held that a non-student's
right to access to university functions and facilities which
are open to the public— at— large cannot be permanently denied
2 2 512 F . 2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1973).
2 3 Ibid.
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without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. 2 ' On the other hand,
the court acknowledged that the language of the Regents-
regulation was not impermissibly vague since the university
is often a focal point for the discussion of public ques-
tions, cultural events, recreational activities, and general
educational functions ," 25 and as such, opens its doors to
the public.
The court likened the procedural due process neces-
sary in this case to that which is required in suspension
or expulsion of students for disciplinary reasons. It
stated that a valid Regents* regulation should provide for
a hearing. But like the decision in Stricklin
,
the court
made it clear that:
. . . when a genuine emergency appears to exist and
it is impractical for university officials to grant
a prior hearing, the right of non-students to access
to the university may be suspended without a prior
hearing so long as a hearing is thereafter provided
with reasonable promptness. 6
Immunity of school officials . In a recent decision,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that in the
specific context of school discipline, school officials are
not immune from liability for damages if they knew or rea-
sonably should have known that the action they took within
24 Id. at 1162.
25 Id. at 1164.
26 Donald D. Gehring, College Students and the Courts ,
(New York: College Admin. Pub., 1973), p. 104.
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their sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the student affected or if they
took the action with the malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights. 27
Although the case concerned high school students, it
applies to higher education as well. Statute 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 declares that:
Every person, who under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State
or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit of
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
In the past, school officials were considered immune
from liability under this section. The Strickland decision
has modified that immunity:
A compensatory award will be appropriate only if
the school [official] has acted with such an imper-
missible motivation or with such disregard of the
student's clearly established constitutional rights
that this action cannot reasonably be characterized
as being in good faith. 28
2
7
Wood v. Strickland
,
95 S.Ct. 992 (1975).
2
8
Id. at 994. The doctrine of governmental immunity is a
commonTaw concept evolved from the English theory that the
"King can do no wrong." Hence, the government cannot be held
liable for acts committed by its officers or employees.
Because a school district is a local subdivision of the state,
the school district is covered by the cloak of governmental
immunity. For an interesting discussion on governmental im-
munity, see: Kern Alexander, Ray Corns, and Walter McCann,
Public School Law , (St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1969),
pp. 335-357.
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Enough time has not elapsed for the ramifications
of this decision to be realized. But, the decision should
surely enhance the right of students to be free from
arbitrary and unreasonable actions by school officials.
Summary
. Students at a state college or university
are constitutionally guaranteed the right to notice and a
hearing, prior to suspension or expulsion, by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution. Procedural due process
requires that students be given written notice of the
specific charges against them, the time and place of the
hearing, evidence which will be presented against them, and
the possible action to be taken if the charges are supported.
The notice should be provided to the students in enough time
to allow the students to prepare a proper defense before
the hearing.
Unless there is a clear and present danger to life
or property, students should not be suspended until they
have had a hearing. If a clear and present danger does exist,
the students may be dismissed; but a hearing must follow in
a reasonable time.
The hearing should provide the students an oppor-
tunity to present their defense and present witnesses in
support of their case. There is no general requirement, at
this time, that the student be warned against self-
incrimination or be permitted to cross-examine witnesses.
There is also no general requirement that students be
51
permitted to be represented by counsel. Only in unusual
cases where the university proceeds through counsel must
the students be permitted representation.
If the hearing is not before the highest adminis-
trative authority at the institution, the student is
1
;
i
'
entitled to appeal the decision to that authority. The
.
—
p „ 0)earing is not Considered to be criminal in nature and
t2 y/ l rtherefore the student is not entitled to all the raiments
of an adversary proceeding. The hearing should simply be
a fair and ample opportunity for both sides to present the
facts of the case.
There is no precise definition of due process of
law. Courts have preferred to define it by the gradual
Proc®S£> of judicial inclusion and exclusion because "pro-
cedures are subject to refinement and improvement in the
never ending effort to assure not only fairness, but every
semblance of fairness." 29 In general, due process means fair
procedures—those procedures that are reasonable, just, and
not arbitrary. 30
29 Due v. Florida A. & M. University, 233 F. Supp. 396
(N.D. Fla. 1963)
.
30 See also, Soglin v. Kaufman
,
295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis.
1968), aff'd 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969); Scott v. Alabama
State Board of Education
,
300 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ala. 1969);
Lowery v. Adams
,
344 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Winnick v.
Manning
,
460 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1972); Edwards v. Board of
Regents of Northwest Missouri State University , 397 F. Supp.
822 (W.D. Mo. 1975) .
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Equal Protection
its jurisdiction
1^ ' ’ * f
eny t0 any person withinthe equal protection of the laws. 31
Throughout our history, American schools have often
been segregated in a variety of ways—by religion, by social
class and wealth, and by sex and race. No method of segre-
gation in the schools has thus far led to greater social,
educational, political or legal conflict than segregation
by race. That our elementary and secondary schools are
the scene of racial conflicts and court orders is
perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the devisiveness of
this issue.
Although racial discrimination is still prevalent
in our society, courts have uniformity ruled that schools
cannot discriminate on the basis of race. Today, another
form of discrimination is also being challenged. Colleges
are now being forced to defend their policies and actions
which are based on classifications of sex. This section
will explore the aspects of race and sex discrimination as
it pertains to public higher education.
Race
. In 1896, the Supreme Court of the United
States recognized the concept of "separate but equal"
3 1 U.S. Const, amend. XIV, sec. 1.
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as a constitutional principle. 32 However, 46 years before
that land-mark decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts established the doctrine in relation to
public education.
The case was Roberts v. City of Boston
.
33 By 1850,
Boston had maintained a system of racially segregated public
schools. Benjamin Roberts, a Black, attempted to enroll
his daughter in a White primary school. The child's
application was repeatedly rejected, and Roberts retained
counsel to sue the City of Boston school officials. 34
Roberts argued that the separation of children in
the public schools on the basis of color or race established
a caste system and denied equality as guaranteed by the
Constitution of Massachusetts. He also claimed that
although the teachings of both a White and Black school are
the same, they are nevertheless not equivalent. 35 Separate
schools
,
3 2 Plessy v. Ferguson
,
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850). It is interesting to
note that a court in a northern state first propounded the
doctrine of "separate but equal."
34 He retained a Black attorney and Mr. Charles Summer,
later the fervent abolitionist United States Senator. See,
Levy and Phillips, "The Roberts Case: Source of the Separate
but Equal Doctrine," 56 Am. Hist. Rev. 510 (1951).
3 5 Roberts v. City of Boston
,
supra note 33 at 203.
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t0 °ne class must differntii iy, i its spirit and character, fromthat public school known to the law, where allclasses meet together in equality. 36
The court rejected this plea, and in finding for the school
committee created the "separate but equal" doctrine.
Chief Justice Shaw explained:
The great principle, advanced by the learned and
eloquent advocate of the plaintiff, is, that by the
constitution and laws of Massachusetts, all persons
without distinction of age or sex, birth or color,
origin or condition, are equal before the law. This,
as a broad general principle, such as ought to appearin a declaration of rights, is perfectly sound; it
is not only expressed in terms, but pervades and
animates the whole spirit of our constitution of
free government. But, when this great principle
comes to be applied to the actual and various con-
ditions of persons in society, it will not warrant
the assertion, that men and women are legally clothed
with the same civil and political powers, and that
children and adults are legally to have the same
functions and be subject to the same treatment; but
only that the rights of all, as they are settled and
regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal
consideration and protection of the law, for their
maintenance and security. What those rights are, to
which individuals, in the infinite variety of circum-
stances by which they are surrounded in society, are
entitled must depend on laws adapted to their respec-
tive relations and conditions. 37
Thus, a northern court sanctioned the use of racial
classifications and sustained a dual system of public
education.
In Plessy v. Ferguson , the Supreme Court of the
United States was called upon to determine whether a
3 6 Ibid
.
3 7 Id. -it 206.
55
Louisiana law segregating railroad passengers violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
issue was essentially the same as was brought in the Roberts
case, except now the Supreme Court would set judicial
precedent that would decide the fate of Blacks for over
half a century.
In 1890, Louisiana passed a law that in part
required:
... that all railway companies that carry passengers
in their coaches in this state shall provide equal
but separate accommodations for the white and colored
races
. . . .
3 8
The statute was to be enforced by train officials, and
violation of this law could result in a fine of $25 or
imprisonment for no more than twenty days.
A conflict arose when Mr. Plessy refused to leave
a coach reserved for Whites, and occupy a "seat in a coach
assigned for persons not of the white race." 39 Because of
his refusal, he was ejected from the train and "hurried
off and imprisoned in the parish jail. . . . " 40 plessy
believed that the statute under which he was arrested and
convicted was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
3 e Plessy v. Ferguson , supra note 32 at 540.
3 9 Id., at 538.
4 ° .Ibid
.
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equal protection clause. 41
In affirming the constitutionality of the statute,
the Supreme Court applied the test of reasonableness to
the legislation. Justice Brown, delivering the majority
opinion, saw the case resting on the question of what
constitutes reasonable regulation under the Fourteenth
Amendment:
So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself to
the question whether the statute of Louisiana is
a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this,
there must necessarily be a large discretion on the
part of the legislature. In determining the question
of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with
reference to the established usages, customs and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the pro-
motion of their comfort, and the preservation of
public peace and good order.
Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a
law which authorizes or even requires the separation
of the two races in public conveyances is unreason-
able.
. . ,
42
Justice Brown also cited the Roberts case as evidence
that the "separate but equal" doctrine had been accepted in
states with very liberal attitudes toward the rights of
Blacks. 43 The court explained the concept of "separate but
equal" in relation to the Fourteenth Amendment:
4 Although Plessy alleged other violations (i.e. the
assertion that he "was seven-eighths Caucasion and one-
eighth African blood") the constitutional question is the
hallmark of this decision.
4 2 Id. at 550.
4 3 Id. at 544.
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The object of the amendment was undoubtedlv t-n
the°^
G
^\absol^te equality of the two races'beLelaw
^
bab ln the nature of things it could not haveeen intended to abolish distinctions based upon
°F to enforce social, as distinguished frompolitical equality, or a commingling of the two racesupo° terms unsatisfactory to either? Laws permitting,
th^/ I
6 *1
f®qK^
rlng their separation in places where
9
ey are liable to be brought into contact do notnecessaniy imply the inferiority of either race totne other, and have been generally, if not universally,
recognized as within the competency of the statelegislatures in the exercise of their police power.The most common instance of this is connected with the
establishment of separate schools for white and colored
children
r which has been held to be a valid exercise ofthe legislative power even by courts of states where
the political rights of the colored race have beenlongest and most earnestly enforced. 44
The court ruled that "separate but equal" did not
violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although some argued that this "tended to stamp
the colored race with a badge of inferiority," the court
dismissed this, "because the colored race chooses to put
that construction upon it." The court went one step
further and added that "if one race be inferior to another
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put
them upon the same plane." 45
In eloquent anger. Justice Harlan rejected the major-
ity opinion:
The arbitrary separation of citizens on the basis
of race, ... is a badge of servitude wholly incon-
sistent with the civil freedom and the equality of
4 4 Ibid.
4 5 Id. at 551-52.
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the law established by the Constitution. it cannotbe justified upon any legal grounds.
. . . The thindisguise of "equal" accommodations for passengersm railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, nor
atone for the wrong this day done. 46
In memorable language, he went on to note that:
. . . in view of the Constitution, in the eye of
the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens
... the law regards man as man, and takes no
account of his surroundings or of his color when
civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the
land are involved. 47
In a prophetic statement. Justice Harlan was correct when
he declared:
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered
will in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as
the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred
Scott case
.
4 8
The separation of the races in the United States
extended not only to Black and White, but to Yellow, Brown
and Red as well. A case in point is Gong Lum v. Rice. 49
4 6 Id. at 562.
4 7 Id . at 559.
48 Ibid. In Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1857),
the Supreme Court held that any individual of African descent
could not be considered a citizen of the United States or of
any state in the sense that the word citizen was used in the
U.S. Constitution. The case also upheld the right of people
to own slaves, maintaining that any state that tried to
abolish slavery violated an individual's right to "property."
It may be of interest to note that Justice Harlan's
grandson would be serving as a Supreme Court Justice when the
"separate but equal" doctrine was declared "inherently unequal.
4 9 275 U.S. 78 (1927)
.
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In 1927, the Supreme Court held that states could segregate
children of the Caucasian race from children of not only
Black but Yellow and Brown as well. Martha Lum, an Oriental,
claimed denial of equal protection when she was forced to
go to a Black school in Mississippi. The Supreme Court
held that the issue is no different whether the state
segregated "White from Black" or White from Yellow." The
same principles that were established in Plessy applied
here; the state was not unreasonable in segregating the
races, and the exercise of this disrection was not a vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In attempting to define and apply the doctrine of
"separate but equal" to higher education, it became apparent
that the states were not financially able to provide equal
educational opportunities. The Supreme Court was confronted
with this problem in 1938. What was the minimum that a
state could provide and be in compliance with the "equal"
portion of the Plessy doctrine? The conflict arose over
whether the University of Missouri could be compelled to
accept a Black student to its law school. 50 Lloyd Gaines
was a resident of Missouri, and upon completion of his
undergraduate study, wished to enroll at the law school of
the university. There was no claim that Gaines lacked the
proper qualifications for acceptance except that he was of
5 °Missouri ex. rel . Gaines v. Canada , 305 U.S. 337 ( 1938 )
.
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the Black race, and a Missouri statute provided for the edu-
cation of the races separately but equally. He was, there-
fore, refused admission. An alternative proposal was
presented that, in accordance with another statute, would
provide the funds necessary for Gaines to acquire a legal
education in a school of an adjacent state which provided
unsegregated facilities. Gaines refused the alternative
and brought his case to court arguing that he had a right
to attend the state law school and practice in the state
because he was a "citizen and taxpayer of Missouri." His
denial was thus a violation of the equal protection clause.
Chief Justice Hughes praised the State of Missouri for
the financial arrangements it had offered Gaines, but found
that since there was no law school for Blacks in the entire
state, the equal protection clause was in fact violated. The
court, continuing to maintain the "separate but equal" doc-
trine explained that Missouri could have fulfilled its obli-
gation to provide legal instruction to its Black citizens
"by furnishing equal facilities in separate schools, a method
the validity of which has been sustained by our discussions." 5
In lieu of this decision, Missouri was forced to allow Gaines
into the all White law school.
Twelve years past, and again the Supreme Court was
faced with applying the Plessy doctrine. The case was
5
1
Id. at 340.
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Sweatt v. Painter
.
52 In compliance with the Gaines decision,
Texas had established a law school for Blacks. Herman
Sweatt refused to attend the separate law school, and
demanded to be admitted to the all White University of
Texas Law School. His demands were rejected, and he
brought his case to court claiming that the Black law
school was inherently unequal to that of the all White
school and, thus, a violation of the equal protection clause.
The Texas trial court found that the newly-estab-
lished state law school for Blacks offered Sweatt "privi-
leges, advantages, and opportunities for the study of law
substantially equivalent to those offered by the state to
White students at the University of Texas." 53 The court,
utilizing a strict interpretation of the "separate but
equal doctrine," rejected his petition. Sweatt, believing
he still had a right to go to the all White school, appealed
his case to the Supreme Court.
The Court first compared the facilities of the two
schools. The all White school was staffed by sixteen full-
time and three part-time professors,
. . .
some of whom are nationally recognized author-
ities in their field. It's library contained over
65,000 volumes. Other facilities available to the
students were a law review, moot court, scholarship
5 2 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
.
5 3 Ibid.
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funds, honor society and its alumni occupy the mostdistinguished positions in the private practice ofthe law and in the public life of the state. It mav
law^schools.
^°nSidSred °ne ° f the nati°n ' s
In comparison, the law school for Blacks was not yet
accredited, had a faculty of five, and a library of some
16,500 volumes. The school also had a moot court and legal
aid association, and one alumnus who had become a member of
the Texas Bar.
After comparing the two schools, the Court declared:
. . . we cannot find substantial equality in the
educational opportunities offered White and Negro law
students by the State. In terms of number of the
faculty ... scope of the library
. . . the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School is superior. What is more
important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to
a far greater degree those qualities which are incap-
able of objective measurement but which make for great-
ness in a law school. ... It is difficult to believe
that one who had a free choice between these law
schools would consider the question close. 55
The Chief Justice went on to point out some of the intensely
practical considerations that rendered the Black law school
so decidedly inferior:
The law school to which Texas is willing to admit
Sweatt excludes from its student body members of the
racial groups which number 85 percent of the popu-
lation of the state and include most of the lawyers,
witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with
whom Sweatt will inevitably be dealing when he becomes
a member of the Texas Bar. With such a substantial
and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot
5
4
Id. at 633.
5 5 Id . at 6 3 4 .
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conclude that the education offered Sweatt is sub-
stantially equal to that which he would receiveif admitted to the University of Texas Law School
.
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While the court held that there was simply no way
to make the two schools equal and yet separate, it still had
stopped short of declaring the doctrine null and void.
During the same session, the Supreme Court went a
step further in expanding the concept of "equal protection
of the laws." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for
Higher Education
,
57
a Black was admitted to the graduate
school of the state supported University of Oklahoma as a
candidate for a doctorate in education, because no Black
school had such a program. He was permitted to use the
same classroom, library, and cafeteria as White students.
In lieu of a state law requiring that the instruction of
Blacks in institutions of higher education be "upon a
segregated basis," he was assigned to a seat in the class-
room in a row specified for Black students, was required
to sit at a special table in the library, and although
permitted to eat in the cafeteria at the same time as other
students, was assigned to a special table . 58 McLaurin
believed that the school 1 s action by setting him apart from
5 6 Ibid .
5 7 339 u.S. 637 (1950). It may be of interest to note
that Justice Thurgood Marshall was at that time McLaurin'
s
counsel
.
5 8 Ibid.
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the other students solely because of his race was
of his right to equal protection of the laws.
a denial
Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the
Court. He found that the university's treatment of
McLaurin, which set him apart from the other students,
handicapped him in his pursuit of effective graduate
education.
Such restrictions impair and inhibit his abilityto study, to engage in discussions and exchanges,
views with other students, and in general, to learnhis profession. 59
Justice Vinson elaborated on the consequences of
this unequal treatment:
... he is attempting to obtain an advanced degree
in education, to become, by definition, a leader and
trainer of others. Those who will come under his
guidance and influence must be directly affected by
the education he receives. Their own education and
development will necessarily suffer to the extent
that his training is unequal to that of his class-
mates. State imposed restrictions which produce
such inequalities cannot be sustained. 60
In concluding, the Court found that:
. . . the conditions under which this appellant is
required to receive his education deprive him of his
personal and present right to the equal protection of
the laws. We hold that under these circumstances the
Fourteenth Amendment precludes differences in treat-
ment by the state based upon race. Appellant, having
been admitted to a state-supported graduate school,
must receive the same treatment at the hands of the
state as students of other races. 61
Id . at 641.
60 Ibid.
6 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education ,
supra note 57 at 642.
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Thus, the reasoning of the Court in expanding the rights of
Blacks had progressed as far as possible without contesting
the entire "separate but equal" doctrine.
By 1954, the stage had been set in the evolutionary
process for overturning the "separate but equal" doctrine.
The landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka
,
Kansas G 2 would change and challenge the social,
political and legal concepts of society.
Acting under the authority of a 1949 Kansas statute,
the Topeka Board of Education established segregated elemen-
tary schools. The law permitted, but did not require,
separate schools for Black and White students. Brown, a
student, and others filed a class action challenging the
constitutionality of segregated schools. They claimed that
the maintenance of segregated schools by the state was an
infringement on their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection of the laws. The Court did recognize that
"segregation in public education has a detrimental effect
upon Negro children, 63 but it rejected Brown's assertion
*
on the basis of the "separate but equal" doctrine. The court
found that the Black and White schools "were substantially
6 2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Although the Court heard cases
from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware, it will
be sufficient for the purpose of this study to highlight
the Kansas case. The other cases were: Briggs v. Elliott ,
Davis v. County School Board , and Gebhart v. Belton .
e 3 Id. at 484.
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equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula,
and educational qualifications of teachers." 64 Brown,
believing this arrangement was unconstitutional, appealed
to the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the unanomous
opinion of the Court. He rejected the state's assertion
that the case must be decided on the basis of the "separate
but equal" doctrine; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was
not intended to apply to public education when it was
adopted. He stated:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the
clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted,
or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of
its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the Nation. . . , 65
The Court next explained the importance of education
In an often quoted paragraph. Chief Justice Warren declared:
Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of the state and local governments. Com-
pulsory school attendance laws and the great expendi-
tures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today, it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
6 56 4 Ibid. Id. at 493.
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where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal
terms
.
6 6
He then concluded that the segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, does deprive the
minority group students of equal educational opportunity.
"Even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible'
factors may be equal." 67
The Court, relying on the work of social scientists
that had established the negative effects of discrimination
and prejudice on the development of children, quoted, with
approval, an earlier Kansas case:
Segregation of white and colored children in
public schools has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children. The impact is greater when it has
the sanction of law; for the policy of separating
the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority
affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segre-
gation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental
development of Negro children and to deprive them of
some of the benefits they would receive in a racial [ly]
integrated school system. 6 8
Justice Warren eloquently declared:
To separate [Blacks] from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
Thus, the Court rejected the precedent of Plessy v.
Ferguson . "We conclude that in the field of public
education
6 6 Ibid. 6 7 Ibid.
G8 Id. at 494.
6 9 Ibid.
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the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal .
"
7 0 (Italics
mine
.
)
The late 1950 's and early 1960 's were times of
extreme difficulties for the nation. The university campus
was no exception. Colleges confronted with public pressure
tried in vain to thwart the Supreme Court's ruling. Blacks
were suspended or denied admission for fear tftat their
presence would cause disruptions and threaten lives and
property. 71 These attempts at depriving Blacks equal
educational opportunity were rejected by the courts. 72
It is urged that this proposed segregation will
promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts.
Desirable as this is, and as important as is the
preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be
accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights
created or protected by the Federal Constitution. . . .
Thus, law and order are here to be preserved by
70 Id. at 495. In order to carry out the Brown decision,
the Court requested the parties to submit arguments for its
implementation. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown II ("all delib-
erate speed") was essentially concerned with desegregating
secondary schools. The important principles effecting higher
education were established in Brown I.
7
1
See Lucy v. Adams, 228 F.2d 619 (3rd Cir. 1955), cert,
denied 351 U.S. 931 (1956); Florida ex. rel. Hawkins v. Board
of Control of Florida , 350 U.S. 40 (1956)
.
72 Lark v. State Board of Education, 150 F. Supp. 900 (E.
D. La.T957), aff'd 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958); Booker v.
State of Tennessee Board of Education , 240 F . 2d 689 (6th Cir.
1957)"; and Hunt v. Arnold, 172~F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ga. 1959).
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rights!??
^ NGgr° Children of the^ constitutional
In a dramatic attempt to prevent the desegregation
of the University of Alabama, Governor George C. Wallace
declared that he would personally "bar the door." The
district court issued a temporary injunction restraining the
Governor from interfering with the enrollment of students.
Judge Lynne considered the problem in this way:
Thoughtful people, if they can free themselvesfrom tensions produced by established principles
with which they violently disagree must concede
that the governor of a sovereign state has no author-ity to obstruct or prevent the execution of the lawful
orders of a court of the United States. No legalisticformula is required to express the craving of honest,hard working God-fearing citizens for a moral order
logically supported, an attitude long ago expressed
when Coke informed King James tht there was a law
above the King. 74
The two students in this case were enrolled with the
help of the Office of the Attorney General of the United
States. The legal principles were clear— a qualified
minority person could not be denied admission to a state
college or university solely on account of race. No dis-
tinction would be made among undergraduate, graduate or
professional programs. A qualified person could and would
be able to enroll.
7 3 Cooper v. Aaron
,
358 U.S. 1 (1958). In Watson v. Memphis ,
the Supreme Court later declared, "The best guarantee of civil
peace is adherence to, and respect for, the law." 373 U.S.
526 (1963).
74 United States v. Wallace, Governor, 218 F. Supp. 290,
291-92 (N.D. Ala. 1963)
.
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Reverse Discrimination. Although race discrimination
is still prevalent in society, some efforts have been made
to alleviate the injustices of the past. in 1973, an
approach that some label "reverse discrimination," met with
immediate opposition. The case was DeFunis v. Odegaard
.
75
In 1970, Marco DeFunis, a white male, applied to the
University of Washington's School of Law. He was not
accepted, but was told that if he applied in 1971, he would
have a better chance of being admitted. DeFunis reapplied
and again was rejected. DeFunis discovered that the school
had accepted minority students with grades and law school
aptitude test (L.S.A.T.) scores lower than his own. He
also learned that the admissions procedure used for minority
and non-minority candidates was not the same. Minority
persons were compared with other minority candidates, and
not with the non-minority applicants. Because race had
been used in evaluating the applicants and "several minority
students were admitted to the first year class who, if they
had been white, would have been denied admission," 76 DeFunis
believed that the school's policy was a violation of the
equal protection clause. The state district court agreed
with him. Relying on the Brown decision, it declared:
7 5 507 P . 2d 1169 (Wash. 1973), 94 S.Ct. 1704 (1974).
76 D. Parker Young & Donald Gehring, The College Student
and the Courts
,
(N.C.: College Admin. Pub., Inc., 1973),
p. 106.
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After that decision, the Fourteenth Amendment
could no longer be stretched to accommodate the needs
Policies of discrimination will inevi-tably lead to reprisals
. . . the only safe rule istreat all races alike, and that is what is required
under the Equal Protection Clause. 77
The Washington State Supreme Court reversed the
tr ^-al coaE’t s decision, and supported the university's
right to consider the racial and ethnic background of
applicants in their admissions process. The court noted
that the Brown decision did not prohibit racial classi-
fications, but only those which were invidious and stigma-
tized a racial group.
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have
made it clear that in some circumstances a racial
criterion may be used—and indeed in some circum-
stances must be used—by public educational insti-
tutions in bringing about racial balance. . . . The
Constitution is color conscious in order to prevent
the perpetuation of racial discrimination and to
correct the effects of segregation which took
place in the past. 78
One of the purposes of this admissions policy was to
insure the participation of racial and ethnic groups in the
legal profession. These groups had historically been denied
such participation and were under-represented in the legal
community. The court stated that:
Clearly, consideration of race by school author-
ities does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, when
the purpose is to bring together rather than separate,
the races. The minority admission policy of the law
7 7 DeFunis v. Odegaard , supra note 75.
7 8 Id. at 1179-80.
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school, aimed at insuring a reasonable representation
of minority persons in the student body, is not invi-dious. Consideration of race is permissible to carry
out the mandate of Brown
,
and as noted, has been
required in some circumstances. 79
The court agreed that the university had shown why
this admission policy was necessary in order to accomplish
a compelling state interest.
The educational interest of the state in producing
a racially balanced student body is compelling
. . .
we do not find the consideration of race in the admission
of these minority applicants who indicate competence to
successfully complete the law school program to be
arbitrary or capricious. 80
Thus, the court found that the university's admission policy
was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal pro-
tection clause.
This decision was not unanomous. Chief Justice Hale
wrote a scathing dissent.
Racial bigotry, prejudice, and intolerance will
never be ended by exalting the political rights of
one group or class over that of another. The circle
of inequality cannot be broken by shifting the in-
equalities from one man to his neighbor. To aggran-
dize the first will, to the extent of the aggran-
dizement, diminish the latter. There is no remedy
at law except to abolish all class distinctions
heretofore existing in law. For that reason, the
constitutions [Federal and State] are and ever
ought to be color blind. Now the court says it
would hold the constitution color conscious that they
may stay color blind. I do not see how they can be
both color blind and color conscious at the same time
toward the same persons on the same issues. . . .
He also stated that the majority opinion,
7 9 8 1Id. at 1182. 0O Id. at 1184-85. Id. at 1189.
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... suggests a new rule of constitutional interpre-tation to be applied here that, if the administrativeintentions are noble in purpose (a person) may bedeprived of equal protection of the laws and certain
special immunities and privileges may be granted to
others which, on the same terms, are denied to him. 82
Marco DeFunis appealed, and the United States
Supreme Court agreed to hear his case. While the court
battles were raging, DeFunis had been allowed to attend
the law school. When the Supreme Court finally heard his
case, he was in his last year of school. Because he had
brought suit on behalf of himself and not as the repre-
sentative of any class, the Court declared that.
Because the petitioner will complete his law
school studies at the end of the term for which he now
registered regardless of any decision this court might
reach on the merits ... we conclude that the court
cannot
. . . consider the substantive constitutional
issues tendered by the parties. 83
Thus, the Court, by declaring the case moot, 8
4
relieved itself of deciding one of the most controversial
issues confronting our society today.
Justice Douglas, in a lengthy dissent, declared:
. . .
in endeavoring to dispose of this case as moot,
the court clearly disserves the public interest. The
constitutional issues which are avoided today concern
vast numbers of people, organizations and colleges
8
2
Ibid .
8
3
DeFunis v. Odeqaard , 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1707 (1974).
84Moot: "A judgment on some matter which when rendered
for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect."
Courts will only deal with actual controversies. If a
decision will have no effect on the parties involved, the
court will not render a verdict on what in fact has become
an academic question. See, Henry Black, supra note 3 at 1
74
and universities.
. . . Few constitutional questionsin recent history have stirred as much debate and they
c 2
d
^
sappear * They niust inevitably return tot e federal courts and ultimately again to this court. 85
The interpretations of "equal protection" have evolved
and matured since the doctrine of "separate but equal" was
advanced in Plessy v. Ferguson
. This evolutionary process
has not ended, nor have the controversies associated with it.
It is inevitable that the Supreme Court will be called upon
again to declare the meaning of the equal protection clause
regarding race.
Sex. While progress has occurred in the area of
racial equality, almost half the population of the United
States is still faced with discriminatory practices solely
because of their sex. As Susanne Martinez explains:
. . . it is almost inconceivable that a public school
. . . would openly and blatantly exclude students from
particular high schools because of their race, or deny
minority students access to . .
.
programs. . . .
Substitute the word sex, however, and such practices
are not only commonplace, but openly performed and
righteously defended. 86
Colleges and universities have not been immune to
the pervasiveness of this discrimination. In 1958, a Texas
court ruled that the refusal to accept women applicants to
85 Id. at 1122. See also, Fred M. Hechinger, "The Case
Against Preferential Racial Quotas: Justice Douglas' Dissent
in the DeFunis Case," N.O.L.P.E. School Law Journal 4 (1974) :8.
86 Susanne Martinez, "Sexism in Public Education: Liti-
gation Issues," Inequality in Education , no. 18, edited by
Leah Levy (Cambridge, MA: Center for Law and Education, October
1974)
,
p. 5.
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The Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas solely
because of their sex was unconstitutional. 87 Citing the
Brown decision, the court announced that:
... as a matter of law separate but equal facilities
are inherently unequal as applied to males and females,
and as a matter of law any attempt at classification of
males and females for educational purposes ... isirrational and immaterial to the educational objectives
sought, and does violence to . . . and is in clear
violation of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 8
8
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
noting the co-educational and women's schools the applicants
could attend. Thus, by implicitly holding that in regard to
sex the "separate but equal" doctrine applied, the court
stated:
A state, as a matter of public policy, may as a
part of its total system of higher education, main-
tain, for the choice of its citizens, one all male and
one all female institution,
. . . along with institu-
tions which are co-educational.
. . . Such a plan
exalts neither sex at the expense of the other, but
to the contrary recognizes the equal rights of both
sexes to the benefits of the best, most varied system
of higher education that the state can supply. 89
This case is illustrative of the position the courts
took until the late 1960's. Sex was a legitimate classifi-
cation, and if the sexes were treated separately but equally,
there was no constitutional infringement.
87 Heaton v. Bristol , 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 1958).
8 3 Id. at 91.
89 Id. at 100. In rendering its decision, the court also
reviewed the many areas of legislation that classified persons
on the basis of sex, e.g. minimum wage, jury service and types
of employment.
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In 1970, a case that seemed reminiscent of the
Sweatt decision was Kirstein v. The Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia . 90 The State of Virginia operated
institutions of higher education, some of which were all
male, all female and co-educational . The University of
Virginia, traditionally an all male institution, developed
a three-year plan for the admission of females. Four women
filed a class action suit to compel the university to admit
them. Failure to do so, they urged, would be a violation of
the equal protection clause.
The court agreed. Although Virginia did maintain
colleges for women, and co-educational institutions, it
found that the University of Virginia was superior. The
school offered programs not available at any other state
institution, and the school had a national reputation which
the others did not. In so finding, the court explained:
The plain effect of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is "to prohibit pre-
judicial disparities before the law. This means
prejudicial disparities for all citizens—including
women." We hold, and this is all we hold, that on
the facts of this case these particular plaintiffs
have been ... denied their constitutional right to
an education equal with that offered men at Charlot-
tesville and that such discrimination on the basis of
sex violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 9
However, the court proceeded to state:
9 0 309 F. Supp. 184 (D.C. Va. 1970),aff'd Mem. 401 U.S.
951 (1971).
9 1 Id . at 187.
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BecaUse the university had submitted a plan for •'desegregating
the school, the court declined to grant an injunction and
declared the case moot.
By applying the same legal principles, a three judge
federal district court in South Carolina upheld a statute
providing for the maintenance of the all female Winthrop
College.” Four males sued to enjoin enforcement of the
statute limiting enrollment to women, claiming that it was a
violation of their rights under the equal protection clause.
The court held that the classification by sex was not unreason
able or arbitrary, and, in this particular case, was not vio-
lative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court distinguished the case from Kirstein by also
utilizing the rationale of the "separate but equal" doctrine.
There the women plaintiffs were seeking admission
to the University of Virginia and it is conceded that
the University occupied a preeminence among the State-
supported institutions of Virginia and offered a far
wider range of curriculum. No such situation exists
here. It is not intimated that Winthrop offers a wider
range of subject matter or enjoys a position of out-
standing prestige over the other state-supported insti-
tutions in this state. 94
9
2
Ibid.
9 3 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970); aff'd Mem. 401 U.S.
951 (1971).
9 4 Id. at 138 - 39.
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It has been established that race is a suspect
classification and a state must have a "compelling interest"
in making such a classification. However, sex classifi-
cations have not been determined to be "inherently suspect."
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on student sex
discrimination in higher education. However, in Reed v.
Reed
,
9 5 the Court did enunciate a standard of review for
sexual classifications under the equal protection clause:
[A classification] must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike. 96
The Court used this standard in striking down a
statutory preference given to men in matters concerning the
appointment of an administrator for an estate. The Court
found this to be a sexual classification which did violate
the equal protection clause. 97
It appeared that the Supreme Court was moving toward
finding sex to be a suspect classification and, therefore,
the "strict judicial scrutiny test" would have to be applied. 98
9 5 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
.
9
6
Id. at 76.
9
7
Ibid.
98 In Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S.Ct. 1764 (1973), the
"uniformed services" maintained a policy under which males
were permitted to claim their wives as dependents automatically,
while females had to show that their spouses were financially
dependent upon them. The "uniformed services defended its
79
However, in 1974, the Court in Kahn v. Shevin" relied once
again on the "fair and substantial relation test" enunciated
in Reed in upholding a Florida statute which granted a pro-
perty tax exemption to widows but not to widowers. The
Court implicitly suggested that the "strict scrutiny" is
not the appropriate standard for sex classifications. 100
Another example of the Court's hesitancy to declare
sex a suspect classification is Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleur
.
1 0
1
in this case, the Court refused to find that
mandatory maternity leave for teachers violated the equal
protection clause as did both lower courts. The Court
found it necessary only to find that the policy was arbi-
trary and thus violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1 0 2
actions on the grounds of administrative efficiency. In a
plurality decision, the Court rejected this argument and
found the policy to be a violation of the equal protection
clause. Four justices held that sex is an inherently sus-
pect classification subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
Three justices concurred, but found it unnecessary to reach
the question of whether sex is a suspect classification,
they merely noted that "administrative efficienty" did not
pass the "fair and substantial relation" test.
"94 S.Ct. 1734 (1974) .
100 Susanne Martinez, supra note 86 at 61.
1 0 2 94 S.Ct. 791 (1974)
.
1
"Because of the uncertainty the Supreme Court has shown
in determining what standard to apply to this issue, the 4th
Circuit Court of Appeals established what would seem to be
an intermediary test. By holding that the South Carolina
80
Regardless of the precise standard, the courts
are grappling with sex discrimination, and women are being
afforded some protection by the courts under the equal
protection clause. In a recent college case, the Court
of Civil Appeals of Texas found that a parietal rule of
Texas Woman's University which required women, but not
men, to live in on-campus housing was declared unconsti-
tutional
.
1 0 3
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
.
Another avenue for ending sex discrimination is Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972. 1 04 Although no cases
have been reported as yet utilizing Title IX, it will
undoubtedly provide more protection. The key provision reads:
Senate could not refuse to comply women as pages the court
declared:
A classification based upon sex is less than suspect;
a validating relationship must be more than minimal.
What emerges is an "intermediate approach" between
rational basis and compelling interest as a test of
validity under the equal protection clause. (Eslinqer
v. Thames
,
476 F.2d 235, 231 [4th Cir. 1973].)
1 0
3
Texas Woman's University v. Chayklintaste
,
521 S.W.2d
949, 951 (Tex. 1975).
It is Therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed, that
[the university's] Parietal rule, which, requires every
adult undergraduate woman student to live in a unit of
the residential system, . . .be, and the same is hereby
declared invalid, void and unenforceable as . . . pro-
hibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment
.
104 Education Amendments of 1972, sections 901-907, 20
U.S.C. sections 1681-86 (1972).
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No person in the United States shall, on the basis
.£ Sk
X
' 5^ excluded from participation in, be denied
under^nv
1
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°T be sub^cted to discrimination
?•
dUCat
J
on Program or activity receivingfederal financial assistance.
. . .
1
0
5
Except for the specific exemptions of religious or
military schools, any educational institution which receives
federal monies by way of a grant, loan or contract is required
to comply with the requirements of the act. This includes all
levels: kindergartens, preschools, elementary and secondary
schools, vocational schools, junior and community colleges,
four-year colleges, universities and graduate and professional
schools. Private, as well as public schools are subject to
the requirements of Title IX if they accept federal financial
assistance
.
If an institution does not comply with the law, the
government may delay awards of money, revoke current awards
or debar institutions from eligibility for future awards.
The Department of Justice may also bring suit at the request
of the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare.
When, and if, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
becomes law, women and men would be guaranteed a strict
judicial test in sex discrimination cases. It reads:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any
state on account of sex. 106
105 Id. at section 901(a), 20 U.S.C., section 1681 (1972).
10e Proposed: Section 1 of 26th Amendment to U.S. Consti-
tution.
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Summary
. Sex discrimination seems to be ingrained
in the American culture. But, as we have slowly progressed
with the problem of racial discrimination, it appears that
legitimate efforts are being made in this controversial
area. However, as the Texas court remarked in the Chayklin-
taste case:
It is to be observed as we anticipated that our courts
are about to embark upon tasks like unto that made
necessary by the litigation over racial discrimination.
Hopefully, it will be neither as extended nor as
bitter. 1 0 7
Classifications of students can be made and college
rules can apply to certain classes of students and not to
others. However, classifications based upon race will be
inherently suspect, and the state will have to show a com-
pelling interest in using it as a criterion. The DeFunis
case illustrates one use of this standard in redressing past
discriminatory affects on minority students.
College officials also must insure that a classifi-
cation of students is not arbitrary and that there is some
l07 Texas Woman's University v. Chayklintaste
,
supra note
103 at 950. See also, Mollere v. Southeastern "Louisiana
College
,
304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La~. 1969 ) ; Sail'er Inn, ~Inc .
v. Kirby , 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971); Bucha v. Illinois High
School Association , 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. 111. 1972); Bray
v. Lee , 377 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1972); Davis v. Meek , 344
F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Brenden v. Independent School
District
,
477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Berkelman v. San
Francisco Unified School District , 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1974); Anne Dellinger, "Sex Discrimination in the Public
Schools: Title IX and the Education Amendments of 1972,"
School Law Journal Bulletin , (October 1974); and Carolyn
Rusch, "Equality in Athletics and the Cheerleader v. The
Athlete," 19 S.D. L. Rev. 428 (1974).
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educational or other sound rationale which supports such a
classification. In areas other than race, the standard
used has been the "fair and substantial relation" test as
developed in the Reed case. It would appear that classifi-
cations based on sex seem to lie somewhere between these two
standards, when relying upon the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. A more scrupulous standard will
undoubtedly be applied when alleged sex discrimination is
brought under Title IX and, if adopted, the proposed equal
rights amendment.
Regardless of the standards employed by the court,
one thing is clear, students at public colleges and univer-
sities are entitled to the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause.
Freedom of Expression
The Fourteenth Amendment specifically prohibits the
state from depriving any person of due process or the equal
protection of the laws. But, what of the liberties enumer-
ated in the original Bill of Rights?
Although in the past the first ten amendments only
restricted fereral actions, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Fourteenth Amendment to bring the actions of the state
84
under the restraints of the Bill of Rights. 100 Public
colleges and universities, as agencies of the state, must
also respect the students 1 legitimate exercise of these
rights.
One of the fundamental liberties protected by the
Constitution is freedom of expression. 109 The First
Amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech
,
or of the
press ; the right of the people peaceably to aisemble
and to petition the government for a redress of griev-
ances. 1 0 (Italics mine)
Freedom of expression has been described as "the
freedom to express and to defend views or beliefs, and the
1 0 8 For an interesting discussion of the Bill of Rights and
its applicability to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment see: Arval A. Morris, The Constitution and American
Education
,
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1974), pp. 82-
110. See also: Gitlow v. New York , 268 U.S. 652 (1925);
Palko v. Connecticut
,
302 U.S. 319 (1937); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); and Duncan v. Louisiana , 291
U.S. 145 (1968).
109 Although freedom of expression is not specifically
addressed in the First Amendment, it is used herein to denote
the rights of students to symbolic, oral, and written expres-
sion (speech, press)
.
Freedom of expression will be used to illustrate that
colleges are required to respect the constitutional rights of
students beyond the specific prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This area was chosen because of its importance
in the field of education. The investigation of knowledge
must necessarily involve the active and open exchange of.
ideas. It is, therefore, of particular interest to examine
its effect on colleges and students in its use and restraints.
110 U.S. Const, amend. I.
85
freedom to question and differ
. . . without authoritative
repression and without scholastic penalization." 111 i n the
past, however, schools had been able to prohibit student
expression (whether symbolic, oral, or written) in further-
ance of promoting discipline among its students. 112 it was
not until 1965 that students were recognized as having
legitimate interests in expressing their views and ideas.
Symbolic expression
. In 1965, the United States was
becoming more involved in the war in Viet Nam. Anti-war
protests were being conducted throughout the nation. There
were rallies and marches held for and against the war in
Washington, D.C. and New York.
In Des Moines, Iowa, a group of Quakers planned to
wear black armbands to publicize their support of a truce
called for by Robert Kennedy and to mourn the dead of both
sides in the Viet Nam conflict. School officials of the
Des Moines public schools, aware of this plan, adopted a
policy that forbid the wearing of these armbands in school.
If a student refused to remove it, he/she would be suspended.
The school board ratified this policy.
1 1
2
R. M. Maclver, Academic Freedom in Our Time
,
(N.Y.:
Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 207.
1 1 Goldberg v. Regents of the University o f California ,
57 CalT Rptr . 463 (1967 ) . As long as the school could show
a reasonable relationship between its policy and goal of
maintaining "good order and decorum," courts would not sub-
stitute their judgment for that of the school's.
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Aware of the policy, a group of students wore the
black armbands to school. They were suspended and not
allowed to return until they would remove the armbands.
John and Marybeth Tinker and Chris Eckhardt did not return
to school until after the period for wearing the armbands
had expired. In order to prevent the school officials from
taking disciplinary action for their absence, the students
(through their fathers) brought suit in a federal district
court. They alleged that the policy of prohibiting the
wearing of armbands in school violated their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech. Thus was born Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District
.
1 1
3
District Court Judge Roy Stephenson outlined the
legal principles applicable in this case. First, "an
individual's right to free speech is protected against state
infringement by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 114 The wearing of an armband for the purpose
of expressing certain views is a "symbolic act and falls
within the protection of the First Amendment's free speech
clause. 115 Second, freedom of speech is not absolute, and,
in some circumstances, may be abridged by the state. Third,
school officials have the "responsibility for maintaining a
1 1 3 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Io. 1966).
1 1
4
Id. at 972.
1 1 5 Ibid.
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scholarly, disciplined atmosphere within the classroom
they have an obligation to prevent anything which might be
disruptive of such an atmosphere." 116 Fourth, unless the
^-^^-ions of school officials are unreasonable, the courts
should not interfere." 117 Thus, the question posed by this
case is. How to resolve the conflict between the needs of
school officials to maintain discipline and the rights of
the students to freedom of speech?
By reviewing the facts, the court determined that,
"it was not unreasonable in this instance for school
officials to anticipate that the wearing of armbands would
create some type of disturbance. 118 Judge Stephenson thus
concluded that the school officials had a "reasonable basis
for adopting the armband regulations." 119
The judge noted that the students' freedom of speech
was limited only during school hours. They were still free
to wear armbands off school grounds. In upholding the school
regulation, the court declared:
School officials must be given a wide discretion,
and if, under the circumstances, a disturbance in
school discipline is reasonably to be anticipated,
actions which are reasonably calculated to prevent
such a disruption must be upheld by the court. . . .
1 1
6
Ibid .
117 Ibid.
1 1
8
Id. at 973
1 1 9 Ibid.
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lt is the disciPlined atmosphere ofth\ClaSSr°°m/ not the [students'] right to weararmbands on school premises, which is entitled to theprotection of the law
.
120
The Tinkers, dissatisfied with the district court's
decision, appealed their case. The U.S. Court of Appeals
affirmed without opinion. The Tinkers next appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
In a landmark decision, the Court reversed the lower
court decisions. 121 On behalf of the Court, Justice Fortas
reviewed the facts and the legal principles involved in the
case. Contrary to the lower court, Justice Fortas emphasized
that constitutional rights are available to students and
teachers in our public schools.
It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. 122
By citing Justice Jackson in an earlier Supreme Court
ruling, Justice Fortas supported this assertion:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
states, protects the citizen against the state itself
and all of its creatures—Board of Education not
excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate
and highly discretionary functions, but none that they
may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.
That they are educating the young for citizenship is
reasonable for scrupulous protection of constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle
1 2 0 Ibid .
1 2 J 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
.
1 2 2 Id. at 506.
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the free mind at its source and teach youth to discountimportant principles of our government as mere plati-tudes. 3
On the other hand, the Court also recognized the right
and obligation of school authorities to maintain discipline
and provide the "proper educational atmosphere." Thus, the
case concerns the collision of the students' exercise of
%
First Amendment rights and the rules of school authorities.
The district court concluded that the action of the
school officials had been reasonable because it was based
upon their "fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the
armbands." 1214 This finding was rejected by the Supreme
Court
.
right to freedom of expression. 125
Justice Fortas eloquently continued by explaining that:
In our system, undifferentiated fear or appre-
hension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the 7V>
Any departure from absolute regementation may
cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's
opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken in class,
in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from
the views of another person may start an argument or
cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
must take this risk . . . our history says that it
is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of open-
ness—that is the basis of our national strength and of
the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and
live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious
society
.
1 2 G
1 2
3
id . at 507. West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
1214 Ibid .
1 2 5 Ibid.
1 2 6 Id . at 508-9.
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The Court rejected the "reasonable relation test"
followed by the district court. In setting forth the
legal principle to be applied, the Court stated:
In order for the State in the person of school
officials to justify prohibition of the particular
expression of opinion, it must be able to show that
its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always, accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Cer-
tainly where there is no finding and no showing that
engaging in the forbidden conduct would materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,
the prohibition cannot be sustained. 127 (Italics
mine.
)
Thus, the Court developed the legal principles to
be applied. Where there is no evidence that the forbidden
conduct would "materially and substantially interfere" with
school work and discipline, its prohibition is unconstitu-
tional. But, conduct by students which does materially and
substantially interfere with school work or infringes on
the rights of others is not protected.
In this case, the Court found no evidence to support
the school officials' prohibition on the wearing of armbands.
It, therefore, reversed the lower court's decision.
Although this was a case concerning the rights of
public secondary school students, it established the legal
principles to be applied to public college cases.
An example of how the Tinker principles were
12 8
applied at the college level was Williams v. Eaton .
1 2 7 Id. at 109.
1 2 8 333 F. Supp . 107 (D. Wy . 1971)
.
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Fourteen members of the University of Wyoming informed
their coach that they were going to wear black armbands
during the game to be played between Wyoming and Brigham
Young University. The purpose of the armbands was to
protest the racially discriminatory practices of the Mormon
Church which operated Brigham Young University. A coaching
rule which forbids players from participating in demonstra-
tions was made known to players several times, but the
players insisted that they would wear the armbands. The
coach suspended the players from the team, and, at a hearing
before the trustees, the suspensions were upheld. Believing
that they had a constitutional right to wear the armbands,
the students sought a restraining order from the court.
Judge Kerr acknowledged that the wearing of armbands
can be a symbolic form of free speech. He noted that this
case concerned more than a collision of the rights of
students and the authority of the college to prohibit certain
conduct. Although Judge Kerr distinguished this case from
Tinker
,
he also utilized its legal principles. He agreed
that the school authorities did not have evidence to show
that the wearing of the armbands would cause a material and
substantial disruption. However, this was not necessary,
because the wearing of the armbands would haver as the Supreme
Court stated, "infringed upon the rights of others," since
they were to be worn to protest the alleged religious beliefs
or tenets of the Mormon Church. Judge Kerr pointed out that
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the students were members of the University of Wyoming
(a state institution) football team. As such, they repre-
sent the school whenever they play. if they were allowed
to wear the armbands, it would be considered a form of
state action, and thereby in violation of Brigham Young
University's rights to freedom of religion.
The fullest realization of true religious liberty
requires that government neither engage in nor compel
religious practices, that it effect no favoritism
among sects or between religion and non-religion, and
that it work deterence of no religious belief. 129
In balancing the rights involved in the case, Judge Kerr
declared:
The rights of the [students] to freedom of speech
as guaranteed by the First Amendment cannot be held
paramount to the rights of others to practice their
religion free from state-supported protest since
individual liberties cannot be left completely uncon-
trolled to clash with similarly asserted liberties of
several thousand others. 130
The court, therefore, upheld the suspension of the
students. Although the students did not win this case, the
Tinker principles were still applied. Freedom of expression
is not absolute. In this case, the expression would have
infringed upon the rights of others; it was, therefore, the
duty of the school authorities to prohibit the conduct.
Written expression . The written expression of
student ideas and opinions is another area of controversy
for students and college officials. Most of the cases in
1 2 9 Id. at 115. 1
3
°ibid.
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this area concern college supported and underground student
publications
.
A leading "student press" case is Dickey v. Alabama
State Board of Education
.
131 in early April, 1967, Dr.
Frank Rose, the President of the University of Alabama, came
under attack by a few Alabama state legislators for his
censor a University of Alabama student publication
that included some articles written by communists. Gary
Clinton Dickey, editor of the Troy State College student
newspaper, the Tropolitan, "should be heard on this matter."
He prepared an editorial supporting the position of Dr.
Rose and presented it to the paper's faculty advisor who
instructed him not to publish it. Dickey went to the
president of the college, who also determined that the
editorial could not be published. The decision was based
on a Troy State College rule that precluded the carrying of
articles or editorials in the school paper which were
critical of the governor or legislature of Alabama. However,
the rule did not prohibit editorials or articles of a lauda-
tory nature concerning the governor or legislature.
The faculty advisor furnished a substitute article
concerning "Raising Dogs in North Carolina." An editor, Dickey,
did not believe this to be suitable material, and acting
against the specific orders of his advisor and President
1 3
1
273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
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Adams, arranged to have, with the exception of the title,
A Lament for Dr. Rose," the space ordinarily occupied by
editorials left blank, with the word "Censored" diagonally
across the blank spaces. In addition, Dickey mailed his
editorial to a Montgomery newspaper. Because of this "will-
ful and deliberate insubordination," Dickey was expelled.
Believing that his expulsion was a violation of his
right to freedom of speech and press, Dickey took his case
to court. In reviewing the facts of the case. Chief Judge
Johnson acknowledged that an educational program requires
certain rules and regulations necessary for "maintaining
an orderly program, and operating the institution in a manner
conducive to learning." 132 However, he also stated that the
right to communicate on matters of public interest is
"embraced in the First Amendment right relating to freedom
of speech" and is protected against infringement by state
officials, "and these First Amendment rights extend to
students insofar as unreasonable rules are concerned" 133
Was the college rule precluding critical editorials
unreasonable? Judge Johnson believed that it was. In an
opinion delivered two years before Tinker , he declared:
A state cannot force a college student to forfeit
his constitutionally protected right to freedom of
expression as a condition to his attending a state
supported institution. State school officials cannot
1 32 Id. at 617. 1 3 3 Ibid.
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infringe on their students' right of free anrt
srs^ysa.
Thus, the court held that the rule was an unreason-
able infringement on Dickey
-s right to freedom of expression.
Judge Johnson pointed out that the rule, in fact, had nothing
to do with maintaining discipline. As to the charges of
insubordination
,
the court stated:
The attempt to characterize Dickey's conduct, andthe basis for expelling him, as "insubordination".
.does not disguise the fact that Dickey was expelledfrom Troy State College for exercising his constitu-
tionally guaranteed right of academic and/or political
expression
.
3 5
The court also noted that there was no legal obli-
gation on the school officials to operate a school newspaper.
However, since they did, they could not punish its editor
for utilizing his constitutional rights.
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Papish v. Board
of Curators of University of Missouri
.
136 A graduate student,
Barbara Papish, was expelled for distributing on campus a
newspaper "containing forms of indecent speech" in violation
of the by-laws of the Board of Curators. The newspaper,
the Free Press Underground, had been sold on campus for over
four years. However, this issue was found unacceptable for
two reasons. First, on the front cover was a reproduction of
1 3 51 3 4 Id. at 618. Ibid
.
1 36 93 S.Ct. 1197 (1973)
.
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a political cartoon depicting a policeman raping the Statute
of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. Second, the issue
also contained an article entitled "Mother Fucker Acquitted,"
which discussed the trial of a youth who was a member of an
organization known as "Up Against the Wall Mother Fucker." 137
Following the hearing, the student was expelled for
violating the college's Code of Student Conduct which
requires students "to observe generally accepted standards
of conduct," and specifically prohibits "indecent conduct or
speech." 138 Ms. Papish believed that her expulsion was
improperly premised on activities protected by the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed. The Court recognized
that a university has the legitimate authority to enforce
reasonable regulations "as to the time, place, and manner
of speech and its dissemination." 139 it also acknowledged
the university's right to enforce reasonable rules governing
student behavior. However, the Court declared that, "State
colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the
sweep of the First Amendment." 140
In reviewing the articles, the Court found that
"neither the political cartoon nor the headline story can
1 37 Id. at 1198.
1 3 6 Ibid .
1 39 Id. at 1199.
1
4
°Ibid. The Court also found no evidence indicating any
disruption of university functions because of the distribution
of the newspaper.
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be labelled as constitutionally obscene." 141 Because the
newspaper was not legally obscene, the Court stated:
The mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how offen-Slve to 9°°d taste on a state university campus may
not be shut off in the name alone of "conventions ofdecency.
"
1 H 2
The Court concluded that Ms. Papish was expelled
because of the content of the newspaper. In so finding,
the Court declared:
Since the First Amendment leaves no room for the
operation of a dual standard in the academic community
with respect to the content of speech, and because the
state university's action here cannot be justified as
a non-discriminatory application of reasonable rules
governing conduct
. . . the case is remanded to the
District Court, and that court is instructed to order
the University ... to reinstate her as a student in
the graduate program. 1 4 3
In Thonen v. Jenkins
,
1 4 4 the 4th Circuit Court of
Appeals relied on Tinker and Papish to uphold the right of
a student to use a "four letter word" in depicting the
president of East Carolina University in the school news-
paper. The court merely pointed out that there was no
evidence of disruption because of the editorial and that
"the mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive
1 4
1
Ibid .
142 Ibid .
1 4 3 Id. at 1200.
1 4 4 491 F . 2d 722 (4th Cir. 1973).
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to good taste- on a state university campus may not be shut
°ff in the name alone of "conventions of decency." 145
Summary
. These cases illustrate that students at
state colleges and universities are guaranteed the right to
freedom of expression. As long as the expression does not
materially and substantially disrupt school work or disci-
pline, or infringe upon the rights of others, the expression
is protected by the First Amendment. A school may reason-
ably regulate the time, place and manner of expression and
its distribution. It may also prohibit any "legally"
obscene material. But a state school may not shut off
the dissemination of ideas "in the name alone of 'conventions
of decency,' no matter how offensive to good taste." The
courts have also recognized that a school does not have to
operate a newspaper, but if it does, it can not punish
students for exercising their constitutional rights. An
issue which has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court
in college student press cases is that of prior restraint.
However, a federal district court in Massachusetts held
that a rule requiring the prior submission of material to
be published to an advisory board was a prior restraint on
the students' right to freedom of expression. "Having
fostered a campus newspaper, the state may not impose
145 Id. at 724, quoting Papish at 1199.
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arbitrary restraints on the matter to be communicated. 1 " 6
Conclusion
Students enrolled in state colleges are entitled to
the protections guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States. The cases presented in this chapter have illus-
trated the legal principles involved in public college
students' rights to due process, equal protection, and
freedom of expression.
It has also been shown that the Fourteenth Amendment
restrains the state and its entities, such as state colleges
and universities, from prohibiting the free exercise of
constitutionally protected liberties. However, the amend-
ment only prohibits state actions. Actions by private
colleges are not bound by its provisions. Therefore, stu-
dents at these schools do not enjoy the same safeguards
from institutional actions as do students at public schools.
The following chapter will examine this distinction and
will present those cases which establish the rights of
students at private institutions.
1 4 6 Antonelli v. Hammond , 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970)
For an interesting discussion of the rights of students to
freedom of expression see: Richard L. Berkman, "Students in
Court: Free Speech and Schooling in America," 40 Harv. Educ.
Rev., 567 (1970); Charles Allan Wright, "The Constitution and
the Campus," 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027 (1969); Edmund Reutter Jr.
The Courts and Student Conduct, (Kansas: N.O.L.P.E., 1975);
Barbara Gold, "The Student Press: An Update," Inequality in
Education, no. 20 (Mass: Harvard Univ. , July 197b) , pi /4
.
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CHAPTER iv
THE CONCEPT OF STATE ACTION
Introduction
The distinction between a public and a private
college, Christopher Jencks and David Riesman have explained,
. . . was of no special importance during the firsttwo centuries of American higher education. Then
after the Civil War, it became one of the centralissues and divisions within the emerging academic
system. Today
. . . the distinction seems once again
to be losing some of its importance. 1
To the students in these colleges, however, the distinction
has again become important. While demands for freedom and
justice have been met by the constitutional safeguards
afforded them at public colleges and universities, 2 students
at private colleges have not received the same protections.
Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic
Revolution
,
(New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1968), p. 257.
2 By "public college or university" is meant an institu-
tion of higher learning, whether or not granting degrees,
which is "operated by a State, subdivision of a State, or
governmental agency within a State." All else for these
purposes is private. This definition is from Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 401(c), 12 U.S.C. section
2000-1 (c) (1964). The act also states that colleges and
universities are public when they are "operated wholly or
predominantly from or through the use of governmental funds
or property, or funds or property derived from a governmental
source." Many of the difficult cases we shall examine fall
into this category. It is interesting that Congress had no
problem calling these institutions "public" when the courts
have been reluctant to do so.
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The Private College and Student Rights
It is generally understood that the Fourteenth
Amendment restrains the state and its entities, such as
state colleges and universities, from prohibiting the
free exercise of constitutionally protected liberties.
Actions by private institutions do not come under the
scrutiny of its restrictions. 3 The amendment is not binding
on private colleges or universities. Therefore, students
at such institutions do not enjoy the same protections as
do students at public schools. For example, in 1967, a
federal court in Greene v. Howard University 4 upheld the
right of the college to summarily expel students without
affording them a hearing as required by public colleges.
Judge Holtzoff explained that:
It is clear that a government college may not expel its
students without notice of charges and an opportunity
to be heard, but this is not applicable to Howard
University, for it is not a public institution nor
does it partake of any governmental character. 5
In finding that Howard University was not a public
institution, the court found the relationship between the
3,, The only rights exactly correlative to the duties
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment are rights against the
state, not against private individuals." Archibald Cox,
"Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights," 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 110 (1966).
4 271 F. Supp. 609 (D. D.C. 1967), moot 412 F.2d 1128
(D.C. Cir. 1968) .
5 Id. at 612.
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institution and student to be primarily contractual. 6
Therefore, the court turned to the university catalog,
which enunciated the relationship between the institution
and its students as follows:
Attendance at Howard University is a privilege. In
to protect its standard ... the university
reserves the right and the student concedes to the
university. the right, to deny admission to and to
require withdrawal of any student at any time for any
reason deemed sufficient to the university.
. . .
7
After reviewing this provision. Judge Holtzoff declared:
If there is any contractual relation between the
university and its students, the foregoing provisions
are part of the contract. 8
The court also noted that nowhere in the catalog
did it state directly or by implication that a student would
be afforded a hearing before his connection with the school
could be terminated. Therefore, the court concluded that:
. . . the students had no constitutional, statutory
or contractual right to a notice of the charges and
a hearing before they could be expelled. ... It was
entirely within the discretion of the university
authorities to grant or withhold a hearing. 9
Similar results were reached in a private secondary
school in 1970 where students were summarily suspended for
attending a pep rally at the public school across the street.
6 id . at 613. For a discussion of the contract theory,
see Chapter II, pp. 14-23.
7 Ibid .
8 Ibid.
9 Id . at 614.
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Because the school was private, not public, the court
found that there was no "state action" and, therefore,
the requirements of due process guaranteed by the Four
teenth Amendment were not applicable.
The origins and central meaning of the FourteenthAmendment and our basic societal values, as expressed
^
law®' d° indicate that the constitutional
requirements of due process which establishes the
i i°^
the relationship between government andindividuals should also be the standard for the
relationship between private individuals and organi-
zations
.
10 (Italics in original}
The court explained that although it may disagree
with the action, it would not substitute its opinion for
that of the school. it was well within the discretionary
authority of the school to promulgate such a policy. The
court also emphasized that the relationship between the
student and the school is one of contract. Because the
school's rules do not provide for hearings, the student
is therefore not entitled to one.
In Ryan v. Hofstra University
,
1
1
a student was
accused of destroying school property. He was expelled
and fined over $1,000 for the damage done. Although
Hofstra was considered to be a private university, Ryan was
reinstated because the hearing he was afforded was contrary
to the procedures called for in the university catalog.
1
°Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1393 (N.D.
Ind. 1970)
,
~aff 'd 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
1 1 324 N.Y.S. 2d 964, aff'd 328 N.Y.S. 2d 339 (N. Y. 1971).
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The court found this to be an abuse of the college's
discretionary power. Relying upon the catalog provision,
the court found the university's action to be a breach of
contract
.
In 1973, two students were dismissed from Brooklyn
Law School for "poor scholastic performance." 12 The
students alleged that the real reason they were dismissed
was because they had, as co-editors of the school's student
magazine, printed articles unfavorable to the legal profes-
sion. Therefore, they were being punished for exercising
their constitutional right to freedom of speech. The U.S.
Court of Appeals found Brooklyn Law School to be a private
institution; therefore, the court found its actions were
not restrained by the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
3
These cases have illustrated that students in
private colleges are not entitled to the protections
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, these stu-
dents do not enjoy the same rights as students in public
12 Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School , 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir
.
1973.
1
3
In general, federal courts can only hear cases that
raise federal questions. For the purposes of this study,
it is sufficient for a person to show that his/her consti-
tutional rights have been violated for a federal court to
have jurisdiction. Because the Constitution only prohibits
governmental actions, by finding the college private, no
constitutional question arises. Thus, the court has no
jurisdiction. See, Powe v. Miles , 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
1968); Blackburn v. Fisk University , 443 F.2d 121 (6th
Cir. 1971)
.
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institutions. The relationship between the private school
and its students is contractual in nature. Such schools
may promulgate regulations that are not arbitrary, unreason-
able, capricious or an abuse of its discretionary powers. 14
As Greene and Bright demonstrated, if a school's rules do not
provide for a hearing, it is not obliged to afford it.
However, once the college establishes procedures or regu—
lations
,
they are required to follow them.
In a few cases, the courts have held or implied
that a private college should "be bound by the principles
of fairness and justice," 15 and that the school "must abide
by constitutional principles of fair conduct implicit in
our society." 16 However, these opinions are not consistent
with the overwhelming majority of the decisions in this
area. 17 Today, private colleges are not generally bound
1
4
Slaughter v. Brigham Young University
,
514 F.2d 622
(10th Cir. 1975) ; "It is apparent that some elements of the
law of contracts are used and should be used in the analysis
of the relationship between [students] and the university.
. .
." Id. at 626.
15 ...
See, Sturm v. Trustees of Boston University, Equity
Number 89433 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County, MA. 1969) , as reprinted
in Michael Nassbaum, Student Legal Rights , (New York: Harper
& Row Pub., 1970), p. 64.
1
6
Ryan v. Hofstra University , supra note 11 at 970.
1
7
See also, Powe v. Miles , 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968);
Blackburn v. Fisk University, 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971);
Jones v. Vassar College, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 283 (N.Y. 1969); Brown
v. Villanova
,
378 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974) . These cases
held that unless the state is involved in the alleged actions,
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions do not apply. Private
actions are not prohibited by the amendment.
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by the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Unless state action is involved, the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees are not applicable to the student and
college relationship. But can a private college become so
entwined with the state so as to constitute state action?
To answer this question, it will be necessary to examine
what it means to be a public or private college as well as
the concept of state action.
Public or Private College
In the first two centuries of American higher edu-
cation, there was no real distinction between public or
private colleges. Most institutions were established by
various Christian churches. The main purpose of the colleges
was to train men to become leaders in the church and state.
As the Yale Charter states: "[Men] may be fitted for public
employment both in church and Civil State." 18
Harvard, William and Mary, and Yale served as training
centers for their colonies' political and professional leader-
ship. Since the colleges were providing this service, they
were considered to be performing a public function. Thus,
higher education was viewed as closely linked to the interests
1
e
As quoted in Jurgen Herbst, "The Eighteenth Century
Origins of the Split Between Private and Public Higher
Education in the United States , " History of Education Quar -
terly
,
Fall 1975, pp. 278-279.
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of the state and church. 19
Because of this close relationship between laymen
and the government, the legislatures often assisted the
colleges by contributing land or financially supporting
the institution. Jencks and Riesman have succinctly
recounted this history:
The colonial college was neither "public" nor "private"
in the modern sense. It was seen as a public trust,
subject to state regulation. Chartered by the state,
its board of trustees often included public officials,
ex officio, and sometimes other public appointees. On
a year to year basis, the colonial college was usually
expected to balance its books without tax assistance,
but when it needed a new building or had other special
expenses, it often appealed successfully for legis-
lative help. Its activities and solvency were viewed
as public rather than private questions, yet it was
not an arm of the state in the same sense that a modern
state university is. 20
In general, this arrangement lasted until the early 1800's
when opposition began to develop over this relationship.
Then, these colleges began to be viewed as denominational
and elitest institutions which deprived the public of oppor-
tunities to higher ecuation, and they began to lose the
support of the state governments. This was due partly to
the mounting pressures against public aid to religious
institutions, now enforced by constitutional provisions.
It was also due to the attempt to make these colleges respon-
to the "democratic movement of the day" to make the
19 Id. at 273.
20 Jencks and Riesman, supra note 1.
sive
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institutions open to the public, and nonsectarian. 21 The
efforts to turn these colleges into "open" public institutions
met with little success. 22 One such effort resulted in the
Dartmouth College case of 1819, 2 3 which "slowed down and
effectively stopped the transformation of private sectarian
colleges into public institutions." 24
^e Dartmouth College case was concerned with the
legal issues surrounding the right of individuals to con-
tract and the constitutional restrictions upon the state
not to impair the obligation of such contracts. 25 The case
is important to this study because of the observations the
Supreme Court made concerning higher education in general
and private colleges in particular.
21 R. Freeman Butts, "The Relation of Higher Education to
Society: Two Historical Examples," Higher Education Crisis
and Support
,
(New York: Int. Council for Ed. Dev., 1974) p. 11.
2 2 •Ibid . Thomas Jefferson was able to get the University
of Virginia established in 1818.
2 3
Trustees of Dartmouth Colleqe v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
( 4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
24 R. Freeman Butts, supra note 21.
2
5
The Supreme Court held that the charter granted by the
British Crown to the Trustees of Dartmouth College was a
contract and that the State of New Hampshire replaced the
Crown after the revolution. The State's attempt to alter
the charter without the consent of the college was an impair-
ment of the obligation of the charter and was therefore
declared unconstitutional. The college was found to be a
private corporation, not public, and therefore it was not
under the control of the legislature.
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In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice
Marshall perceived a difference between "a civil insti-
tution to be employed in the administration of government
and a private eleemosynary institution." 26 Dartmouth was
considered to be the latter, and thus. New Hampshire could
not alter its character by legislation. Because the Court
found Dartmouth to be a "private eleemosynary institution"
(founded by individuals and private funds)
,
it was not a
public but private endeavor. The Court explicitly rejected
New Hampshire's claim that the college was performing a
Puklic purpose and, therefore, should be considered a
public corporation. The rejection of this argument may
have been based on the Court's observation that private
institutions like colleges and universities "do not fill
the place which would otherwise be occupied by government,
but that which would otherwise remain vacant." 27 Thus,
higher education was an essentially private activity which
might occasionally be supplemented by the public sector. 28
These assumptions have lasted over a century and a
half. "The federal courts . . . still view private higher
26 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra note
23 at 640-41.
2 7 Id . at 647.
28 The history of higher education has demonstrated the
involvement of the states in education from the beginning, and
as Judge H. Friendly stated, "Marshall may have made things
too easy for himself" in this regard. The Dartmouth College
Case and the Public-Private Pnumbra , (New Hampshire: Dartmouth
College
,
1969)
, pp. 10-11.
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education in Marshall's terms." 23 By holding that insti-
tutions privately established to conduct higher learning
are private corporations, it effectively removed these
colleges from the constraints of the Constitution which
restrains public not private actions. 30
While in the Dartmouth College case the states lost
in an effort to control the private colleges, they now began
to establish public colleges (in the modern sense)
. Private
colleges still sought and received governmental support, but
they were now competing with public colleges which were
financed and controlled by the state. The public college
movement was further reinforced by the passage of the
Morrill Act (Land Grant Act of 1862) . The bill granted
federal land worth millions of dollars to the states according
to the size of their congressional delegation.
[The state] was expected to use its portion to establish
at least one college where major, but not exclusive,
attention would be devoted to "agriculture and the
mechanic arts." 31
29 Robert M. O’Neil, "Private Universities and Public
Law , " 19 Buffalo L. Rev.
,
155, 157 (1970).
30 These assumptions and their significance will be
explored in the next chapter.
3 x For an interesting account of the history of higher
education in America, the split between private and public
education, see: Jurgen Herbst, "The Eighteenth Century
Origin of the Split Between Private and Public Higher
Education in the United States," History of Education
Quarterly
,
Fall 1975, pp. 273-280; Essay Review, "American
College History: Re-Examination Underway," History of
Education Quarterly , Summer 1975, pp. 259-266; Natalie A.
Ill
With the exception of M.I.T. and Yale, the resources went
to the establishment of public colleges or the enlargement
of already existing state institutions.
Thus, the complete bifurcation of public and private
colleges seemed probable. The last century has, however,
partially restored the colonial pattern. Many of the large
private schools have become secularized, thus opening the
doors for governmental assistance. Both the state and
federal governments are, in fact, contributing millions of
dollars to private colleges and universities. So, as
Jencks and Riesman observed, "Today
. . . the distinction
seems once again to be losing some of its importance." 32
The colonial pattern was marked with the state's
direct involvement with private colleges. The Dartmouth
case established that states could not materially interfere
with the internal operations of private colleges. Today,
both the state and federal governments are once again
becoming more involved with private education. This raises
the question of whether or not a private college's actions
Naylor, "The Ante Bellum College Movement: A Reappraisal
of Tewbury ' s Foundings of American Colleges and Universities,"
History of Education Quarterly , Fall 1973, pp. 261-274; John
H. Florer, "Major Essues in the Congressional Debate of the
Morrill Act of 1862," History of Education Quarterly , Winter
1968, pp. 459-478.
3
2
John H. Florer, "Major Issues in the Congressional
Debate of the Morrill Act of 1862," History of Education
Quarterly
,
Winter 1968, p. 459.
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can become so entwined with the state as to constitute
state action for purposes of the law.
In order to understand the probable application of
state action to private colleges, it will be necessary to
examine the cases which employed the concept to determine
whether private actions may at times be considered actions
of the state.
State Action Concept
The Supreme Court first set out the distinction
between public and private actions based strictly on the
presence or absence of direct state action in 1883. 3
3
The
rights cases established that unless there was direct
state action, the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply. The
cases concerned the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, providing for the equal enjoyment of all,
without regard to color or race of the accommodations of
inns, public conveyances on land and water, theatres, and
other places of public amusement. The Court took a strict
view of the state action requirement and held the act
unconstitutional as it applied to prevent racial segregation
in privately owned and operated facilities. Justice Bradley
explained that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits "state
action of a particular character .... Individual
33 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of
the amendment." 34
The view that only direct state action was controlled
by the Fourteenth Amendment was followed for many years.
Through the gradual process of judicial interpretation and
the changing of the times, many inroads were made into the
%
state action requirements by the Supreme Court. 35
In Marsh v. Alabama
,
3 6 the Court held that a company
town, although owned completely by a private corporation,
could not prohibit a Jehovah's Witness from standing on
one of its street corners and distributing religious pam-
phlets. The Court found that the company town was performing
a public function and was, therefore, under the prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black declared:
People living in company-owned towns are free citizens
of their state and country, just as residents of
municipalities. And there is no more reason for
depriving them of liberties guaranteed by the 1st and
14th Amendments than there is for curtailing these
freedoms with respect to any other citizens. 37
34 Id. at 11.
[The amendment] only nullifies and makes void all State
legislation, and State action of every kind, which
impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens . . .
or which injures them in life, liberty or property
without due process of law, or which denies to any of
them the equal protection of the laws.
35Michael T. Johnson, "The Constitutional Rights of
Students," 42 Texas L. Rev. 344, 346 (1964).
3 6 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
.
3 7 Id. at 508.
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The Supreme Court found that the company-owned town
was providing the same functions as any other "town" and
was thus so entwined with the state as to constitute state
action.
Similar results were reached in Terry v. Adams 38
where the Supreme Court held that a private political associ-
ation that did not allow Blacks to be members and vote in
their primaries violated the Fifteenth Amendment. The
found that the association's slate of candidates was
always accepted by the Democratic Party as the nominees to
run in the elections. Therefore, the Court likened the
association to a political party which is performing a
public function and was thus so entwined with the state as
to constitute state action. By depriving Blacks the oppor-
tunity to vote, they were effectively denied their Fifteenth
Amendment rights. 39
Although the Supreme Court has ruled on the question
in several other controversies, 40 the leading case in this
3 8 345 U.S. 461 (1953) .
39 The amendment provides that: "The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude."
40 e.g., Steele v. Louisville and N. Ry. , 323 U.S. 192
(1944)—Labor union bargaining representative so clothed
with governmental authority that he was said to be performing
a quasi-public function and could not discriminate on a racial
basis; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) —State court's
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants constitutes state
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area is Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, et. al. 41
In 1958, Mr. Burton, a Black man, entered the Eagle Coffee
Shop located in a building owned and operated by the
Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of the State of
Delaware. He was refused service because of his color,
and he filed suit in a state court claiming that this
refusal abridged his rights under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The lower court agreed
with Burton, but the Supreme Court of Delaware held that
the restaurant's action was not state action. Eagle was
acting in "a purely private capacity" when he refused to
serve Burton, and therefore, the amendment was not applic-
able. 42 Burton, still believing his rights had been
violated, appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice
Clark noted that the Wilmington Parking Authority was
created by the City of Wilmington as a "public body corporate
action violative of equal protection clause of Fourteenth
Amendment; Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323
F . 2d 959 (4th Cir7 1963), cert, denied 376 U.S. 938 (1964)—
Private hospital received federal and state money, state
contributed land and buildings sufficient to warrant state
action in hospital which discriminated; Evans v. Newton ,
382 U.S. 296 (1966)—Services rendered by a park are munici-
pal in nature, and because state maintained facilities,
regardless of ownership, the park is subject to the equal
protection requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
4
1
365 U.S. 715 (1961)
.
4 2 Id. at 716.
116
and politic exercising public powers of the State as an
agency thereof."" To provide adequate parking facilities
for the people of Wilmington, the Authority decided to build
a downtown parking facility. it acquired the land by
purchases from private owners. Before the facility was
constructed, the Authority was advised that it would need
additional revenues beyond that received from parking fees
to finance the building. Therefore, the Authority decided
to lease some of the space of the building to the public.
In 1957, a private lease for twenty years was made
with Eagle Coffee Shop, Inc., for use as a restaurant.
The space allotted to Eagle was located within the building,
but had a separate entrance. Eagle agreed to pay an annual
rent of $28,700, and the Authority agreed to provide Eagle's
heat, gas service, and to make necessary structural repairs.
Eagle spent some $220,000 to make the space suitable for
its operation, and to the extent such improvements were
attached to the building they were tax exempt. Upon com-
pletion of the building, the Authority placed official signs
indicating the public character of the building and flew
on the roof both state and national flags.
After presenting the facts of the case. Justice
Clark considered whether Eagle's private "racially discrim-
inatory action was beyond the prohibitive scope of the
43 Id. at 717.
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Fourteenth Amendment?" 4
4
To answer this question. Justice
Clark noted that this "Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrong-
ful." 45
Thus, he explained that private conduct abridging
individual rights does no violence to the Fourteenth Amend-
%
ment "unless to some significant extent the State in all
of its manifestations has been found to have become involved
in it." 46 He further explained that "only by sifting facts
and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement
of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance .
"
4 7
Therefore, Justice Clark weighed the circumstances
to see the extent of the involvement of the state with
Eagle's Coffee Shop. He noted that the land and building
were publicly owned. The building was dedicated to "public
uses" in the performances of the Authority's "essential
governmental functions." The costs of the land acquisitions,
construction and maintenance are defrayed by the City of
Wilmington, and from the proceeds of rentals, and parking
services. Indeed, the Court noted that both benefited from
4 4 Id . at 721.
4 5 Id. at 721, quoting Shelley v. Kraemer , 334 U.S. 1,
13 (19^48") .
4 6 Ibid
.
4 7
Ibid.
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one another: (1) The convenience of the parking area to
Eagle; (2) more customers for the Authority from the patrons
of his restaurant; and (3) the fact that any improvements
made by Eagle are tax exempt because the fee is held by a
governmental agency. Justice Clark poignantly declared:
Neither can it be ignored, especially in view of Eagle's
afflrm^tive allegation that for it to serve Negroes
would injure its business that profits earned by dis-
crimination not only contribute to, but also are indis-
pensable elements in, the financial success of a
governmental agency. 4 8
The Court found that the cumulative effect of all
these
. . . activities, obligations and responsibilities of
the Authority, the benefits mutually conferred, together
with the obvious fact that a restaurant is operated as
an integral part of a public building devoted to a
public parking service, indicates that degree of state
participation and involvement in discriminatory action
which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to
condemn. 4 9
Justice Clark explained that the Authority could have
affirmatively required Eagle to discharge the responsibilities
of the Fourteenth Amendment "imposed upon the private enter-
prise as a consequence of state participation." 50 He then
declared:
But no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities
by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge
them whatever the motive may be. It is of no consolation
to an individual denied the equal protection of the laws
that it was done in good faith. 51
Therefore, Justice Clark stated:
4 94 8 5 0 5 1Id. at 724. Ibid. Id. at 725. Ibid.
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The State has so far insinuated itself infn . .of interdependence with Eagle that it mu«t h
Position
mzed as a joint participant in 6 reco9-
which, on that account cannot be considered
9
^ ^
ctivity-
been so "purely private" «*“, to have
of the Fourteenth Amendment. »
WlthOUt the scoPe
Thus, the Court found Eagle's refusal to serve
Burton a violation of the equal protection clause.
Conclusion
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states, not
private parties, from denying persons due process and equal
protection of the laws. 53 However, as the cases have
illustrated, private actions may become so entwined with
the state as to constitute state action. 54
As Justice Clark explained, the only way to determine
if the state is involved in "non—obvious" cases is "by
sifting facts and weighing circumstances." 55
5 2 Ibid.
The action inhibited by the first section of the Four-
teenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be
said to be that of the states. That amendment erects
no shield against merely private conduct, however
discretionary or wrongful. (Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 13 (1948).
54 Private conduct abridging individual rights does no harm
to the [Fourteenth Amendment] unless to some significant
extent the state in any of its manifestations has been
found to have been involved in it. (Shelley v. Kraemer,
supra note 45.
55 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, et. al., supra
note 41 at 721.
1
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This section has dealt with cases concerning company
towns, political associations and a public parking lot.
They have all demonstrated that private activity may become
so entwined with the state as to constitute state action,
thus coming under the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Can the actions of a private college or university consti-
tute state action? Although the Supreme Court has not ruled
directly on this question, the legal and educational pros
and cons of applying the constitutional safeguards to students
in private colleges will be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
THE CONSTITUTION'S APPLICABILITY TO THE
PRIVATE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
Introduction
Private college students have met with little success
in convincing the courts or college administrators that they
should be afforded the same constitutional safeguards as
students at public institutions. Courts have been reluctant
to interfere with their autonomy and have explained that
the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits states from denying
persons due process or equal protection of the laws. The
"amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,"
whether discriminatory or wrongful. 1 However, as the Burton
case illustrated, private conduct may become so entwined with
the state as to constitute state action. 2
Can the actions of a private college or university
constitute state action? Although the Supreme Court has
not ruled directly on this question, this chapter will
examine the cases which have raised constitutional issues
1 Shelley v. Kraemer , 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
2 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, et. al. , 365
U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
Private conduct abridging individual rights does no
harm to the [Fourteenth Amendment] unless to some
significant extent the state in any of its manifestations
has been found to have become involved in it.
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concerning private colleges and student rights, and explore
the legal and educational arguments for applying consti-
tutional standards in this controversial area.
Part I
The State Action Concept and the
Private College and University
There are a limited number of cases which have grap-
pled with the problem of applying the state action concept
to private colleges and universities. The cases presented
below illustrate the different factors that have been
considered in this controversial area.
The application of the state action concept to
private education has been a relatively recent legal phenc-
nena; hence, the law is still in its early stages of refine-
ment. Because of this, no distinct pattern has developed
in the way courts have resolved these conflicts. Therefore,
the following cases will be presented in a chronological
fashion so that the application of the state action concept
to private colleges may be examined from its inception to
the present.
Public function of higher education . The first case
to rule on the concept of state action relating to private
higher education is Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane
University of Louisiana . 3 It was decided in 1962—one year
3 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962).
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after the Supreme Court decision in Burton
. Two Black
women, Barbara Guillory and Pear lie Ellioe, were denied
admission to Tulane University solely on the basis of their
race. The university maintained that it was a private
institution and, hence, immune from the commands of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The women filed suit asking for a
summary judgment. They contended that the university
was so involved with the State of Louisiana that it should
be subject to the constitutional restraints on governmental
action.
Judge J. Skelley Wright began his decision with this
general observation:
At the outset, one may question whether any school
or college can ever be so private as to escape the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a country
dedicated to the creed that education is the only
"sure foundation of freedom," without which no republic
can maintain itself in strength, institutions of learn-
ing are not things of purely private concern. ... No
one any longer doubts that education is a matter af-
fected with the greatest public interest.
. . . Clearly,
the administrators of a private college are performing
a public function. They do the work of the state often
in the place of the state. Does it not follow that
they stand in the state's shoes? And, if so, are they
not then agents of the state, subject to the consti-
tutional restraints on governmental action. . . . " 4
After addressing the relationship of education to the republic,
Judge Wright returned to the facts of the case. He noted that
Tulane University operates under a special legislative
4 Id. at 858— in part quoting from Jefferson, letter to
Whythe, August 13, 1786, in I Writings (Bergh ed. 1907, p. 396).
Also from Jefferson, Letter to Governor John Tyler, May 26,
1810, in XII Writings, p. 393.
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franchise, enjoys a very substantial state subsidy in the
form of a tax exemption for commercially leased property,
and has three public officials on its governing board. 5
Having uncovered these facts. Judge Wright was able to
decide the case without having to go as far as declaring
all schools and colleges under the commands of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He applied the teachings of Burton
,
Shelley
,
Terry and Marsh
,
6
"that private ownership or operation of a
facility impressed with a public interest does not auto-
matically insulate it from the reach of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . " 7
Because Tulane University was involved with the state,
to the extent indicated above, it was sufficiently entwined
with the state to subject it to the constitutional restraints
on government action. Specifically, Tulane* s refusal to
admit Blacks involved the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 8
State financial assistance . In Grossner v. Trustees
of Columbia University in the City of N.Y. , 9 the district
5 Id . at 863-4.
6 See Chapter IV, pp. 112-120.
7Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University of
Louisiana
,
supra note 3 at 859.
8 A1though Judge Wright's decision was based on specific
findings of state involvement with the institution, rather
than just the public function theory, his views on the func-
tion of education have not been accepted by most courts
hearing these kinds of cases.
9 2 87 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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court refused to grant a preliminary injunction to restrain
the university from disciplining several students who had
allegedly participated in demonstrations and the occupation
of buildings on campus. The students argued that although
Columbia was a private university, it was performing a public
function. Furthermore, it was significantly entwined with
the City and the State of New York so as to constitute its
acts as state acts. The university maintained that it was
a private institution and, therefore, not required to
comport to the constitutional demands of the Fourteenth
Amendment
.
The students argued that the university received
substantial public funds; "some 49,500,000 dollars in 1966
out of a total of 117,500,000 dollars, and in 1967, about
59,700,000 dollars of a total of 134,300,000 dollars." 10
The students further contended that the lease of public
lands for the building of a gymnasium indicated another
form of governmental benefit and assistance. 11 They also
believed a finding of state action was appropriate because.
In many respects, both insofar as the power it
exercises over students and insofar as defendant
Columbia University fulfills a public function of
educating persons, it may be likened to a "company
town" or a "party primary system." 12
A final claim of state involvement was the fact that
the New York county district attorney was also a member of
1 2
1
°Id. at 546
.
1
1
Id. at 547. Ibid.
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the Board of Trustees. Because criminal actions were filed
and apparently being processed by the district attorney's
office, the students claimed this was direct state partici-
pation.
In rendering the decision of the Court, Judge
Frankel rejected the students' contentions:
The claim that the University receives larger
amounts of "government" money is grossly inflated in a
significant respect and relatively insubstantial in
any event. The inflation inheres in the fact that
something over 80% of the public funds
. . . comes from
the Federal rather than the State Government. The
jurisdiction ... is available for state, not for
federal action. 13 (Italics mine.)
The judge further declined to accept the students'
argument that the university performed a public function.
That Columbia performs a "public function" in
educating persons which may be likened to a "company
town" or a "party primary system"— is briefly, without
any basis. It is not sounder for Columbia than it
would be for Notre Dame or Yeshiva. Of course [students]
are correct in a trivial way when they say education is
"impressed with a public interest". . . . But nothing
supports the thesis that university (or private
elementary) "education" as such is "state action." 14
1
3
Ibid .
This seems to be a strange doctrine, for it implies
that a private institution is less amenable to suit in the
federal courts when it is dependent upon federal funds when
it depends to the same degree upon state funds. Although the
jurisdictional statute does address action "under color of
state law," so literal reading seems incompatible with the
objectives of the original civil rights legislation. Robert
M. O'Neil, "Private Universities and Public Law," 19 Buffalo
L. Rev . 155, 181 (1970).
1 4 Id. at 549.
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Judge Frankel then developed an aspect of state
action previously discussed by other courts when he declared:
What is still more striking is the total absence
of any indication that the State (or any government)is
. involved as a participant in the University disci-plinary proceedings to which the motion for a prelim-inary injunction is directed. 15
The court did, however, indicate that because the
district attorney had been named as a defendant in the case,
additional issues may be posed. Judge Frankel acknowledged
that official actions by them is state action, but that it
raises questions of "wrongs committed other than those
involved in the preliminary injunction motion." 16 Because
the court found no state action present in Columbia Univer-
sity's acts, the preliminary injunction sought by the
students was denied.
Public college within a private university: "Current
tests" for state action . In 1970, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit was faced with the dilemma of applying
the state action concept to private higher education.
Students at Alfred University were suspended "on the spot"
by the Dean of Students for participating in efforts to
disrupt an awards ceremony for the R.O.T.C. parents' day
%
1 5 Id. at 548. Apparently, Judge Frankel does not consider
the distfrict attorney's prosecution of the students for
violations brought by the university, as direct involvement
in the disciplinary procedures; even though the district
attorney is also a menber of the Board of Trustees.
1 6 Id. at 553.
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program held at the university's football field. The
dean's actions were upheld by a faculty committee, so the
students sought reinstatement in a federal district court.
Because Alfred University was a private institution, the
court concluded that it had no jurisdiction under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 17 as it relates to actions under color
of state law. 18 The students, believing that the university
was so entwined with the state to constitute state action,
appealed to the second circuit. 19
Alfred University is a small liberal arts college in
western New York, not unlike private colleges such as
Hobart, St. Bonaventure, or Wells. But there is one major
difference on which the case turned: Alfred is the site of
the ceramics college of the State University of New York,
one of six specialized "contract colleges" that comprise a
distinctive part of New York's hybrid system of public higher
education. 20 The state pays the entire operating costs of
the ceramics college through a line item in the annual S.U.N.Y.
17 42 U.S.C., section 1983.
1
8
Powe v. Miles
,
294 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D.N.Y. 1968).
1
9
Powe v. Miles , 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
2
°Four of the other contract colleges are at Cornell; the
fifth is the College of Forestry at Syracuse University.
Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 158.
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budget. 21 The state also pays a certain amount per credit
hour for courses which ceramics students take in the liberal
arts departments of the university. in addition, New York
pays a pro rata share of the administrative costs of the
institution, including the salaries of Alfred's president,
dean of students, and other university officials. The
faculty of the ceramics college, although paid by the state,
are hired and promoted on the same basis as liberal arts
professors. The ceramics college students enroll at and
receive a degree from Alfred, and the university is respon-
sible for "the maintenance of discipline and
. . . all
matters pertaining to its educational policies, activities
and operations ... as the representatives of the state
university system." 22 The seven students who were suspended
included four enrolled in the liberal arts college and
three in the ceramics college.
Judge Henry Friendly rendered the decision of the
three judge court. In deciding this case. Judge Friendly
was presented with three options: To uphold the district
21 The appropriation for the ceramics college during the
year of this case was approximately 1.8 million dollars. Powe
v. Miles
,
294 F. Supp. 1269, 1292 (W.D.N.Y. 1968). This
figure represented 27.5% of the total university budget.
There are 550 students and 40 faculty members in the ceramics
college as compared with the university total of 1,800
students and 140 faculty. Students in the ceramics college
take some courses in the liberal arts, and liberal arts
students may take courses in the ceramics college. Powe v.
Miles
,
407 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1968).
22 N.Y. Education Law, section 6102 (McKinney 1953) as
reported in Powe
,
supra note 18 at 75-76 fn. 3.
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court's decision that it lacked jurisdiction because Alfred
acted under color of no state law; to find state action as to
the institution because of its significant relation with the
State of New York; or to find state action only as to the
students enrolled in the ceramics college. 23 The court
chose to follow the latter course. Judge Friendly found that
as to the ceramics students, there was state action "for the
seemingly simple but entirely sufficient reason that the
state willed it that way." 24 Under the New York statute,
the dean of students acted as the representative of the
trustees of S.U.N.Y. system in making and enforcing rules
against these students. 25 Judge Friendly proceeded to
explain that the "very name of the college identifies it
as a state institution ... we see no reason why the state
shouldn't be taken at its word." 26 He continued;
The students of the New York State College of Ceramics
can properly regard themselves as receiving a public
education and entitled to be treated by those in charge
in the same way as their counterparts in other portions
of the State University. 27
The court next turned to the question of state action
regarding the four liberal arts students. Here, Judge
2 3 Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 159.
24 Powe v. Miles , supra note 18 at 82.
2 5 Ikid .
2 6 Ibid.
27 Id. at 83.
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Friendly drew a sharp distinction. He noted that the college
was chartered by the state, receiving some financial assis-
tance from the federal and state governments, and to some
degree benefited from the presence of the state's ceramics
college financially and in prestige. The court did not
these reasons to be an adequate basis for state action
as to the dismissal of the liberal arts students. Judge
Friendly also did not find state action in the interdependence
and close involvement with the state, ruling that the ceramics
college was separable from the actions of the university. He
also rejected the contention that the function of the univer-
sity was analogous to a "company town" or "shopping center"
open to the public. 28 He pointed out that the university
was in general "open only to persons connected with the
university or licensed by it to participate in or attend
athletic contests or other events." 29
The court, having rejected all the liberal arts
students' arguments, specified the most frequently used
test of state action:
28 Id. at 80.
2
9
Ibid. It should be remembered that the alleged mis-^
conduct took place on the university's football field at the
R.O.T.C. parents' day award ceremony. It is interesting to
note that Judge Friendly did not even consider that during
the disruption the field was being utilized by the R.O.T.C.
which must be considered an agency of the government.
132
activitv of fh
involved not simply with somey t e institution alleged to have inflictedinjury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that
thTtt
1
^
Ury * Putting the point another way,
Iht l
ct
t
on
' not the private action, must bet e subject of complaint. 3 °
Although the state paid for a third of the dean of student’s
salary, who imposed the suspension, the court found him
acting as a private official in his handling of the liberal
arts students. The court thus explained:
We do not have at all a case where the wholly state-
supported activity is so dominant that the private
activity could be deemed to have been swallowed up. 31
Upon deciding that the liberal arts students had no claim
under the Civil Rights Act, 32 the court returned to the
issues presented by the ceramics college students. Although
the court did find these students entitled to constitutional
safeguards, it found the dean of students' actions and the
university's guidelines reasonable, and wholly consistent
with the case law concerning the rights of public college
30 Id. at 81. Professor O'Neil has taken objection to
this test:
This requirement that the injury complained of be
inflicted by that part of the institution in which the
governmental involvement is clear seems out of keeping
with the developed principles in this field. ... No
such requirement seems to have been imposed in several
other contexts where state action has been on the part
of private institutions. (Robert M. O'Neil, supra note
13 at 160.)
3
1
Id. at 82.
3 £ U . S . C
. ,
section 1983.
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students. 33 Therefore, the circuit court affirmed the
district court's decision as applied to the liberal arts
students and modified the opinion so that the complaint of
the ceramics students was dismissed on the merits rather
than for lack of federal jurisdiction. 3
4
It should be noted that Judge Friendly did acknowledge
the difficulty Alfred would face with different sets of
rules for the students at the university.
If we should hold there was state action with
respect to the C.C. students, it would be impracticable
to have different rules for the two groups. Perhaps
so, but that would be Alfred's problem. Whether or not
it decided to establish the same policies for students
outside C.C. was for those within it, its choice and
the administration of the policies chosen for the
former would be private action. 35
Tax exemptions . In a similar case. Browns v. Mitchell
,
3 6
a federal circuit court rejected student arguments claiming
that the University of Denver was involved in state action
when it summarily suspended them for refusing to vacate a
university building in which they were demonstrating.
3
3
Id. at 85. See also the cases presented in Chapter III
on the
-
right of public college students to due process and
free expression.
34 Powe v. Miles is important because it formulated the
principle which has been used as the legal test for deter-
mining state action in similar cases. That is:
The state must be involved not simply with some activity
of the institution . . . but with the activity that
caused the injury . . . the state action, not the private
action, must be the subject of the complaint. ( Powe v.
Miles, supra note 18 at 81.)
3 5 Id. at 82.
3 6 409 F . 2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
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The students maintained that although the university
received no direct state aid, 37 it is tax exempt and,
... by virtue of the original territorial charterincorporating Colorado Seminary, the university receives
a special tax exemption not enjoyed by other like
corporations in that the income from its non-educationalincome producing property is also non-taxable
.
3
8
The court rejected this argument:
Assuming that the special tax exemption is tanta-
mount to a financial contribution and that it was
intended to and does generally promote public education,
there is nothing in the record to indicate that this
bounty is or can be utilized in any way to dictate or
influence the administration of university affairs.
And even more critically, there is no suggestion that
the claimed involvement is in any way associated with
the challenged activity. 39
Chief Judge Murrah, relying on the test adopted by Powe,
declared
:
The benefits conferred however characterized have
no bearing on the challenged actions beyond the perpet-
uation of the institution itself. This we hold to be
short of the requisite state involvement. 40
It should be noted that the court indicated, in dicta
,
that if the actions of the students had taken place in a public
area of the university and that a finding of state action
3
7
"Indeed, the State of Colorado is prohibited by its
Constitution from making appropriations for any educational
activity not under the absolute power of the State." Browns
v. Mitchell , 409 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1969).
3 8 Ibid .
3 9 Id . at 596.
4 0 Ibid.
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may have been appropriate only in such areas. 1* 1 Although
this was incidental to the issues in the case, it is
important because it marked the first time a federal court
of appeals acknowledged that the public function theory
might apply to private higher education.
State intervention in college functions
. Coleman
v * Wagner College 42 presented another opportunity for the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to tackle the
question of state action in private higher education. In
1970, 24 students were expelled from Wagner College after
repeated warnings to vacate the dean's office. The students
received a notice of expulsion, but it did not specify the
college rule they were alleged to have violated. They were
also required to leave the Wagner campus prior to the time
the faculty council could hear their appeal. 43
After failing to convince the college to stay the
order requiring them to leave the campus, 24 of the expelled
students brought their case to court. The students alleged
that the procedures employed by the court in issuing their
expulsions did not comport to the requirements of due process.
41 That judged by the totality of its public functions,
this university may be likened to Marsh . . . for the
purpose of exercising First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights in its public ways. ( Ibid .
)
4 2 429 F. 2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
4 3 Id. at 1123.
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The students sought a hearing that would conform to the
constitutional requirements of due process. The district
court, after considering the question of state responsibility
for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions by Wagner College,
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Because
the students did not show state action, the court declined
to interfere with the internal operations of a private
college
.
4 4
On appeal, the students did not claim that all of the
actions of Wagner College, an institution affiliated with
the Lutheran Church and supported almost entirely by private
funds, are actions of the state. They did allege that:
(1) The State of New York passed legislation in 1969
requiring all colleges and universities in the state to
file with the regents and commissioner of education "rules
and regulations for the maintenance of public order on
college campuses; 45 and (2) "The penalties for violations
4
4
Ibid.
4 5 Id . at 1122.
The trustees or other governing board of every
college chartered by the regents or incorporated by
special acts of the legislature shall adopt rules and
regulations for the maintenance of public order on
college campuses and other college property used for
educational purposes and provide a program for the
enforcement thereof. Such rules and regulations shall
govern the conduct of students ... on such campuses
and property. The penalties for violations of such
rules and regulations shall be clearly set forth therein
and shall include provisions for the ejection of a
violator. . . . Such rules and regulations shall be
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of such rules and regulations [were to] be clearly set
forth therein," 46 and could include "suspension, expulsion
or other appropriate disciplinary action, 47 for student
violators. Therefore, colleges which failed to file such
rules and regulations lost their eligibility for state aid
to education.
%
The court noted that this case presented an interesting
variation on the "familiar theme of state action." In the
previous cases, the presence of state action has been alleged
because a private organization has undertaken to perform a
public function. Here, the approach to state action is the
"converse of the public function doctrine." 48 The state has
intervened in the performance of a function traditionally
entrusted to private institutions—the maintenance of internal
order. By so doing, it has subjected the imposition of
filed with the regents and the commissioner of educa-
tion not later than ninety days after the effective date
of this act. All amendments to such rules and regula-
tions shall be filed with the regents and the commis-
sioner of education not later than ten days after their
adoption. ... If the trustees . . . of a college fail
to file the rules and regulations within the time
required by this section, such college shall not be
eligible to receive any state aid or assistance until
such rules and regulations are duly filed. (New York
State Education Law, McKinneys Consolidated Laws c.16,
section 6450 .
)
4
6
Ibid .
4 7 Ibid
.
4 8 Id . at 1121.
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disciplinary sanctions by private colleges and universities
to scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. 49
Although the court was impressed with this argument,
it wasn't convinced. In referring to their previous holding
in Powe v. Miles
,
Judge Kaufman explained:
Neither the New York legislature, the regents, nor
the commissioner of education ever granted approval to
the particular conduct sought to be challenged.
. . .
Nor, in our view, was Wagner College's expulsion of
twenty-four students in a campus demonstration closely
tied to traditional governmental functions.
. . .
Moreover, it appears to us that the "regulations of
college discipline embodied in section 6450 appears
almost devoid of meaningful content." Colleges are not
required to secure approval of rules and regulations
[they] merely file them with the designated officials. 50
Judge Kaufman appeared to be headed for a strict
adherence to the Powe v. Miles test, (direct state involve-
ment in the action complained of ); but, he stopped short of
this by noting that the statute
. . . may be intended or applied as a command to the
colleges of the state to adopt a new, more severe
attitude toward campus disruption and to impose harsh
sanctions on unruly students. ... If [this] con-
sideration has merit and section 6450 was intended
to coerce colleges to adopt disciplinary codes em-
bodying a "hard line" attitude toward student protes-
ters, it would appear that New York has indeed "under-
taken to set policy for the control of demonstrations
in all private universities" and should be held respon-
sible for the implementation of this policy. 5
Because the court would not resolve this issue with
the facts before it. Judge Kaufman remanded the case for
further hearings to determine whether or not section 6450
represented a meaningful state intrusion into the disciplinary
5 o Id. at 1124. 5
1
Id . at 1125.
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policies of private colleges.
A concurring opinion in this case was filed by Judge
Friendly. He agreed that the district erred in dismissing
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction; however, he disagreed
with the majority in remanding for further hearings. Judge
Friendly, author of the Powe decision, believed that state
action had been established. Therefore, he would have heard
the case and decided it on the merits. Arriving at this
conclusion. Judge Friendly based his decision on two con-
siderations
.
Plainly one objective of the New York legislation
was to deter student disturbances by the clear announce-
ment of rules of conduct and of the penalties for dis-
obedience. That is fair enough; indeed it is a principal
justification for our system of criminal sanctions. But
if the state wishes the benefits of such deterrence in
private colleges, must it not accept responsibility for
preventing overdeterrence by excessive sanctions for
lack of fair procedure for enforcement? Furthermore,
and perhaps still more important, do not rules of private
colleges framed in response to a state mandate have a
significantly different symbolic appearance than rules
formulated in the absence of such a statute? 52
Judge Friendly then addressed the actions of Wagner
College. The institution had enacted rules and regulations
concerning student discipline and prefaced this document
with a statement that these rules were promulgated "in
accordance with the newly enacted New York Public Law 129(a),
which required such a document.' 1 The document then set out
52 Id. at 1126.
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section 6450 of the Education Law in its entirety. Judge
Friendly noted that the "circulation of such a document fits
rather precisely with the principle set forth in Griffin v.
Mary ! and.
"
5 3 Furthermore, objections to the very existence
of a detailed code would be met by the answer that one was
state implied. He concluded his argument by explaining that:
When a state has gone so far in directing private
action that citizens may reasonably believe this to
have been taken at the state's instance, state action
may legitimately be found even though the state left
the private actors complete freedom of choice. 54
Citing Burton
,
Judge Friendly indicated that here
. . . the State has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence
. . . that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity, which on that account, cannot be considered
to have been so purely private as to fall without the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. 55
The majority of the court was not willing to go as
far as Judge Friendly although they did consider the New
York legislation significant enough to warrant further
proceedings
.
Substantial financial support . In Brown v. Strickler , 5 6
a group of students were summarily expelled from the
*
- -
‘
<
5 3 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1964). "If an individual is posses-
sed of state authority and purports to act under that author-
ity, his action is state action."
5 4 Coleman v. Wagner College , supra note 42 at 1127.
55 Burton v. Wi lmington Parking Authority, et. al. , 365
U.S. 715, 725 (1961)
.
5 6 422 F . 2d 1000 (6th Cir. 1970).
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University of Louisville. The students filed suit in a
federal district court alleging that their expulsion consti-
tuted state action and thus deprived them of their consti-
tutional rights of due process. The district court dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, because "the operation
of University of Louisville cannot be characterized as
a public function for purposes of Title 42 U.S.C., section
1983.
"
5 7
The court of appeals disagreed:
The University of Louisville
. . . receives sub-
stantial financial support from the City of Louisvill
the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the United States
Government. "An institution such as this, serving
an important public function and financed by public
funds .is sufficiently linked with the state for its
acts to be subject to the limitations of the Four-
teenth Amendment .
"
5 8
In a brief opinion, the appellate court reversed and
remanded the case to the district court explaining that these
students were entitled to due process because the university's
actions "must be regarded as having been taken under color
of law." 59
Education as a public function . Washington University
was faced with a law suit of a different nature. In Belk
57 Id. at 1001.
5 8 Ibid -
59 Ibid. It would have been helpful to the reader if the
court had expounded on the indicia necessary to find state
action. Apparently, this court found it an easy case to find
state action; whereas the other courts have found it just as
easy to find no state action under apparently similar situ-
ations .
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v * The_ Chancellor of Washington University . 60 an action
was brought, not by the demonstrators, but, by the other
students affected by the demonstrations. The students
filed a class action suit seeking a mandatory injunction
that would order the chancellor to prevent repeated dis-
ruption of classes and educational activities. They fur-
ther sought to enjoin him from condoning or encouraging or
knowingly failing to prevent activities which he knew or
should have known would have the effect of abridging the
rights of students who desire to engage in educational
activities
.
The students contended that although this was a
private university, the deprivation of their right to
participate in an orderly education constituted state action
in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The chancellor moved to dismiss the action on
the grounds that the federal court had no jurisdiction
because his actions were the internal concerns of a private
university.
The court did not agree. Judge Harper declared:
This court holds that the conduct of the chief
executive of a private university, in light of the
public function of a private university in education,
could amount to sufficient "state action" in order to
grant jurisdiction to this court. It now remains for
the plaintiff at the trial to prove such allegations
as would confer the necessary jurisdiction. 6
6 0 336 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Mo. 1970). 61 Id. at 49 *
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Although the case is not definitive, it is worth
noting because the court relied primarily on the public
function theory propounded by Judge Skelley Wright in
Guillory
. Here the court announced:
The acts of a private university can constitute "state
action" when said university is denying to its students
their right to participate in the educational process.
Education is a public function
. The state granted a
charter under which said university could operate as
an educational institution. Hence, the private univer-
sity's performance of a public function could render
its action subject to constitutional restraints. 62
(Italics mine
.
)
Substantial involvement with a state agency . In Ryan
v. Hofstra University
,
6 3
a student was accused of destroying
school property. He was expelled and fined $1,000 for
the damages done. 64 Ryan, believing that he was unfairly
disciplined, filed suit in the state court alleging that the
procedures the university employed to expel him violated his
rights to due process. He contended that the university was
engaged in state action when it disciplined him, and, there-
fore, should have been controlled by constitutional inhi-
bitions. The university, however, made "no claim to the
6
2
Id. at 48. Implied in this statement is the assertion
that a
-
private university's performance of a public function
could render its inactions subject to constitutional require-
ments.
6 3 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. 1971).
64 The decision turned not only on the state action theory,
but also on the elements of contract and inherent authority.
For an account of the facts and these aspects of the case,
see Chapter II, pp. 14-29.
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reasonableness of its procedures, its position being that
it is a private university unfettered by any community
standards .
"
6 5
In a lengthy opinion, Justice Harnett delivered
the ruling of the court. He began his examination of
Hofstra 1 s relationship with the state by stating:
The responsiveness of private universities to
constitutional inhibitions is a lively current topic.
Because of the essential need for academic freedom, a
justly careful watch must be kept on outside inter-
ference in educational institutions. Yet, the principle
of personal right is also an essential need of demo-
cratic society. In this competition of principle, a
constitutional domino theory is occasionally advanced
under which any collegiate restriction is viewed as
an opening fall which will surely tumble the entire
institutional array.
We cannot agree that the right of academic freedom
requires the total preclusion of personal rights,
whether they be of faculty, students, or affected
members of the public. Where a "right" can be identi-
fied, its force and priority must be measured with the
conflicting rights of others. These questions of
social balance weave through our whole constitutional
texture
.
6 6
After establishing the issue of balancing rights.
Justice Harnett addressed the contention that Hofstra Univer-
sity was engaged in state action. He noted that Hofstra
. .
. has the major state goverrmental presence of the
New York Dormitory Authority ... [and] over half of
the total book value of Hofstra University consists
6 5 Ryan v. Hofstra University , supra note 63 at 974.
6 6 Id. at 977.
of assets not only constructed but owned bv theDormitory Authority
.
67 y
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He also found that the size and dispersion of these
facilities "make it useless to think of Hofstra as a fully
functioning university apart from them, they are integral
to the university." 68 in addition, the court took notice
that signs declaring the authority facilities appeared
conspiciously throughout the university," and that the
offenses committed by Ryan occurred on authority
property.
Although the university's involvement with the
Dormitory Authority was sufficient to find state action in
this case. Justice Harnett also noted that over $1,000,000
out of the total university budget of $25,000,000 comes
67 Id. at 979.
Formed under the provisions of the New York Public
Authorities Law, sections 1675-1692, the Dormitory
Authority constructs dormitories and other buildings
for universities, state operated, statutory and contract
colleges, as well as other higher educational institu-
tions such as Hofstra. Under the statutes, the state
owns the facilities and leases them to universities
authorized to confer degrees by the State Board of
Regents. This includes Hofstra. The construction
money comes from municipal bonds issued by the public
authority upon the guaranty of the public authority.
The Dormitory Authority itself has the power, under
Public Authorities Law, section 1670, to make by-laws
for the management and regulation of its affairs, and
to maintain and operate its buildings. . . .
6 8 Ibid.
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directly from governmental grants, that during the past five
years it received over $3,000,000 in direct federal constru-
tion grants, and that the large majority of students at the
university receive state scholarships and incentives. He
also highlighted the fact that 125 acres of Hofstra's 225
acre campus was donated to the institution from the federal
government and all the land is tax exempt. Another form of
involvement was indicated by the operation of a police
training center by Hofstra for the county of Nassau.
Justice Harnett, armed with the indicia above and the
cases previously discussed in the chapter as precedent, could
have found state action in this case and stopped here. But
he went further. Although he acknowledged that some of
Hofstra's assets are owned by a university corporation.
Justice Harnett explained:
"Private" connotes ownership or possession by some-
body. No private person owns Hofstra University or
its property directly, nor even indirectly in the form
of shares of stock. The university is replete with
public interest, requirement and supervision. The
university is in the most real comparable sense a
public trust for the rendition of education. It is
only for this reason that so much public worth and
effort has been supplied to it.
A private university like Hofstra is an oligarchal
form tending to be self-perpetuating. Its fundamental
legal responsibilities are to the public. Its existence
and favored position can be justified only as a public
stewardship. 6 9
6 9 Id. at 981.
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The court further explained that Hofstra operates
under a charter from the New York State Board of Regents
which can move to dissolve the university corporation if it
ceases its educational functions
.
70 The court also noted
that Hofstra' s degree requirements are controlled by the
Board of Regents . 71
Justice Harnett continued in an unprecedented fashion
by examining the "deminishing difference" between public
and private colleges:
In modern practice, there is a deminishing dif-
ference between the actual operation of the universities,
whether they be "public" or "private" in format. While
the state university system is under the control of the
governor and the legislature, it is financing which
forms the dominant relationship of the state politic
to its own schools. Substantial autonomy is afforded
boards and faculties, which abound with private citi-
zens in board positions. To a greater degree, state
universities are operating internally free of public
political control. On the other hand, "Private"
universities financed through state action also have
important regulation by the State Board of Regents.
And so the two types continually approach a similar
reality. The state makes the university fiscally pos-
sible. The university's Board of Trustees, the faculty
and school administration make the place .
7
The court found that Hofstra University was engaged in
state action when it expelled Ryan, and, therefore, its
procedures should have been commensurate with the constitu-
tional requirements contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court based its opinion on three considerations.
First,
Hofstra 's significant involvement with the Dormitory
Authority
7 27 0 Ibid
.
7
1
Ibid. Ibid
.
and other state benefits; second Hofstra was performing a
public function; and third:
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Here, as in the Burton case, the state could have
affirmatively required Hofstra to discharge minimum
guarantees of constitutional procedures in nonacademic
discipline for offenses against property as a condition
of state participation ... no state may effectively
abdicate its responsibilities by ignoring them or by
failing to discharge them no matter the motive. 73
Therefore, Ryan was ordered reinstated to the univer-
sity. Hofstra was to provide the student with a proper
hearing if it wished to reinstitute the disciplinary proce-
edings against him. Those proceedings would have to be com-
mensurate with due process afforded to students at public
institutions as specified in the Dixon case. 74
73 Id. at 983.
74 Id. at 984. This case is especially interesting because
a state court went farther than any federal court in _ upholding
federal constitutional rights. It had been the opinion of the
author that civil liberties were more ostensibly protected
in federal rather than state courts. Perhaps New York students
or teachers alleging state action would do better filing suit
in state courts. For this opinion seems to indicate that there
really is no such thing as a private university unfettered
with constitutional restraints on its actions.
Compare this case with Blackburn v. Fisk University,
443 F . 2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) in which
-
the court m a very
brief opinion held that the university was not engaged in
state action when it suspended students without a hearing.
The court found that: n«vn 7afP H
state involvement sufficient to transform a private
university into a "state" university requires more
than
merely chartering the university, providing
financial a
in the form of public funds, or granting a tax
exemption.
(Id. at 123.)
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The sale or granting of public property
. In Grafton
v. Brooklyn Law School
,
75 Judge Friendly was called upon
again by students alleging that their school was involved
in state action. In 1973, Brooklyn Law School expelled two
students for scholastic deficiencies. The students argued
that they were actually being expelled for expressing their
%
views on the Vietnam War and as members of the school news-
paper writing a critical editorial on state judges.
Brooklyn Law School, originally a division of St.
Lawrence University, became a wholly independent school in
1941. It operates under a charter granted by the State
Board of Regents. It has adopted policies and practices
entitling it to be considered an "approved" law school
established by the New York Court of Appeals so that a graduate
is eligible to take the state bar examination without having
studied for four years in a law office. 76 The school receives
some financial aid from the state. In 1965, it was the sole
bidder on a public building which now houses the law school.
As the only bidder, the law school received the facilities at
7 7
a cost far below its actual value.
The students maintained that the above indicia were
sufficient to have a finding of state action. Judge
Friendly
7 5
478 F . 2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
76 Id. at 1139.
7 7 Id. at 1141.
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was not impressed. Referring to his earlier opinion in
Powe v. Miles
,
he explained that "the mere granting of
property to assist the construction of an educational
facility has not been thought sufficient to convert it from
a private into a public institution." 78
Although this case concerned a law school. Judge
Friendly still rejected the public function theory applying
to private higher education:
The circumstance that we are here dealing with a
law school rather than a liberal arts college does not
make law teaching "governmental in nature" . . . the
mere fact that a school is giving instruction the suc-
cessful completion of which affords one, and the more
generally desired, party to the taking of a state bar
examination, does not make its function any more govern-
mental than the imparting of the pre-legal instruction
which is also required. 79
Therefore, Judge Friendly found no state action as
required by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, thus, giving the
court no jurisdiction on which to hear the merits of the case.
7 8 Ibid .
7 9 Ibid .
80 Consider: Massachusetts has no public law schools. The
people and state are wholly dependent on the private sector
to produce persons trained in the law. With the accepted
these oeople play in society, one would be hard pressed
not
find the private law schools performing a vital public
function
invested with the highest public interest.
Another aspect Judge Friendly perhaps shouxd have
con-
sidered is the distinction between an undergraduate
liberal
arts college and a professional school. If
^
n
a^
d
^
d
^^ listic
expelled or suspended from a law school, what re
the rea
chances of that person being accepted by "er school? The
possible harm to the individual no longer ablate
pursu
or her chosen profession, is no small loss.
bureiy n
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Federal financial assistance
. The latest case raising
the issue of state action and private education is Williams
v » Howard University
.
81 A student applied for readmission
to the medical school after withdrawing for medical reasons.
The school's executive committee denied his application on
the basis of his unsatisfactory performance in his first
and second years of study. After Williams was refused a
hearing on the matter, he filed suit alleging that Howard
University denied him due process to which he was entitled;
because, Howard was substantially funded by the federal
government and tax exempt, thus making Howard's action
federal action. 82
In a brief three page opinion, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's grant of Howard's motion for
summary judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The court first
dispelled the state action claim by explaining that the
District of Columbia is not considered a "state or territory
within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. Thus, the
student's claim of jurisdiction under that provision fails.
The court next turned to the issue of alleged federal
action. It acknowledged that if the student could demonstrate
of fairness should require the minimal safeguards
afforded
students at public colleges and universities.
8
1
528 F . 2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
8 2 Id . at 660
.
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that Howard's involvement with the federal crovernment was
sufficient to make Howard's readmission decisic. equivalent
to federal action, the school would be subject to due process
• The court did not believe there was governmental
action.
There is no doubt that Howard's action has serious
consequences for appellant but it is not subject to
all the constraints put on governmental action by the
due process clause.
Furthermore, the court held:
. . . the fact that the federal government contributes
funds to the university, by itself, is insufficient to
show the exercise of influence on university decision
making or the encouragement of specific policies
. . .
we must conclude that federal jurisdiction does not
exist for his due process claim, because it has not been
shown that the government exercises some form of control
over the actions of Howard. 83
8 3 Ibid . It is indeed curious that the court can hold that
funding is not sufficient, when in the case of Howard, the
federal government contributes almost all of the operating
costs of the institution; a large share of the capital con-
struction funds come directly from Congress; the administration
is subject to extensive regulation by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare; faculty appointments are processed on
regular civil service forms; and the university is frequently
listed in official documents as a federal quasi-governmental
agency (see "Reasonable Rules, Reasonably Enforced--Guidelines
for University Disciplinary Proceedings," 53 Minn. L. Rev.
301, 308 n. 44 (1968). If the removal of federal assistance
would mean the end of Howard University , does this not make
the government a partner at least or more precisely the govern-
ment's allowing private individuals to administer its programs.
As Burton demonstrated, this is exactly the significant^involve-
ment between government and private parties that constitute the
actions of both as governmental.
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Summary and comment
. These cases have exemplified the
position courts have taken concerning the concept of state
action and private higher education. 84 Most courts are not
disposed to finding state action in the context of student
discipline or expression. But several of these courts indi-
cated that, had racial discrimination been alleged, they may
%
have been inclined to find state action because of the
invidiousness of the constitutional violation alleged. 85
See also: Counts v. Voorhees College
,
312 F. Supp. 598(D.S.C. 1970), public function insufficient for a finding of
state action; Torres v. Puerto Rico Jr. College
,
289 F. Supp.
458 (D.P.R. 1969), receiving some federal financial aid insuf-
ficient for finding of state action; Robinson v. Davis
,
447
F . 2d 753 (4th Cir
. 1971), state action not involved when campus
security work for both town and college. Related cases:
Greenya v. George Washington University
,
512 F.2d 556 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)
,
higher education not state action so as to trig-
ger First and Fifth Amendment rights in university's relations
with employees; Wahba v. N . Y . U
.
,
492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974),
federal research grant insufficient for finding of state
action requiring hearing for dismissed teacher working under
such grant.
85 See, e.g., Powe v. Miles
,
407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968);
Browns v. Mitchel l
,
409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Grossner
v. Trustees of Columbia University in City of N.Y.
,
287 F.
Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
I decline to accept this position.
It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to arrange
federal constitutional rights in an ascending hierarchy
of value. What is clear is that any deprivation of such
a right, whether to the equal protection of laws as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment or to the freedoms
of speech and association as guaranteed by the First
Amendment, is a matter of extreme importance to the
person who suffers the deprivation. It is equally clear
that the courts should be especially sensitive to any
such deprivation, whether it involves a black man who
is refused service in a segregated restaurant, or two
[students] disciplined for speaking their minds about a
university’s publication policies. The freedoms of
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The leading case in this field is Powe v. Miles which
established the legal test for finding state action in private
higher education. Although the Supreme Court has not ruled
on this controversial area, 86 many courts have applied the
test established in Powe :
The state must be involved not simply with some activity
of the institution alleged to have inflicted injury
upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the
injury. Putting the point another way, the state action,
not the private action, must be the subject of com-
plaint. 87
These courts have held that the state must be signifi-
cantly entwined with the private college so as to constitute
speech and association have been held so fundamental
to the concept of ordered liberty that they have been
incorporated into the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Clearly then, the courts should be
alert to their infringement "under color of" state law,
and quick to vindicate them if they have in fact been
curtailed. (Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple Univer-
sity
,
385 F. Supp. 473 [E.D. Pa. 1974], state action
present in dismissal of two faculty members, therefore.
Temple required to provide hearing consistent with
Fourteenth Amendment.)
86 The Supreme Court may have come closer to hearing a case
concerning state action and private education when it held
that private schools (with some exceptions) could not refuse
to admit qualified Blacks to their schools. In McCrary v.
Runyon, 44 U.S.L.W. 5025 (1976), the court held that a private
school's policy of refusing to admit Blacks solely because
of their race violates the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.,
section 1981, by denying Blacks the same right "to make and
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.
This case was not decided on state action but it is importan
to this study because for the first time the Supreme Court
has "entered the dominion" of private education, and holding
it responsible to certain aspects of public policy.
8
7
Powe v. Miles, supra note 19 at 81. As previously
discussed, this "test" appears to be more strict than the
one developed in Burton , the leading case concerning state
action.
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state action. This entwinement has taken many different
forms, but the courts will not recognize a claim of state
action unless to a significant extent the state has become
involved with the private action. As the above cases have
indicated, courts have considered the following indicia
to determine the state's involvement with private colleges:
(1) Does the university perform a public or governmental
function? (2) Does the state grant the university substan-
tial financial assistance, particularly in th.e form of
grants or direct appropriations? (3) Does the university
issue statements in its catalog and other publications
emphasizing its close relationship with state facilities?
(4) Is the university exempt from taxation? (5) Are any of
the university's activities subject to state control or
supervision? (6) Does continued financial assistance depend
on the university's filing with the state written rules and
regulations governing students? (7) Has the state donated
or leased buildings or land to the university? (8) Has the
university been granted a charter by the state? (9) Does
the charter reserve the power to the state to make amendments
without the university's consent? (10) Does the university
receive surplus government property? (11) Does the state
appoint all or some of the trustees? (This fact alone might
support a finding of state action.)
As the cases illustrated, state action normally will
not be found if only one or a few of the above indicia
are
156
present. However, if a college is involved with the state
in a number of the above ways, a few courts are willing to
declare the college and state significantly entwined.
In sum, although most courts have not been willing
to accept the above factors of involvement as important,
a few courts have found state action present where it
has been shown that a number of the indicia are involved in
the relationship. Only a couple of courts have found state
action present when only one of the indicia signifies the
relationship of the college and state . In addition, there
are some factors which would indicate still further entwine-
ment between state and private colleges that have not been
reviewed. One area of involvement is in accreditation. 88
The fact that a public or private college is accredited
enhances its reputation, attracts students and faculty and
8 8 Paul L. Dressel , "Accreditation and Institutional Self-
study," The North Central Association Quarterly 46 (Fall 1971)
277-287.' "
, .
.
Accreditation as practiced by institutions of higher
education in the United States, is without parallel elsewhere
in the world. Through regional accrediting associations,
colleges and universities have banded together to establish
accrediting procedures which: (1) Certify to the general
public, to government, and to other institutions, the presence
of at least minimal qualifications in the institutions ac-
.
credited; (2) provide limited protection to the public against
degree mills and disreputable educational policies by their
inability to acquire accreditation; (3) provide counsel an
assistance to new and developing institutions moving toward
accreditation; (4) encourage improvement in institutions y
review activities; and (5) provide some protection to insti-
tutions against threatened encroachments on their autonomy
which might also be destructive to educational quality.
Id. at 277.
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furthers communications with other institutions. More
importantly
,
an institution cannot receive government grant
monies if it is not accredited.
The state is involved in the process through the
accreditation associations to which a majority of colleges
and universities belong. Each institution pays an appli-
cation fee and thereafter an annual affiliation fee. It
becomes obvious then, that the private colleges receive
some benefits from associating with and belonging to a cor-
poration which includes the resources of state colleges and
universities. 89 The same has been said of athletic associ-
ations, such as the National Collegiate Athletic Association
which is comprised of public and private colleges and
universities
.
9 0
89 See, e.g.. New England Association of Schools and
Colleges, Inc., Amended Set of By-laws Approved at the
Annual Meeting of the Corporation, December 13, 1974.
90 The large majority of which are public institutions.
Every college pays acceptance and annual fees. Also, member
institutions share resources, such as playing fields when
competing with each other. Rules for the conduct of athletics
and colleges are established by the association.
In several cases, the N.C.A.A. has been held to be
performing state action when it enforced its rules and regu-
lations (Parish v. N.C.A.A. , 361 F. Supp. 1220 [W.D. La. 1973]).
Althoucrh this does not mean that individual members can
said to be performing state actions, it does demonstrate
th
private colleges and universities are stiH further invove
Sith the state. By itself, it probably not he
suffi
cient for showing significant involvement with the
state, but
it is just another indicia of how many ways private colleges
and the state are entwined to the mutual benefi
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Another indicia to consider in this area are cooperative
programs between private colleges and neighboring state insti-
tutions . 91 Usually these programs involve sharing facilities,
transferring credit and teaching.
Doesn't a program of this sort benefit the private
college? This involvement would certainly not constitute
sufficient state entwinement; but if it were another indicia
considered by the court, perhaps it would be the "final spoke
in the wheel" to create the significant involvement of the
state with a private college or university. Perhaps the
courts would consider them insufficient, but one wonders why
they have not been presented.
Not one of these factors alone imply sufficient entwine-
ment with the state or one of its agencies. However, they are
indications of involvement and benefit between the state and
private college or university.
These indicia would not have mattered to Judge Skelley
Wright. For his decision in Guillory ventured further than
any federal judge in the area of state action and private
education.
Clearly, the administrators of a private college are
performing a public function. They do the work of the
state often in the place of the state. Does it not
follow that they stand in the state's shoes? And, if
91 The cooperative program in the Pioneer Valley among
the five colleges—Amherst, Holyoke, Smith, Hampshire and
the University of Massachusettsr“is but one example.
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so, are they not then agents of the state, subject tothe constitutional restraints on governmental action.
Almost no judge, however, has been willing to accept Judge
Wright's view in this matter.
Part II
Rationales For and Against Applying
Constitutional Standards
In order to understand the significance and complexity
of the problem, it will be necessary to examine the major
rationales for and against applying constitutional standards
to the relationship between students and private colleges
and universities. This section will first explore four
rationales for applying constitutional standards; and, second,
it will explore rationales for not applying them. The value
of private education and the application of constitutional
principles to it will also be presented in the context of
developing the argument for and against their application.
9 2 Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University of
Louisiana, supra note 3 at 858. Perhaps somewhere between
the Powe and Guillory reasonings, the courts will settle on
a definitive rationale for applying state action to private
colleges and universities. It is hard to sustain a position
such as Powe, which would allow a state to contribute almost
all the revenue of a private college and as long as it was
not directly involved with the "activity that caused the
complaint',1 there would be no finding of state action. Like-
wise, to sustain Guillory would require a finding of state
action in every case.
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Rationales for applying constitutional standards
.
This section will outline several major arguments for
applying the state action concept to private colleges:
Control or sponsorship of unique educational programs; the
university as a "company town"; government supervision
and regulation; and the public purpose of higher education.
%
1. Control or sponsorship of unique educational
programs . In most instances, students have the choice of
attending public or private institutions for their education.
In some states, however, a particular course of study or
specialized degree can be pursued only at a private college.
For example, a student in Massachusetts who wants to study
law without leaving the state, has a wide choice of good
schools—Harvard, Boston College, Boston University, North-
eastern, Suffolk, Portia and Western New England—but they
are all private. Although no state is constitutionally
required to furnish specialized graduate education at the
public's expense, the study of law and its practice in the
state is essential to both the private and public sectors.
Therefore, the private colleges (having a monopoly on the
study of law granted because of state inaction) perform an
essential public function—providing the state with legal
scholars and practioners.
This private monopoly of an essential educational
program appears to be analogous to the relationship
of the
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political association in Terry v. Adams
.
9 3 In this case,
the Supreme Court had no difficulty in deciding that the
association was performing a public function and was thus
so entwined with the state as to constitute state action. 94
Another result of this situation, although not as
significant, is that students are effectively denied the
choice of attending a college or university at which consti-
tutional standards are practiced. There have been some
cases that suggest that beneficiaries of such a monopoly
9 3 345 U.S. 461 (1953) .
94 See Chapter IV, p.119. Also consider: William 0.
Douglas, "Should not the Corporate Giants be Considered as
'States'? Is it not Naive to Think of Them as 'Persons'?"
Douglas Book Review, The New York Times Book Review , (October
22, 1961), p. 3.
As a beginning, we can set out the following propo-
sitions: (1) The Constitution was framed on the theory
that limitations should exist on the formal exercise of
power in government but not on power exercised unof-
ficially. (2) The essential problem of individual
liberty, however, is one of freedom from arbitrary re-
straints and restrictions, wherever and however imposed.
(3) The Constitution should be so construed as to apply
to arbitrary applications of power against individuals
by centers of private government. (4) The main flow of
group decisions in the [academic] community would not be
thrown into litigation or controversy by such consti-
tutional construction, but only those which directly
and substantially affect an individual. (5) It would
take only a slight modification of present constitutiona
doctrine to effect such a constitutional construction.
i
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are themselves subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. 95
2. College as a "company town". All colleges and
universities exercise some control over the lives of their
students whether they are public or private. However,
public institutions are limited by constitutional restraints
and some private universities exercise limited control over
%
the lives of their students. Students attending schools in
the major metropolitan areas are hardly dependent on the
institution for their entertainment, recreation or social
life. But what about the students attending private colleges
in rural and out-of-the-way places? Institutions which are
isolated in this way do exercise a quasi-governmental power
over the lives and activities of all members of the academic
community. 9 6
A number of private colleges require students to eat,
play, and live on the college campus. Many private insti-
tutions have their own security forces, power plant and
provide housing for both students and faculty. Some of
95 For an interesting discussion on the importance of a
monopoly control over certain educational opportunities to
the state action question, see William Van Alstyne and Robert
Karst, "State Action," 14 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 32-36 (1961). See
also: Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Ass
1 n
,
413 F. 2d
826 (4th Cir. 1969); Grusnan v. Newcomp Hospital , 172 A. 2d
817 (1963) , hospital associations considered acting under
color of state law because of public function and
"governmental
aid and support—through cash payments, donations or loans
°
buildings, special tax exemptions, or some combination of
these ingredients."
9 6 Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 187.
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these colleges promulgate curfew regulations, and forbid
certain activities (such as card playing and certain displays
of affection) not otherwise restricted . 9
7
There are also instances where a whole community may
be economically and culturally dependent upon a private col-
lege or university. Stanford has been considered a classic
example
:
It is not merely a comprehensive and diverse univer-
sity, with a full program of facilities and activities
for its members; it is quite literally a governmental
unit. Even more clearly than the company town in Marsh
v. Alabama
,
Stanford exercises municipal powers. In
addition to a campus security force (which most colleges
and universities possess today), the town of Stanford,
California, has its own fire department, power plant
and for what it may be worth. Zip Code. Many members
of the Stanford faculty lease housing from the Univer-
sity and thus live under the governance of the body
that also employs them. What more could be needed to
make Stanford as much a town as Chickasaw, Alabama ?
38
Clearly, all private colleges and universities do not
control the lives of their students as much as Stanford. But
here is a private university that allegedly has "all the
characteristics of any other American town ."
99 The Supreme
Court found that a company town which provided the same
functions as any other town was so entwined with the state
to constitute state action.
9 7 See
Delaware
.
the student catalog for Wesley College, Dover,
The author also received first hand experience
at this institution.
"Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 188.
"Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
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People living in company-owned towns are free
citizens of their state and country first, as residents
of municipalities. And there is no more reason fordepriving them of liberties guaranteed by the 1st and
14th Amendments than there is for curtailing these
freedoms with respect to any other citizens. 100
A college is a unique establishment in our society.
Here, there are people living and working together in a
common cause—education. In many instances, the college is
self“Sustaining. Students and faculty need not leave the
campus, for everything they need is provided. Therefore,
there is little difference between some private colleges
and company towns
.
Furthermore, the reason for joining together is the
common goal of education, whether to learn, research or
teach. So, here is a "town" of people whose whole purpose
for being is concerned with a public interest—education. 101
3. Government supervision and regulation . State
involvement with private colleges and universities is
reflected by state supervision and control over the affairs
of private colleges in two ways: through legislative
charter and by authorizing the granting of degrees.
In some cases, the private college is chartered by
a special act of the legislature which includes a specific
1 0 0 Id. at 508.
101 It should be noted that today most students entering
college are of legal age. This was not the case when
several courts rejected the "company town, public function
theory. See, e.g., Powe v. Miles , 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
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delegation of legislative powers. The Charter of Dartmouth
College grants the institution authority to "make and
establish such Ordinances, Orders and Laws as may tend to
the good and wholesome government of said College and all
the students." 102
The Charter of Yale University grants the college
... to make, ordain and establish all such wholesome
and reasonable Laws, Rules, Ordinances, not Repugnant
to the public laws as they shall think fit and proper
for . . . Ordering, Governing, Ruling and Managing the
said College
. . . which shall be laid before this
[state] Assembly as often as Required or Disallowed
by this Assembly when they shall think proper. 103
Here, the state has granted the authority of governing
students to a private college. Does this not represent the
delegation of state power to a private institution? By the
delegation of this power, is not the private college, when
it disciplines its students, acting "under color of state
law"? Furthermore, because the charter granted allows the
state the option of reviewing and repealing any "laws, rules,
ordinances," of the college, the state is required to ensure
that the college's rules are consistent with public law.
It appears that Connecticut has established a relationship
with Yale which makes it responsible for all the rules and
power
Edwi
Ame:
Co., Inc. , 1974) , p. 185.
1 0 3 Id. at 591-92.
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regulations of the college. Since a state may not partici-
pate in actions which it is constitutionally forbidden from
doing, it can be argued that Connecticut has created a
relationship which demands it take affirmative actions in
requiring constitutional compliance. 104
States also supervise or control private colleges in
less direct, but no less important, ways. The awarding of
degrees is a principal power conferred to private colleges
by states which maintain control by establishing requirements
to be met, determining qualifications of teachers, and
reviewing of new degree programs. 105
Professor Martin Levine considers a different aspect
of the authority of private colleges granting degrees:
Colleges are among the few institutions in our
society whose function is the award of new statuses--
degrees. . . . Though the status of degree recipient
is or can be awarded by a "private" school"—with all
the rights, privileges, and immunities thereunto
appertaining"—the status is recognized by the state
for such purposes as qualifications for professional
licensing and civil service requirements. 106
1 0 4 The failure of a state government to act can only be
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Chapter IV,
State Action, pp. 112-20.
However, it should be noted that no case to date has
substantively considered all of the "language contained in
these charters. Perhaps it is the fear that in finding state
action in education, they would be forced to find state action
in every case where the state has granted charters of incor-
poration. Most courts have not been willing to find state
action when the only involvement the state has with a univer
sity is its charter.
105 Robert M. O’Neil, supra note 13 at 185.
1
0
6Martin Levine, "Private Government on the Campus:
Judicial Review of University Expulsions," (Notes and Comments)
72 Yale L.J. 1362, 1384 (1963).
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This presents another picture of state involvement
and investment in higher education. The fact that it super-
vises and establishes degree requirements, and then considers
and utilizes those people who acquire the degrees, demonstrates
the public function a private college plays in providing the
education necessary for the acquisition of a college degree.
Once source of authority for allowing states to
regulate private colleges and to require them to comport to
the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment may be Pierce
v. Society of Sisters
.
1 0 7 The Supreme Court held that it was
beyond the power of the state to compel all children to
attend public schools. However, the Court did not prohibit
the state from regulating private schools.
No question is raised concerning the power of the
state reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect,
supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils
to require that all children of proper age attend some
school, that teachers shall be of good moral character
and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly
essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be“aught which is manifestly
- inimical to the
public welfare . 1 0 8 (Italics mine.)
By allowing states to regulate private education and
require certain studies "essential to good citizenship" and
to ensure that "nothing be taught which is inimical to the
public welfare," the Supreme Court has created a door whereby
states could require that every private college adhere to
the same constitutional standards operating at public
1 07 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
.
1 0 8 Id. at 534
.
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colleges. Interpreting the wording of the term "taught"
to encompass behavior and practices present on a college
campus, could include disciplinary procedures. Is it in
the interest of a democratic society to have adults unfa-
miliar with its practices of fair play and justice? A
state could maintain that a college, in order to develop
"good citizenship," practice those principles and qualities
found in a democratic society—those principles and qual-
ities embodied in the Constitution and Bill of Rights. 109
In sum, the power of a college to grant or withhold
academic degrees is significant. This power is also the
cause for extensive state regulation and supervision of
education which "underscores the essentially governmental
character of the degree-granting institution." 110
4. The public purpose of higher education . Chief
Justice John Marshall believed that private colleges like
Dartmouth "do not fill the place, which would otherwise be
occupied by government, but that which would otherwise
remain vacant." 111 That may have been the case in 1819, but
the opposite seems true today. Higher education is osten-
sibly a public or governmental responsibility, which private
colleges and universities share and supplement in vital ways.
109 The aspect of education in a democracy and the hidden
curriculum will be developed in more detail later in this
chapter
.
1
1
°Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 181.
1 trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward , 17 U.S. (4
Wheat. 1 518, 647 (1819)
.
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Public colleges and universities are numerically
dominant today
,
and roughly two out of every three students
are enrolled at a public college or university. 112 The
states have assumed an impressive role in all aspects of
education. Most states have now recognized the importance
of higher education as well as the established need of
elementary and secondary education. The New York Regents
has expressed this importance in the state's plan for
higher education:
College attendance and a college degree are neces-
sary today as high school attendance and a high school
diploma were in the past. The economic, social and
cultural forces in our society are all pushing in that
direction. 1 1
3
1 1 2 Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 187.
1 1
3
Regents of the University of the State of New York,
The Regents Statewide Plan for the Expansion and Development
of Higher Education , (New York: Regents of the University of
the State of New York, 1964), p. 9.
Although applying to public secondary education, the
importance of education was illuminated in the landmark
decision of Brown v. Board of Education , 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954):
Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments . . . the great
expenditures for education . . . demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today, it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values. ... In these
days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the oppor
tunity of an education.
Professor Martin Levine suggests that the category
"governmental function" properly includes ''^tivities of
kind which are regular and substantial
. |t .
operation." The reasoning is that were the pnva
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The value of a college education and degree can be
measured in different ways. An average college graduate
will in his lifetime earn approximately $150,000 more than
a person not receiving such a degree. 114 As Professors
Jencks and Riesman have observed:
The bulk of the American intelligensia now depends
on universities for a livelihood and virtually every
would-be member of the upper middle class thinks
he needs some university's imprimatur, at least in
the form of a B . A . and preferably in the form of a
graduate professional degree as well. 115
Although few courts have accepted the public function
theory of private higher education, it is interesting to note
enterprises to shut down, the government would have to take
their place. Thus, it is concluded, the private enterprises
are performing a function in the place of the government.
Under such an analysis, education and justice—the two chief
activities of state and local governments—would be the
"governmental functions" par excellence , and justice on campus
would be a "governmental function" and therefore subject to
constitutional requirements. (Martin Levine, supra note 106
at 1385.)
1 1 4 Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 178.
1 1
5
Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, "Where Graduate
Schools Fail," The Atlantic , (February 1968), p. 49.
A similar conclusion was reached by Jacques Barzon
when he commented:
.
In American society the college is the gateway to
good employment. Every year the figure goes up that
expresses the value of a college education in future
earnings. Banks publish it, parents daydream about it.
Depressed minorities view the college as the tunnel ou
of prison into economic freedom— it is the great
equa-
lizer, as Horace Mann once said of all education.
u
now nothing short of college is education. (Jacques
Barzon, The American University , [Calif.: Jossey Bas ,
Inc., 1968] , p. 212.)
'
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that another branch of the law has already accepted the
great importance of a college education. Upon the dis-
solution of a marriage, a court must decide whether or not
adequate provisions have been made in the settlement or
decree for the education of a minor child. At issue is
the extent of the father's duty to pay for higher educa-
tion. In the past, the position of most courts was that
adopted by the Supreme Court of Vermont in 1844. The court
held that a college education was not a "necessary" for
which the father was liable because "the mass of our citi-
zens pass through life without . . . [higher education]." 116
However, a number of recent cases simply assume that higher
education is indispensable for success and good citizenship,
that its inclusion within the support obligations of the
father are almost automatic. 117 It is interesting to note
that students have not raised this aspect of the importance
of higher education when seeking judicial review of college
actions depriving them of an education.
Arguments against applying constitutional standards .
The issue of applying the Fourteenth Amendment to private
colleges and universities in matters of student discipline
1 1
6
Middlebury College v. Chandler , 16 Vt. 683 (Vt. 1844)
.
117 Some cases which have held higher education as a legal
necessary dependent only on the financial status of the father
are: O'Berry v. O'Berry, 183 N.E.2d 539 (111. 1962); Mitchell^
v. MitcheTlT 166 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1960); and Pass v. Pass, 118
So. 2d 769'TMi. 1960). See also: Douglas R. Wrights , College
Education as a Legal Necessary," 18 Vand. L. Rev. 1400 (1965).
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has met with severe opposition from the private sector
.
118
They have accepted that a private college may be regulated
to some extent by the state, but these institutions maintain
that they are private entities, and the Fourteenth Amendment
only proscribes state action. Furthermore, they maintain
that discipline is an internal affair of the college and
%
that in any event the student has agreed to comport to all
the school's rules, regulations and procedures when he or
she enrolls. This includes the statement in most college
and university handbooks which states that a student may be
dismissed for any reason, without a hearing, when the insti-
tution believes it to be in its own best interest.
The major argument of private colleges is simply
that they are, indeed, private not public, and therefore not
bound by the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. As
private entities, they contend that the relationship between
the college and student should be based on the concepts of
contract, inherent authority and, to a lesser extent, iri Ioccd
parentis . 1 1
9
As the cases presented in chapters II and IV
illustrate, most courts have recognized these concepts as
controlling in the relationship between private colleges and
students and have been unwilling to apply the state action
concept to this relationship. They have rejected indicia
1 1
8
As indicated by the cases presented in the first
section
of this chapter.
119 These concepts are developed in Chapter II.
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for finding state action in private education, when many
courts with the same, or less, criteria have been willing
to find state action in areas other than education. 120 Why
have the courts been reluctant to apply the state action
concept to private educational institutions? The paramount
reason is the great fear held by private institutions and
>
persons sympathetic to their plight that the governmental
intrusion requiring them to comply with the requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment would not stop there. They
maintain that a domino effect would, in fact, occur, ulti-
mately destroying the private nature of these institutions. 1 ^ 1
The effect would be caused by the ever increasing encroachment
by the Congress, the Executive Branch and the courts. Thus,
by rejecting the state action concept, the courts are
1
2
0 See for example: Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ,
private company town performs a public function and, therefore,
its actions are considered to be those of the state; Simkins
v. Moses H, Cone Memorial Hospital , 323 F . 2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963), cert, denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), private hospital
received federal and state money, state contributed land and
buildings sufficient to warrant state action; Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296 (1966), services rendered by a park are municipal
in nature, and because state maintained facilities, regard ess
of ownership, the park is subject to the regiments of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In general, see also Chapter iv.
1 2
1
Henry Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the
Public-Private Pnumbra , (New Hampshire: Dartmouth College,
1969), pp^ example: The President's Panel on Non-Public
Education, Non-Public Education and the Public Good: Fina_
l
Report , (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
urrice,
1972 )T and Otto F. Kraushaar, Private Schools: From __
Puritans to the Present , (Bloomington, Indiana: The Phi
Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1976)
.
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guarding against a sequence of encroachments that could
possibly destroy the qualities of private colleges that
differentiate them from public institutions.
In order to understand the underlying rationale for
not applying the state action concept to private colleges,
it- will be necessary to explore the value and importance of
private colleges and universities. Alexis de Toqueville
noted in a famous passage, "Americans of all ages, all
conditions and all dispositions constantly form associ-
ations." 122 One purpose of forming associations, he
explained, was "to found establishments for education" which
in turn lead to the founding of schools and colleges. The
significance of associations, de Toqueville believed, was
if its creation "be proposed to advance some truth, or to
foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example,
they form a society." 123 De Toqueville maintained that the
uniqueness and quality of American democracy was in the
ability and desire of the American people to form associ-
ations to achieve certain common goals or aspirations.
That these associations reflect the diversity of the American
people is no happenstance. One of the best examples of the
"phenomenon" is the private college or university.
122Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America , edited by
Richard D. Heffner (New York: New American Library, 1956), p.
206.
12 3 Id. at 129.
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Briefly, the first colleges in this country were
established by private individuals or groups. Although, as
illustrated earlier, the distinction between public and
private was not very apparent in the early stages of this
country, public government did little to promote education. 1214
As Chief Justice Marshall pronounced in the famous Dartmouth
College case, private institutions like colleges and univer-
sities "do not fill the place which would otherwise be
occupied by government, but that which would otherwise remain
vacant.
"
1 2 5
The impetus for founding colleges rested with private
groups and individuals. These people were usually affiliated
with particular religious sects, and the college's main func-
tion was to perpetuate the ideals, beliefs, and customs of
the particular religious orientation. Academic pursuits
were also of import, but they were considered as tools for
acquiring the necessary abilities for ensuring the continued
viability of the religious order.
Today, however, most private colleges, although
technically affiliated with a church, are nonsectarian m
nature. Their purpose is to provide an alternative
educational
1 2 4 See Chapter IV. For an interesting indepth
discourse
on education for the colonial period and beyond,
see: Lawrence
l. Cremin , African Education: The Colonial E
xperrence-ISOT^
1783, (New York: harper & Row, iy/0).
nf Dartmouth College v. Woodward , 17 U.S.
(4 WheIt!rll87WTI^Wr-Ali^¥ee Chapter IV.
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experience to that offered by public institutions. 126
In general, this is the importance of a college's
being private. Our society is in many respects uniquely
diverse. As such, there are many different philosophies
as to what education is and should be. Private colleges,
as autonomous institutions, are free in theory at least, to
be as imaginative and experimental or as traditional or
eccentric as they please. 127
The Dartmouth College case upheld the right of a
private college to remain private. It forbid the state from
"taking over" the governance of the institution. Although
the public system of education is well established, and
today the overwhelming majority of students attend public
colleges and universities, people have the right to choose
whether they want a public or private education.
In a case dealing with secondary education, the Supreme
Court declared it beyond the "general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only." 128 This, Justice McReynolds
stated, was based on "the fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose. . . .
1,1 29
126 0tto F. Kraushaar, supra note 121 at 45-52.
127 Id. at 45. In reality, of course, they are conditioned
by what is salable in the educational market.
128 Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 268 U.S. 510 535 (1925).
1 2 9 Ibid
.
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Thus, the court affirmed the right of private institutions
of education to exist
.
130
The constitutional right to form or attend private
schools is based on the implied right of association, liberty
and academic freedom. Justice Frankfurter poignantly
explained one practical reason for providing this right:
Great diversity of psychological and ethical
opinion exists among us concerning the best way to
train children for their place in society. Because
of these differences and because of reluctance to
permit a single, iron-cast system of education to be
imposed upon a nation compounded of so many strains, we
have held that even though public education is one of
our most cherished democratic institutions, the Bill
of Rights bars a state from compelling all children to
attend public schools . 131
To this end. New York's Heald Committee has recognized
that private institutions
. . .
give American education diversity and scope not
possible in tax-supported institutions alone, and they
130 See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), invali-
dating state statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign
languages to students in public or private schools; Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra note 125; Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U'lsT T05 (1972) , upheld right of Amish alterna-
tive to public education (upper secondary level) under com-
pulsory education laws; Farrington v. Tokushige , 273 U.S.
284 (1927), invalidated Hawaii act regulating content of
curriculum materials, teacher qualifications in private
In another case , although not directly concerned with
private colleges. Justice Douglas indicated that the First
Amendment encompassed "The right to educate a child in a
school of the parents' choice—whether public, pnvaiie o
n^rnnhiral." (Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479,
U965) reversed eviction and overturned statute which
declared it illegal to give out birth control materials.
1
3
^inersville School District v. Gobitis , 310 U.S 586
599 (1940) , upheld mandatory flag salute of public
school
students
.
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have an opportunity to emphasize, if they wish, indi-
vidualistic patterns of thought, courses of social
action, or political or religious activity. 132
Judge Friendly has suggested that the importance of
a college being private is in "the very possibility of doing
something different than government can do, of creating an
institution free to make choices government cannot." 133
Another aspect which highlights the importance of
having private colleges, is the view of what public education
is all about. John Stuart Mill argued that public education
. . . is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be
exactly like one another: and as the mould in which
it casts them is that which pleases the predominant
power in the government, whether this be a monarch,
a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the
132 Heald Committee, "Meeting the Increasing Demand for
Higher Education in New York State: A Report to the Governor
and the Board of Regents," 1960.
1 3
3
Henry Friendly, supra note 121 at 30.
Jencks and Riesman think the reasons for people
choosing private colleges may simply be social: Parents may
know, for example, that the faculty at the University of
Colorado is better than at the University of Denver, and may
nonetheless prefer Denver on the grounds that their daughters
will be less likely to marry the wrong man at Denver , or
that their sons are more likely to make friends who will be
useful in later life. Christopher Jencks and David Riesman,
The Academic Revolution, (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
1968) , p. 287. . _ , , ,
Although this may seem like a trite reason, it should
still be the choice of the parent and/or student. What may
seem insignificant to one person may be very important to
another.
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existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient
and successful, it establishes a despotism over the
mind
. . . .
1 3 4
Thus, private colleges and universities provide higher
education with a diversity and scope not possible in public
institutions. Because there is no one idea of education,
private schools enable people to have a choice in how and
%
what they wish to learn, live and associate— in ways not
always similar to that provided in public colleges.
The fear that the application of the state action
concept could lead to the destruction of private education
must be balanced with the significant questions: What
benefits may be gained by applying constitutional standards
to the student/college relationship? Would the benefits
134 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty , (London: John W. Parker
& Son, Ltd., 1859), pp. 190-91.
For an interesting and persuasive article on the entire
question of government regulation and control of education
and parent and child rights (through an examination of Pierce
and related cases) see: Steve Arons, "The Separation of
School and State: Pierce Reconsidered," Harvard Educational
Review 46 (February 1976)
:
76-104.
And as Desraeli proclaimed:
If I were asked, "would you have Oxford with its
self-government, freedom and independence, but yet with
its anomalies and imperfections, or would you have the
University free of those anomalies and imperfections,
and under the control of the Government?" I would say,
"Give me Oxford free and independent, with all i s
anomalies and imperfections." (Henry Friendly, supra
note 121 at 40, in footnote Judge Friendly quotes
Desraeli .
)
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be better than the possible loss of autonomy? 135
1. Risk. if all the rights guaranteed public college
students were provided to those attending private insti-
tutions, their autonomy would indeed be threatened. For
example, one recognized conflict could involve the rights
of students to organize clubs or associations
—a right well
established in public colleges and universities. However,
should a private institution such as Yeshiva University
be compelled to recognize a Nazi youth group? Catholic
University, a chapter of the Klu Klux Klan? or Brigham
Young University a chapter of Gay Liberation? Besides the
obvious conflict inherent in these examples—the autonomy
of the institution and the aspect of having to recognize
a group it in principle abhores— is the very real problem
of alumni support. It seems reasonable to believe that
alumni would withhold support if their college were to begin
recognizing groups that they disdained. The consequence of
this action for the private college does not need elaboration.
Another recognized conflict could be in the area of
student expression. If a college promulgated rules
requiring a certain mode of dress and hair style because
135 It should be noted that the question of applying the
concept of equal protection has been basically decided by
the federal government in relation to both sex and race.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial
discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance, and Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination in any educational
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
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it believed it to be morally and pedagogically sound, could
students disregard the requirements because they violated
their rights to freedom of expression?
Limiting risk
. It is apparent that applying all
the constitutional restraints to private colleges raises
major concerns that must not be considered lightly. However,
what benefits and risks would there be in applying the
Fourteenth Amendment standards of due process to the student/
college relationship? Would the benefits be greater than the
possible loss of autonomy? Simply, the question is whether
or not private colleges are less able than public colleges
to afford their students fair hearings? 136
Professor Arons, a strong advocate of less government
involvement and more private autonomy, does indicate that
there may be some circumstances when the state may regulate
private schools.
1 3 6 In 1887, for example, a Pennsylvania trial court reviewed
the decision of a private college to suspend a student for
infraction of its rules. The court found no threat to
institutional autonomy in the inquiry there undertaken. The
court was also unconcerned about the prospect of a wave of
litigation invited by its decision:
Nor, if such a practice were adopted (judicial review
of disciplinary proceedings), would it have any tendency
to limit the patronage of the colleges and universities.
Offenses, for the commission of which sentences of
dismissal may be affixed, are not so frequent that it
will impose any great hardship upon facilities to duly
inquire into the guilt of the accused, nor will their
action be so often questioned as to entail any consider
able additional burdens on the court. (Commonwealth ex.
rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 77, 78 (1887).
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A state that seeks to impose any substantialburden upon First Amendment rights must demonstrate
a compelling interest for doing so. Therefore, astate that seeks to regulate private schooling mustshow either that the regulation affects only theincidents of schooling ... or that there is an over-
riding justification for the regulation. It might,in some circumstances, be able to produce such ajustification. 1
3
'
The concepts of fairness and justice embodied in the
\
Fourteenth Amendment and which are now applied to public
colleges would not, in the author's opinion, destroy the
necessary autonomy of private colleges and universities.
Requiring these colleges to provide notice and a hearing
to students accused of breaching regulations that could lead
to suspension or expulsion would not interfere with the
unique features and academic integrity of private education.
The institution could still have any reasonable rules or
regulations; but, if a student is suspected of violating the
rules, he or she would have to be afforded due process.
Although affording due process may add some administrative
costs and inconvenience to the institution, they would be
minimal. Due process only requires that the students be
given written notice of the specific charges against them,
the time and place of the hearing, evidence which will be
presented against them, and the possible action to be taken
if the charges are supported. The notice should be provided
to the students in enough time to allow them to prepare a
137 Steven Arons, supra note 134 at 103.
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proper defense before the hearing. The hearing should
provide the students an opportunity to present their defense
and present witnesses in support of their case. If the
hearing is not before the highest administrative authority,
he or she should be allowed to appeal the decision to that
authority. The hearing is not considered to be criminal
in nature and, therefore, it would not entail all the raiments
of an adversary proceeding. It should simply be a fair and
ample opportunity for both sides to present the facts of
the case
.
1 3 0
What would be the benefits of applying these consti-
tutional standards to the private student/college relation-
ship? Could these benefits rise to the compelling interest
rationale? In order to answer these questions, it will be
necessary to examine the educational justifications for
applying the Constitution to private colleges and universities.
The importance of applying constitutional principles
to the student/college relationship . Since the inception
of American democracy, education has been regarded as the
cornerstone of society. Professor Arval A. Morris succinctly
explains the importance of education:
A citizen's willingness and ability to participate
effectively in the social, civil and political life of i3g
the United States is uniquely dependent upon education.
138 See Chapter III, pp. 36-51.
1 3 9Arval A. Morris, The Constitution and American Education ,
American Casebook Series (Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1974), p. 113.
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Dr. Donald Cowling, once President of Carleton College,
recognized the importance of education, and in particular,
private colleges in education:
The American college, especially the separately
organized and privately supported college, is indige-
nous to the United States, and is one of the most
important agencies our country has developed for
preserving and making effective its basic social
and political philosophy
. . . that have led to the
American way of life. 40
The overall goal of higher education seems to be the
"development of sufficient mind and character" that will
enable a person to know how "to live and participate effec-
tively in American democracy. 141
This country is founded on a Constitution and Bill of
Rights which embody the social and political philosophies
of our society that Dr. Cowling describes as the "American
way of life." Yet, some of these institutions that profess
to be "one of the most important agencies" for preserving
and making effective this country's social and political
philosophy, do not incorporate the values inherent in our
democracy with their actions regarding students.
The previous chapters illustrated how private colleges
have suppressed unpopular ideas of students and suspended or
expelled them without providing a hearing. Basic to our
1
4
°Donald Cowling and C. Davidson, Colleges for Freedom ,
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. vii.
141 Arval A. Morris, supra note 138 at 114. Global state-
ments which reflect this premise can be found in almost all
college catalogs.
185
society are the concepts of justice and fairness. Although
these terms are not readily definable, and people have disa-
greed with their meaning, the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution has been an attempt to provide one meaning
these concepts. Fundamental to our society's sense
of justice is the notion that before someone can be punished,
they must at least be given the opportunity to be heard.
However, as Professor Warren Seavey eloquently
stated:
Our sense of justice should be outraged by denial to
students of the normal safeguards. ... It is shocking
that the officials of an educational institution, which
can function properly only if our freedoms are pre-
served, should not understand the elementary principles
of fair play. It is equally shocking to find that a
court supports them in denying to a student the pro-
tection given to a pickpocket. 142
The effect such practices can have on students has
been explored by the President's Commission on Higher
Education. The Commission found that:
Young people cannot be expected to develop a
firm allegiance to the democratic faith ... if
their campus life is carried on in an authoritarian
atmosphere
.
1 4 3
The Commission also explained the significance of
this problem.
142Warren A. Seavey, "Dismissal of Students: 'Due Process',"
70 Harv. L. Rev. , 1406, 1407 (1957).
1 4 3 Higher Education for American Democracy, A Report from
the President's Commissiorr~on Higher Education^ (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 14.
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,
To teach the meaning and the processes of democracythe college campus itself should be employed as alaboratory of the democratic way of life. ideas andideals, and the habit of cooperation in a common
enterprise can be gained most surely in practice.
this learning cannot take place in institutions
of higher education that are operated on authoritarianprinciples
.
1 4 4
The disparity between what is professed to be the
goals of private colleges and what is practiced therein is
a crucial issue facing our society today. The values inherent
in our democracy, reflected in the Bill of Rights, can only
be protected and preserved if they are practiced. R.
Freeman Butts reiterated the same point recently when he
noted:
The prime purpose of the
. . . schools is to
cultivate the political virtues that are appropriate
to constitutional self-government and that are re-
quired to achieve a society which stands for justice,
equality, and freedom in the modern world. 145
Although most private colleges offer courses and
extoll the meaning and processes of democracy, it is the
everyday operations of the institution that impact signifi-
cantly on the student:
The college is a major agent in promoting the person-
ality development of the young adult. Whether it
realizes it or not, the college has a major effect
upon the development of the whole personality for
the student. . . . Moreover, the young person becomes
what he becomes not only because of what he hears in
the classroom and not even mainly because of what he
hears in the classroom. His interaction with teachers.
144 Id . at 51.
14s R. Freeman Butts, Teachers College Record , as quoted
in "The Public Purpose is the Mam Purpose of the Public
Schools," Education Summary 26 (February 1974), p. 5.
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his encounter with the social structure of the colleq
administration
,
the atmosphere of flexibility or
rigidity which permeates the school environmenthave an immense, if not yet precisely measured,impact.
. . . The college cannot escape the factthat it does have such an impact.
. . .
146
e
This form of teaching (and learning) has been described
as the "hidden curriculum" or "hidden agenda." Students
learn not so much from their studies as from the patterns of
behavior that the organizational structure generates. Thus,
private colleges in their refusal to incorporate constitutional
standards to the relationship they have with students, under
the concept of autonomy, have "follow [ed] undemocratic courses
of action in the very name of democracy." 147
Consequently, "our schools are now educating millions
of students," said Alan Westin, Director of the Center for
Research and Education in American Liberties, "who are not
forming an allegiance to the democratic political system
because they do not experience such a democratic system in
their daily lives at school." 148
1 4 6 Report of the Committee on the Student in Higher
Education
,
(The Hazen Foundation: January 1968), p. 5-6.
1 4 7 Higher Education for American Democracy , supra note
143 at 12 . This has been true of many public colleges as
well. But, for the purposes of this study, only private
colleges are being examined in the context of applying the
minimal standards required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
140 From the Weston Report as reported in the New York
Times, (September 22, 1970), p. 25. In the same article.
Dr. John F. DeCecco, Professor of Psychology and Education
at San Francisco State, declares, "of all American institutions,
it is the one charged with the mission of teaching democracy
is usually perceived by the student as one that leaves him
powerless .
"
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One important outcome of the disparity between what
is professed and what is practiced at private colleges
may be reflected in a study conducted by the American
Council on Education. The Council reported that:
Private universities are most likely to have
violent or disruptive protests
. . .
[the study] said
that 34.4 percent of the private universities had
experienced violent protests, and 70.5 percent had
had disruptive protests. [In contrast], Public
universities had 13.1 percent experiencing violence
and 43 percent undergoing disruption. 149
Although there is no conclusive evidence indicating
the reason more disruptive and violent protests have taken
place at private colleges, one reason may be the lack of
constitutional standards of fairness and justice which could
work to defuse the need for "disruptive or violent actions."
It should also be noted that many private colleges have
not tolerated any form of protests whether peaceful or
disruptive. 150 In contrast, public colleges are required
to allow constitutionally protected assembly and speech.
The importance of private colleges embodying the
values inherent in the Bill of Rights is necessary if their
149 Ian E. McNett, "A.C.E.'s Studies of Protesters Stir
Faculty-Student Critics," Chronicle of Higher Education 3
(September 15, 1969), p. 8.
150 See the cases presented in Chapter II, IV, and in the
first section of this chapter.
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students are to reflect the ideals of a democratic society. 151
Conversely, if the graduates of these colleges have not
Part:i-c;*-Pated in a college atmosphere imbued with fairness
and justice, they will be less able to practice these values
in the society at large. 152
The Supreme Court, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters
,
153
did not question the right of a state to require "that
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must
151 The necessity of private (as well as public) colleges
adopting the principles embodied in the Bill of Rights is
illustrated by the lack of understanding of basic democratic
principles by students, faculty, and administrators in secon-
dary schools. See, e.g., studies that examined understanding
of basic rights: J. Pock, Attitudes Toward Civil Liberties
Among High School Seniors, Cooperative Research Report
(Project #5-8167)
,
United States Office of Education, 1967;
Ronald A. Gerlach and Lunne W. Lamprecht, Teaching About
the Law
,
(Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co., 1975); J. Weiser
and J. Hayes, "Democratic Attitudes of Teachers and Prospec-
tive Teachers," Phi Delta Kappan 47, (May 1966); The Danforth
and Ford Foundations, The School and the Democratic Environ-
ment
,
(New York: Columbia U. Press, 1970); Civil Education
for the Seventies: An Alternative to Repression and Revolution ,
Final Report (Project #8-0457)
,
(New York: Columbia U. Press,
October 1970) .
152 In an interesting study, E.H. Erikson suggested that
the schools of Germany which were organized on the basis of
an authoritarian, autocratic model, produced the kind of
authoritarian child training that made possible the political
organization of Nazism. Because of the controversial nature
of the study, it is presented herein as merely a caution to
autocratic organizational behavior. E.H. Erikson, Childhood
and Society
,
(New York: Norton, Inc., 1955).
1 5 3 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)
.
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be taught and that nothing be taught which is manifestly
inimical to the public welfare."
If the definition of teaching is to include what is
taught by the "hidden curriculum," then a state could
conceivably require private colleges to comply with the
Fourteenth Amendment concerning student discipline. Would
t-bis meet the compelling interest rationale? If the preser-
vation of the democratic ideals of fairness and justice are
compelling, then this form of regulation might satisfy the
rationale. 1 5 4
Indeed, education isa public interest, and those
providing it are performing a vital public function. As
Judge Skelley Wright eloquently stated:
In a country dedicated to the creed that education
is the only "sure foundation ... of freedom without
which no republic can maintain itself in strength"
institutions of learning are not things of purely
private concern. . . . 155
154 As Henry Burch wrote:
Education is the bulwark of civilization. It is the
fundamental basis of democracy. Through it, society
secures the discipline and training needed for its
progressive development. In no other way can the social
inheritance of a people be transformed into sound na-
tional character. (Henry R. Burch, Problems of Democracy ,
(New York: The MacMillian Co., 1934), p. 543-4.
1 5 5Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University of
Louisiana, 203 F. Supp. 855, 858 (E.D. La. 1962).
Because the necessity for society to reflect the
values inherent in the Bill of Rights, the now retired Supreme
Court Justice William O'Douglas declared:
We need a spirit of liberty which extends beyond
what a court can supply, and which accepts in our.
daily lives and behavior the attitudes of toleration
of unorthodox opinions and respect of the dignity
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Although it is the author’s opinion that the impor-
tance of applying constitutional principles outweighs the
risks involved to private colleges, there are still those
who are concerned with its application and consequences.
1. Concern
. A typical concern of independent school
administrators was expressed by Dr. Otto Kraushaar when he
wrote:
It is imperative that much thought be given to theform and limits of state regulation of private schools,
lest the schools suddenly find themselves shackled by
hastily conceived regulations which would deprive them
of the freedom and diversity which are their raison
d'etre . 156
Many people contend that the very existence of private
schools would be threatened if the state became too involved
with the private institution. 157 Thus, compelling private
colleges to afford students the rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment would be perceived by many as a form
of governmental control that would lead to the demise of
private education.
and privacy of each human being, which our Bill of Rights
reflects. (William 0. Douglas, A Living Bill of Rights ,
(New York: The One-Nation Library Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith, 1968).
156 0tto F. Kraushaar, American Nonpublic Schools: Patterns
of Diversity
,
(Baltimore : John Hopkins University Press, 1972)
,
p. 315.
157 See Donald A. Erickson, Public Controls for Nonpublic
Schools, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)
.
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2
* ft-E°.-ssible consequence . 1
5
6 Despite the above
concerns about state control of private education, an
alternative consequence of state action in this field might
be the mutual benefit to both private colleges and their
students. If thoughtful consideration is given this
significant endeavor, the conclusion may in fact mean the
%
increased support of private colleges and universities.
However, if private schools were to continue the practice
of following undemocratic courses of action and maintaining
authoritarian and autocratic methods of control, most
students in such an atmosphere would tend to acquire those
same traits of characteristics. When the students left
this particular atmosphere, they would probably maintain
and operationalize this learned behavior. Conversely,
to teach the meaning and processes of democracy, the college
campus should be employed as a laboratory of the democratic
way of life. Only when ideas and ideals become dynamic are
they lived. "But this learning cannot take place in
150 It is recognized that one principal consequence of
affording students at private colleges constitutional rights
would be the necessity of informing college administrators
and faculty what these rights actually entail. It would be
highly unlikely that private college officials would be
familiar with the rights provided public school students.
The financial cost of teaching these officials about the
constitutional rights of students might not be small. But,
because of the public purpose and governmental requirement,
the financial burden should fall upon the state.
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institutions of higher education that are operated on
authoritarian principles." 159
Thus, graduates of this form of education lack the
ideas and ideals embodied in our Bill of Rights. Lacking
these values, would they protect the civil liberties of
others? Would they respect the concept of diversity?
Would they even appreciate the unique role of private edu-
cation in our society? It is doubtful that they would. 160
However, if a private college does practice the ideas and
ideals of democracy, thereby affording students the consti-
tutional standards of fairness and equity, wouldn't students
be more likely to defend such an institution? Furthermore,
having been educated in an atmosphere of fairness and justice,
wouldn't these students have a better understanding of the
values inherent in the Bill of Rights? Would it not, in
the long run, be to the benefit of private schools to afford
1 5 9 Higher Education for American Democracy , supra note 143
at 51
.
1
6
°See, H. H. Remmers and D. H. Radler, The American Teen-
ager, (New York: Bobbs Merril Co., Inc., 1957) ; and Philip
E. Jacob, Changing Values in College: An Explanatory Study
of the Impact of College Teaching, (New York: Harper & Bros,
1957TT These studies showed a lack of knowledge of the Bill
of Rights among teenagers and college students. A more
^
complex and detailed research study which explored students
application of principles found in the Bill of Rights, was
conducted by J. Pock. His study indicated that many students
approved of secret trials, search without justifiable cause,
excessive bail and the use of anonymous witnesses. J.
Pock, supra note 151.
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their students the constitutional standards guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment? When private institutions propose
and follow democratic principles upon which our social and
political systems rest, they would help ensure the preser-
vation of American democracy, which in turn protects their
own existence. For the private school's right to exist is
%
founded on those values inherent in the Bill of Rights
—
the right to association, academic freedom and privacy.
Summary
. This section has explored the legal and
educational arguments for and against applying the state action
concept to private colleges and universities. It was acknow-
ledged that the application of constitutional standards to
these institutions would involve certain risks to their auton-
omy. However, the importance of applying due process presents
the least risk to private schools; and, the benefits to the
students, institutions, and society far outweigh the costs
involved.
Although the courts have not been willing to apply the
state action concept to private education, a new evaluation
of the present state of the law is called for. The ever
increasing involvement of the government with private colleges
and universities and the increasing importance of higher
education for the individual and society demands that a new
look be taken. The next chapter will examine the various
methods for applying the constitutional standards of fairness
and justice to private colleges and universities.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
AND NEEDS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Introduction
This study has explored the complex and contro-
versial problems of applying the state action concept to
private higher education. Through a review of the litera-
ture of the educational and legal professions and by
analyzing case law, the relationship of students to private
and public colleges was developed. The issues and arguments
for and against the application of constitutional standards
to the relationship between private colleges and their
students were examined. The importance and value of private
colleges and of applying the principles of fairness and
justice, as well as the possible risks and benefits, were
also explored. This section will summarize the significant
points raised in the previous chapters. The author's con-
clusions and recommendations will then be presented. The
needs for further research will be examined and the possible
trend for the future highlighted.
Summary
In Chapter II, the background of the student/college
relationship was examined by studying the concepts of in
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loco parentis
, contract, and inherent authority. By uti-
lizing these legal doctrines, the courts have granted
schools wide discretionary powers. In their concern for
protecting the autonomy of colleges, they were unwilling
to impose their judgments upon the institutions.
The concept of in loco parentis
,
in general, allowed
school officials to act in the place of the parent. As
such, schools were acknowledged to have the authority to
regulate all areas of a student's life commensurate with
that of the parent in all matters pertaining to the function
of the school.
The student/college relationship was also viewed
as contractual. The contract theory assumes that the
student and college are parties to a contract. The school
advertizes and seeks students, thereby making an offer; and
the student, by registering, accepts. The student agrees
to pay tuition and other fees, and the college agrees to
provide instruction, and subsequently, a degree if the
student remains in good standing academically and abides
by the school's rules. This theory, as interpreted by the
courts, provided students with little protection. Colleges
were granted the power to dismiss students "at any time for
any reason" without having to explain their reasons. If
the college had such a clause in its catalog, most courts
considered it to be part of the contract which the students
agreed to when they registered. The contract theory
prevailed
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for well over one-hundred years without such a distinction.
In recent years, however, courts have drawn a distinction
between private and public colleges, maintaining that the
contract theory can apply to private schools, but must be
modified by constitutional considerations at public insti-
tutions .
The concept of inherent authority has also been
used to explain the student/college relationship. American
colleges and universities have a tradition of autonomy.
Courts have consistently held that educational institutions
have the inherent authority to maintain order and freedom
and to discipline students whose conduct is disruptive.
The foundation of this authority has been based on the long
standing custom of schools and on the statutory charter
grants to colleges. These charters empowered colleges to
promulgate regulations for "the necessary tone and standards
of behavior in a body of students" and in the power to
discipline "to protect itself and its property." The courts
have, however, pointed out that this authority is not
limitless. The university's rules and actions may not be
arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. Although the schools
were given broad discretionary powers in the past, the
courts
have modified the colleges' authority when it conflicts
with
a student's constitutional rights.
The concept of trust/fiduciary, although primarily
presented because of its
advanced in legal literature, was
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possible impact on the student/college relationship. The
fiduciary relationship is characterized by the special
relationship between two parties; if one party has reason
to repose confidence in the fidelity and integrity of
another, a fiduciary relation exists. Examples of this
relationship are; attorney/client, doctor/patient, and
husband/wife. No court has ruled on the applicability of
this theory to date. The concept could have a great impact
on private and public colleges. It would require these
institutions to treat students with the highest degree of
fairness and equity recognized by law.
In Chapter III, the constitutional rights of public
college students was examined by analyzing the leading cases
that have established and defined their rights to due process
of law, equal protection and freedom of expression. In
general, it was found that students enrolled in state colleges
and universities are constitutionally guaranteed the right
to notice and a hearing prior to suspension or expulsion by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The students
should be given written notice of the specific charges
against them, the time and place of the hearing, evidence
which will be presented, and the possible action to be
taken if the charges are supported. The hearing should
provide the students an opportunity to present their defense
and witnesses in support of their case. There is no
general
requirement that students be permitted to be represented
by
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counsel. Only in unusual cases where the university proceeds
through counsel must the students be permitted representation.
The hearing is not considered to be criminal in nature, and
therefore, the student is not entitled to all the raiments
of an adversary proceeding. The hearing should simply be
fair and provide ample opportunity for both sides to present
their case.
The student's right to equal protection of the laws
was examined through the case law related to race and sex
discrimination. Racial discrimination was studied by
analyzing the evolutionary process of the law from the
concept of "separate but equal" to the principle that separ-
ate is inherently unequal. Today, unless a state has a
compelling interest in a racial classification, it is pro-
hibited from discriminating on the basis of race. In a
similar evolutionary process, sex discrimination is slowly
being relinquished in this society. Although in many areas
the doctrine of "separate but equal" is permitted, classi-
fying persons on the basis of sex must be based on a "fair
and substantial relation" to the purpose of such classi-
fication. There must be some educational or other sound
rationale which supports the reason for the discrimination.
Today, sex discrimination does not rise to the compelling
interest test employed in racial discrimination cases. But,
it must be remembered that it has taken over two-hundred
years for redressing racial discrimination; and, the question
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of sexism has been a relatively recent legal development.
Regardless of the standards employed by the courts, students
at public colleges and universities are clearly entitled to
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause
.
The rights of students to freedom of expression has
been well established. The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Fourteenth Amendment to bring the actions of the state
under the restraints of the Bill of Rights. Whether the
expression be oral, symbolic, or written, the cases illus-
trated that students at state colleges and universities are
guaranteed the right to freedom of expression. As long as
the expression does not materially and substantially disrupt
school work or discipline, or infringe upon the rights of
others, the expression is protected by the Constitution. A
school may reasonably regulate the time, place, and manner
of expression and its distribution; but a public college may
not shut off the dissemination of ideas "in the name alone
of conventions of decency."
In Chapter IV, the rights of students enrolled in
private colleges was examined by analyzing the present case
law. It was found that these students do not enjoy the same
rights as public college students. Because the college
is
considered private, the Constitution does not apply to
the
student/college relationship. The cases illustrated that
the relationship of a private school to its
students was
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primarily contractual. As such, the institutions are not
required to provide students with due process or freedom
of expression. 1 Today, these students can be suspended
or expelled without being afforded notice or a hearing.
Next, the general history of private and public col-
leges was explored to examine the distinction between these
institutions. It was found that the colonial college was
considered neither public nor private in the modern sense.
Although managed by private persons, it was seen as a public
trust subject to state regulation. Its activities and sol-
vency were viewed as public rather than private questions.
However, the landmark decision in the Dartmouth College case
perceived a difference between "a civil institution to be
employed in administration of government and a private
eleemosynary institution." The Court rejected the claim by
New Hampshire that the college was performing a public
purpose and, therefore, should be considered a public cor-
poration. The rejection may have been based on the Court's
observation that higher education was essentially a private
activity which might occasionally be supplemented by the
public sector. Thus, by holding that institutions privately
x The issue of equal protection has basically been
resolved by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Together,
these laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race,
color, national origin, or sex, in any educational program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
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established to conduct higher learning are to be considered
corporations, the Court effectively removed them from the
constraints of the Constitution.
Today
,
both the state and federal governments are
once again becoming more involved with private education.
® , the question was raised as to whether a private
college's actions can become so entwined with the state
as to constitute state action.
Finally, the chapter examined the case law which
established and defined the state action concept. The Supreme
Court's landmark decision in the Burton case explained that
private conduct abridging individual rights does no violence
to the Fourteenth Amendment unless the state has signifi-
cantly become involved in it. Hence, private activity may
become so entwined with the state as to constitute state
action, thus coming under the purview of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Since private actions sometimes can be considered
state actions. Chapter V analyzes the cases involving
private higher education and the state action concept to
determine the present state of the law. Although the
Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this question,
several cases have been decided by federal and state courts.
It was found that most courts are unwilling to find state
action even when a number of indicia of state involvement
are present. However, a small number of courts have found
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state action present when the state has involved itself
with a college in numerous ways. For example, state action
has been found when the state provides substantial amounts
of financial assistance and supplies public buildings to
institutions. Two courts found state action present,
because the private college was considered to be performing
a public purpose.
The leading case in this field is Powe v. Miles
,
2
because it developed the "legal test" which many courts
have used to determine whether or not state action is present.
The Powe case held that state action may be found when the
state is significantly involved, not simply with some
activity of the college, bub with the activity alleged to
have violated the rights of the students.
In order to understand the significance and com-
plexity of the problem, Part II of this chapter explored
the major rationales for and against applying constitutional
standards to the relationship between students and private
colleges. The importance and value of private higher
education and the application of constitutional standards
were examined in the context of developing the argument for
and against their application. The rationales for applying
the state action concept included: (1) a private college may
control or sponsor unique educational programs not offered
at public institutions. (2) Private colleges may be compared
*407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
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to "company towns" because they perform quasi-governmental
functions. They can require students to eat, play, and live
on the campus. Some have their own security forces, power
plants, housing facilities and most of the characteristics
of an American town. The Supreme Court found a company
town that provided the same functions as any other town
so entwined with the state to constitute state action.
This rationale argues that there should be no legal dis-
tinction between a company town and a college campus, and
a finding of state action should follow because the college
is performing a public function. (3) If the government
supervises or regulates the activites of private
colleges, a finding of state action should follow. For example,
where it can be shown that the state has delegated authority
to colleges to maintain order, it is argued that the dele-
gation of this power makes the college act "under color of
state law" when it disciplines its students. (4) Because of
the importance of higher education to the individual and
American society, it is argued that education has become a
public purpose. As such, any institution providing higher
education is performing a public function, and thus, any
acts of the college should be considered state acts.
The major arguments against applying the state
action concept to private higher education are based on the
proposition that private colleges are private corporations,
and thus, not bound by constitutional standards. It is
205
contended that the relationship is one of contract; and as
such, if a student agrees to attend the institution, he or
she has agreed to follow any and all rules and regulations
of the college. The primary rationale for not applying a
constitutional standard is the belief that it would destroy
the autonomy and unique educational features of private
higher education. It has been argued that the application
of the Constitution to private colleges would have a domino
effect, and in no time private colleges would in reality
become no different from public schools. The risks involved
in applying constitutional standards were examined and it
was acknowledged that there was some risk in affording students
at private schools the same rights as those in public colleges.
But, there was little risk seen in applying the concept of
due process to private college students. In fact, the
benefits may far outweigh the risks and possible expenses
involved. The importance and benefits of applying the concept
of due process were presented in the context of the students,
institutions and society. In general, the practice of demo-
cratic principles upon which our social and political systems
rest will ensure the preservation and progress of American
democracy. Although the courts have not been willing to
apply the state action concept to private education, the
increasing involvement of the government with private higher
education and the increasing importance of higher education
for the individual and society demands that a new
lock be
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taken. The following section will examine the various methods
for applying the constitutional standards of fairness and
justice to private colleges and universities.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Private colleges and universities provide higher
education with a diversity and scope not possible in public
institutions. Because there is no one idea or philosophy
of education, private schools enable people to have a choice
in how and what they wish to learn, live and associate.
Private education can afford this in ways not possible in
public colleges. There has been much said about the fear
that applying the state action concept to private colleges
would destroy the autonomy, integrity, and the unique fea-
tures private higher education can provide. However, it is
questionable whether the fear that the application of
constitutional standards to these institutions will have
negative consequences is justified. Even if it is, these
negative effects must be balanced against the potential
benefits to the student and society.
It has been acknowledged that the application of all
the rights enjoyed by public college students to private
colleges could indeed threaten the special characteristics
of private education. For example, the right of the college
to express and practice its education and social philosophies
might be infringed upon if students were entitled to the same
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rights to expression as public college students. Or, if
a private college wished to promulgate rules concerning
student appearance (e.g., forbiding the wearing of long
hair because of social and educational reasons)
, students
accused of violating this rule could file suit alleging
that the school was violating their right to symbolic
sxp^sssion. Thus, the right of the college to express
its philosophy and the right of the student to symbolic
expression could be in conflict. If the student should
be afforded the right to expression in this case, the
college would have to surrender its social and pedagogical
beliefs. The consequence of this type of conflict does
raise serious concerns and its resolution must carefully
consider the effects on private education. However, there
would be relatively little risk if the constitutional
standards of due process were applied to private colleges.
The concepts of fairness and justice embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment, and which are now applied to
public colleges, would not in the author's opinion destroy
3 Although this form of expression is not a clearly estab-
lished right, some courts have held that it is a form of
symbolic expression protected by the First Amendment. See
for example: Zachry v. Brown , 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala.
1967 ) , the classification of male students by their hair-
style is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; Re ichen
berg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970), a student may
not be constitutionally barred from admission to a state sup-
ported college if ban is based solely upon the length of his
hair. However, compare these cases with: King v. Saddlebacjc
,
Junior College, 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), a state college
regulation prescribing the length of a student s hair does
violence to the Constitution.
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or seriously threaten the necessary autonomy of private
colleges and universities. Requiring these institutions to
provide notice and a hearing to students accused of violating
regulations that could lead to suspension or expulsion would
not interfere with the unique attributes and academic integ-
rity of private higher education. The college could still
promulgate any reasonable rules or regulations it believed
were necessary. But, if a student were accused of violating
the rules, he or she would have to be afforded due process,
and, thus, could not be suspended or expelled without a
hearing. The hearing would provide a fair opportunity for
both sides to present their case; it would not be criminal
in nature, and it would not entail all the raiments of an
adversary proceeding.
Although requiring due process at private colleges
would add administrative costs and inconveniences, the
benefit of applying this constitutional principle far
outweighs the costs involved. This is because it is neces-
sary for private colleges to embody the values inherent in
the Bill of Rights if their students are to reflect the
ideals of a democratic society. The graduates of these
colleges should participate in a college atmosphere imbued
with fairness and justice if they are to manifest these
values in a society at large.
There are several possible approaches to secure the
constitutional standards of fairness and justice guaranteed
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by the Fourteenth Amendment for students enrolled in private
colleges and universities. The problem could be resolved
by: (1) State legislation; (2) federal legislation; (3)
the judicial process; and (4) the executive branch of the
federal government.
State legislation
. Private colleges may be
compelled to provide students the rights to due process by
state legislation. The state could require colleges who
receive any state financial assistance to afford the same
principles of due process that public college students
receive as a condition for obtaining the assistance. Further-
more, the Supreme Court did not question the right of the
state to require "that certain studies plainly essential to
good citizenship must be taught and that nothing be taught
which is inimical to the public welfare." 4 If the concept
"taught" as applied here were expanded to include what is
practiced by the college, it would present another avenue
for providing due process. Because our society is based
on the values inherent in the Bill of Rights, it could
be considered harmful to society if the concepts of justice
and fairness are not practiced by private colleges. Thus,
the state could require these colleges to provide due process
under its authority to prohibit anything taught that is
inimical to the public welfare. Surely, the teaching of
4 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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authoritarian and arbitrary principles should be considered
harmful when practiced by institutions that have been por-
trayed as important agencies for perceiving and making
effective our society's basic social and political philosophy. 5
Federal legislation
. A second avenue for applying
due process to students enrolled in private colleges is
^^^-ough federal legislation. Today, the federal government
prohibits race and sex discrimination in educational programs
or activities that receive federal financial assistance. The
same conditions could be legislated concerning due process.
Thus, students in educational programs or activities that
receive federal financial assistance would have to be afforded
the same constitutional standards of due process that public
college students enjoy.
3. The judicial process . A third avenue open for
applying the constitutional standards of fairness and justice
embodied in due process is by means of the judicial process.
Simply, if a private college was not affording students the
same rights of due process as those enrolled in public colleges,
the courts could review the complaint. Because of the com-
pelling interest society has for preserving and fostering its
democratic ideals, it would not be too difficult to interpret
the current "legal test" for state action so that the courts
5The expulsion of students without providing them reasons
for such expulsion is considered by the author to represent
arbitrary and authoritarian principles.
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could have jurisdiction. The application of the state action
concept utilizing the "public function/public interest"
theory would not be cause for courts to find every organi-
zation or corporation involved in state action. The peculiar
significance and importance of education in this society
would be the indicia needed for such a finding. Only those
corporations involved directly with higher education would
be affected, and then only to such an extent as to provide
the constitutional standards of due process to problems
concerning student discipline.
4 . The executive branch of the federal government
.
A possible fourth avenue for affording private college
students due process would be by executive action through
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Office
of Education. Because of the importance of applying the
concepts of justice and fairness to the private college/
student relationship, the Office of Education could encourage
private colleges to furnish their students the same rights to
due process that are enjoyed by public college students.
This could be accomplished by granting monies to private
colleges to study the effects of supplying their students
due process. This would have the threefold benefit of:
(1) Providing students enrolled in the participating colleges
the same safeguards as public college students; (2) developing
pertinent data on the actual effects of affording such rights;
and (3) initiating this process on a voluntary basis.
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In conclusion, it is important to students and society
that the constitutional principles of fairness and justice
are practiced in private colleges and universities. The
time has come for these institutions to realize the extent
of their power to influence a student's personality and to
take responsibility for the way this power is executed. if
the ideas and ideals of democracy are to be learned and
appreciated, the college should "be employed as a laboratory
of the democratic way of life." Although the application
the constitutional standards to private colleges
might involve certain risks to their autonomy, the importance
of applying due process presents the least risk to private
higher education; and, the benefits to the students, insti-
tutions and society far outweigh the costs involved.
Needs for Further Research
In addition to examining the case law and the legal
and educational arguments for and against applying consti-
tutional standards in student discipline cases, this study also
raises a number of questions which merit further research.
It would be useful if further research were directed
towards analyzing the future role of higher education in
general, and how it relates to democracy in particular.
Although the study touched upon legislative recourse for
redressing the disparities between the rights of students in
public and private colleges, an in-depth investigation
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relating to some of the many possible ramifications of
applying legislative mandates to private education would be
useful. Specifically
, the application of all the consti-
tutional standards applying to private colleges should be
analyzed. The benefits and risks of affording students
such rights to association, religion, and unreasonable
search and seizure should be examined. How the state
action concept should apply in a private college's extra
curricular activities and admmission's process should also
studied. In addition, a study of selected private
colleges that voluntarily provide one or more constitutional
rights to their students would be valuable. Similarly, a
comparison of private schools that do and do not provide
such rights would be instructive. It would also be useful to
tabulate and compare the attitudes of students, faculty,
administrators, and alumni at private colleges about due
process, freedom of expression or other constitutional
rights.
Whether or not there should be a difference between
secondary and higher education in terms of applying state
action to private schools would also be an interesting
and controversial inquiry. Although this study explored
applying the state action concept to private colleges in
matters concerning students, further research is also needed
in analyzing how the concept would apply to faculty at both
the secondary and higher education level.
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Of equal importance would be further study to determine
what effects, if any, private colleges have had on student
knowledge, attitudes, and behavior in relation to the demo-
cratic values embodied in the Bill of Rights. A comparison
with the effects public colleges have had on their students
would also be important.
The legal aspects of education is a field ripe with
different topics and problems for research. it is an area
that, by its very meaning, is impressed with a strong public
interest.
Trends for the Future
As Jencks and Riesman observed, the distinction between
a public and a private college, which became significant
after the Civil War, "seems once again to be losing some of
its importance." Nevertheless, courts have been reluctant
to negate the fundamental distinction that today precludes
private college students from enjoying the same constitutional
safeguards as those enrolled in public colleges. However, the
public interest is becoming compelling for affording such
students the constitutional standards of fairness and equity.
As our society becomes more complex and impersonal, the need
for the ideas and ideals of democracy will become greater.
It is hoped that colleges, which proclaim to be one
of the most important agenices our country has developed
for
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preserving our social and political philosophy" 6 begin
to practice those values they suggest they make most effec-
tive. Although many private institutions have not fostered
the ideas and ideals of democracy inherent in the Bill of
Rights, Justice Frankfurter explained why society must
tolerate this circumstance:
Great diversity of psychological and ethical opinion
exists among us concerning the best way to train childrenfor their place in society. Because of these differences
and because of reluctance to permit a single iron-cast
system of education to be imposed upon a nation com-
pounded of so many strains, we have held that even though
public education is one of our most cherished democratic
institutions, the Bill of Rights bars a state from com-
pelling all children to attend public schools. 7
The future of higher education in our society holds a
reaffirmation of the role and need of private institutions of
education. Although the state will continue to regulate and
control certain aspects of private education, society will
recognize that private schools
. .
.
give American education a diversity and scope not
possible in tax-supported institutions alone, and they
have an opportunity to emphasize, if they wish, individ-
ualistic patterns of thought, courses of social action,
or politics or religuous activity. 8
The private schools, however, should recognize their
responsibility in ensuring fairness and a sense of justice in
/
6 D . Cowling and C. Davidson, Colleges for Freedom , (New
York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. vii.
7Minersville School Dist . v. Gobitis , 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
8 Heald Committee, "Meeting the Increasing Demand for Higher
Education in New York State: A Report to the Governor and the
Board of Regents," 1960.
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their relationship with students. It would, of course, be to
the credit of all private schools if, in their tradition of
diversity and autonomy, they took the initiative to implement
the standards consonant with the values inherent in the Dill
of Rights— for in the long run it is the surest way to ensure
their future.
SELECTED
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